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Abstract
This thesis examines three topics in the political economy of global oil markets and the devel-
opment of resource-rich countries. The first chapter examines the effect of Saudi Arabia's crude
pricing policies on the political behavior of U.S. firms. Between 1991 and 2003, Saudi Aramco sold
its crude to U.S. refineries at a substantial discount relative to Asian refineries at a total cost of
approximately 8.5 billion dollars. Using variation in discount receipts across refineries over time,
I find that the discount rents were entirely captured by refiners as profits and were not passed
through to consumers in the form of lower retail gasoline prices. There is also evidence that the
discount policy affected refiners' political action. In particular, I find that discount receipts are
associated with an increase in refiners' overall political donations, and that other types of profit
shocks were not associated with changes in political giving. This suggests that the effect of the
discount was not simply a consequence of the increase in refining profits. Finally, I show that the
discount resulted in a reallocation of contributions toward members of congressional committees
that reviewed bills of interest to Saudi Arabia and away from those who received donations from
pro-Israel interest groups.
In the second chapter, I assess the impact of a nationalization quota policy in Saudi Arabia on
workers and private-sector firms. In the past two years, Saudi Arabia has dramatically extended its
active labor market policies in order to address the issue of growing youth unemployment and low
Saudi participation in the private sector workforce. This paper studies the 2011 introduction of the
Nitaqat program, which imposed a quota system for Saudi hiring at private firms. The analysis uses
a unique dataset from the Saudi Ministry of Labor on the full universe of Saudi private-sector firms
and exploits kinks in firm incentives generated by the program to examine the effects of this quota
policy on nationalization, firm size, and firm exit. I complement the regression kink results with
a differences-in-differences approach to estimate the overall effects of the program. The analysis
finds that the program succeeded in increasing native employment but also had significant negative
effects on firms. Program compliance rates were high, with firms increasing their Saudization rate
by 0.2 percentage points on average for every percentage point increase required by the quota.
Quota compliance was primarily accomplished by hiring Saudis, and Nitaqat was responsible for
the addition of an estimated 52,000 Saudi workers to the private sector workforce over the 16 month
period. There were also significant costs, however, and the program caused approximately 11,000
firms to shut down, raising exit rates by nearly 50%. Among surviving firms, the program decreased
total employment by 198,000 workers.
The third chapter investigates the direct effect of conflict-related supply disruptions on the
downstream U.S. oil industry. The security of petroleum supplies is a major issue in U.S. domestic
and foreign policy. Although conflict in oil-exporting countries affects the entire global downstream
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industry, supply disruptions may also have an additional effect on refiners who are dependent on
these crude streams. This study uses variation in the sources of oil supplies across refineries to
estimate the effect of conflict-related supply disruptions on refiner profits and local retail gasoline
prices. The analysis shows that while conflicts do cause supply interruptions, these shortfalls have
little effect on the refiners and markets exposed to these disruptions. On average, then, refineries
appear to adjust quickly to unexpected changes in their supplies without significant increases in
their input costs.
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Chapter 1
Do Foreign Gifts Buy Corporate
Political Action? Evidence from the
Saudi Crude Discount Program
1.1 Introduction
Political and economic concerns are fundamentally linked in the world petroleum market. Access
to a dependable oil supply is critical to economic and political stability, and these supplies are very
dependent on local political climates. Oil is used as a political tool by suppliers, and is a frequent
topic of diplomatic intervention. At the center of this is Saudi Aramco, the world's largest single
producer of crude oil and holder of 25 percent of global reserves. Because of its position as a global
swing producer, the economic and political drivers of its output decisions attract a great deal of
attention.
In addition to deciding how much to produce, however, Saudi Arabia also decides where to
sell its crude, a decision which receives much less attention but which is perhaps no less strategic.
From 1991 to 2003, Saudi Arabia maintained a position as the top supplier of foreign crude to
U.S. refiners in order to support its political alliance with the United States. Although oil is often
thought of as having one world price, Saudi Aramco supported this export strategy by selling the
same crude at different prices in different geographic markets. Maintaining the pricing differentials
I am extremely grateful to Michael Greenstone and Esther Duflo for their extensive feedback on this project.
I also thank Christopher Knittel, James Poterba, Jessica Leight, Laura Ralston, Horacio Larreguy, Joseph Shapiro
and Eliza Forsythe as well as seminar participants at MIT for their insightful questions and comments. The George
and Obie Shultz fund provided financial support to acquire the data for this project.
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required by its export targets appears to have been both politically strategic and quite expensive:
between 1991 and 2003, Saudi Arabia spent approximately 8.5 billion dollars selling discounted
crude to the United States. The per-barrel discount relative to the Asian price reached a high of
6.30 dollars, 30 percent of the U.S. crude price in 2001, and was worth 1.9 billion dollars that year
alone. In achieving its export target, Saudi Arabia therefore transferred substantial rents to the
U.S. oil industry in the form of discounted crude supplies. In addition to determining the total
value of this transfer through its export quotas and pricing policies, Saudi Arabia also controlled
how these rents were distributed within the United States; discounted crude was targeted at specific
refineries using highly restrictive sales contracts.
Despite the magnitude of this transfer, the Saudi crude discount program has received almost
no attention in the academic literature or in the popular press.1 The first task of this paper is to
document both the size of these rents and identify the refiners that received this gift. This paper
then evaluates the success of this allocation mechanism as a political tool by identifying where rents
accrued as a result of the policy and how these rents affected political action by discount recipients.
To do this, I first determine where rents were captured by estimating the effect of discounts on
refinery-owner profits and local gasoline prices. I then examine the effect of discount receipts on one
particular type of measurable corporate political action: contributions to congressional campaigns.
The analysis follows the money from the original oil shipment to the campaign funds of federal
politicians.
The empirical analysis relies on several key features of the market for Saudi crude in the United
States. All U.S. refiners pay the same official per-barrel price for Saudi crude each month, but
quantities differ both across refineries and within a single refinery from month to month. These
quantities are based on long-term contracts, but are subject to unilateral changes by Saudi Aramco
each month. This yields variation in the total value of the discount to each refinery, which in turn
creates variation in discount receipts across refining companies and in the geographical distribution
of discounted crude. Because of this, it is therefore possible to estimate the effect of the discount
on company-level outcomes (profits and political contributions) and market-level prices for refined
products.
There are several key results. First, I find that there was a great deal of heterogeneity in
the value of the discount received by different companies and significant geographical dispersion
'Despite considerable attention to Saudi Arabia's petroleum production and exports, The Quest - Daniel Yergin's
history of the world energy market post 1991 - never mentions this program.
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in the destination of Saudi crude. Despite their similar refining capacities, for example, refiners
Marathon and Tosco received very different amounts of Saudi crude: a total of 680 million barrels
were delivered to Marathon's refineries, and just 20 million to Tosco refineries over the period. The
amount received also varied considerably from year to year; in just two years, Marathon's crude
receipts increased from 41 million barrels in 1997 to 75 million barrels in 1998 and then fell to 62
million barrels in 1999. Similar variation is found across refineries and within a single refinery over
time; Chevron's Richmond refinery near Oakland received 118 million barrels of Saudi crude over
the period, with annual receipts varying by as much as 24 million barrels from year to year. The
nearby (and similarly-sized) refinery in Martinez, which was owned by Shell for most of the period,
processed no Saudi crude.
This variation allows for an estimation of the impact of discount receipts both on refiner profits
and gasoline prices in local markets. Correspondingly, the second result is that most of the discount
rents were captured by refinery owners as profits rather than passed through to consumers as lower
gasoline prices. This is to be expected given that the discount was targeted only at certain refineries,
so the effect on market-level costs tended to be infra-marginal. The capture of rents appears to have
been almost complete, supporting the idea that the discount was purposefully targeted at specific
refiners. Finally, I find that discount receipts affected refining company political contributions, with
recipients targeting more of their financial support to politicians on committees that considered
bills of interest to Saudi Arabia. I also find that funds tended to be diverted away from congressmen
who received donations from pro-Israel interest groups.
The results described above tie together several different areas of study. First, although the
Asian price premium (or, U.S. discount) for Saudi crude has attracted occasional comment in the
trade press on petroleum markets, it has received very little attention in the academic energy
literature. Exceptions are several papers that have attempted to explain the premium in terms of
models of price discrimination 2 or regulatory distortions3 . Other papers have discussed strategies
for Asian consuming nations to reduce or eliminate the premium through regulatory reform (Ogawa
2003) or by improving pipeline infrastructure (Jaffe & Soligo 2004).
This paper also provides evidence on the incidence of non-marginal cost changes in the oil
2 Soligo & Jaffe (2000) model Saudi Aramco's pricing decision as that of a dominant firm operating in two fully
separated markets and assert that Asian/European price ratio is consistent with reasonable values of supply and
demand elasticities and Saudi market shares. In a response, Parsons & Brown (2003) propose an alternative model
of international oil markets as a Cournot duopoly, with Gulf OPEC producers competing in both markets with local
suppliers.
3Horsnell (1997) argues that government involvement in Asian procurement has been at least partially responsible
for the higher prices Asian firms pay for oil.
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refining industry. Borenstein & Kellogg (2012) examine the effect of a similar change in average
input costs caused by the oil glut in the U.S. Midwest beginning in early 2011. As in this paper,
they find that the relative decrease in local crude oil prices did not pass through into wholesale
gasoline and diesel prices, and conclude that refiners must have received the rents generated by
the crude price shock. This paper complements their analysis by examining a setting with richer
variation in cost changes and showing that not only was the cost decrease not passed through into
prices, but that it was instead captured by refiners as profits rather than by retailers or other
market intermediaries.
In addition to documenting the existence and incidence of the discount, this paper also adds
a quantitative dimension to the literature on the political economy of global energy markets. As
far as I know, this paper is the first to provide empirical evidence for the use of Saudi oil not
only directly as a tool of political leverage, but through transfers to American companies. The
political motivations behind Saudi supply patterns have been previously examined from a historical
perspective, notably by Moran (1981) and more recently in a comprehensive history by Jaffe & Elass
(2007). Moran (1981) argues that OPEC behavior is best understood by looking at the political
motivations of Saudi Arabia between 1973 and 1980. In an unpublished working paper, Jaffe &
Elass (2007) similarly argue that Saudi Aramco's strategies and aims have been often designed
to meet the kingdom's foreign policy goals; they outline the kingdom's policy of maintaining a
position as the top global supplier of crude to the United States beginning in 1990, and provide a
historical survey that follows the eroding relationship between the two countries and subsequent
policy reversal in 2003.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives some background on U.S.-Saudi
relations, and Section 3 describes the history of the discount policy and how Saudi Aramco targeted
the discount rents. Section 4 provides evidence on who captured the discount rents, and Section 5
discusses how discount receipts affected political action by U.S. oil refiners. Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Background: U.S.-Saudi Relations
1.2.1 Aramco Before Nationalization
Although the discount policy did not begin until 1990, the defense of Saudi political interests
by American oil companies began in the 1930s with the simultaneous foundation of Saudi Arabia
and its oil concession to an American oil company. What followed over the next sixty years was the
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evolution of a complex web of political and economic connections between the Saudi government,
a consortium of American oil companies, and the U.S. government. Throughout this period, the
Saudi government used its oil to try to influence U.S. foreign policy, with U.S. oil companies acting
as both its willing conduits and active partners.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was founded by King Abdul-Aziz Ibn Saud in September of 1932,
four months after Standard Oil of California (SoCal, now Chevron) discovered oil in Bahrain. The
United States recognized the new country in 1933, the same year that the King granted SoCal an
exclusive sixty-six year concession for oil exploration and production in the al-Ahsa region (FTC
1952). The King hoped that this concession to the geographically distant United States would
protect the kingdom from the more immediate interference of the British (Jaffe & Elass 2007). In
1936, SoCal joined with Texaco to form the California-Arabian Standard Oil Company (Casoc),
which first struck oil at Dammam Well No. 7 in 1938. Impressed by the discovery, the king extended
Casoc's original concession to cover a 440,000 square mile area of Saudi Arabia (Sampson 1975,
109). This discovery also prompted President Roosevelt to charge the Secretary of State with
protecting U.S. interests in the Saudi oil concession (Jaffe & Elass 2007). Following the subsequent
discovery of three more major oil fields, the company was renamed Aramco (the Arabian-American
Oil Company) in 1944.
The consortium of American partners expanded following the Second World War, with what
later became Mobil and Exxon buying in to the partnership. The kingdom also began to take a
more active role in the company, with Saudi representatives joining the newly-formed Executive
Committee in 1950. To bolster its alliance with Saudi Arabia and to protect the company against
nationalization pressures, the U.S. government arranged a deal in December 1950 to give 50 percent
of Aramco's profits to the kingdom as a "tax", which was deducted from the taxes owed by the
consortium companies to the U.S. government (Yergin 1991, 447). This was the first in a series of
moves by the U.S. government to use Aramco as a channel of influence between the two countries.
By the Arab-Israeli wars of the 1960s and 1970s, the company had become both a source of
leverage for the United States as well as a representative of Saudi foreign policy toward the U.S. In
1967, oil minister Sheikh Yamani warned the U.S. government of the "consequences" of giving aid
or support to Israel, sending his message through Aramco for emphasis (Brown 1999, 268). Another
account quotes Yamani as saying that "if the United States directly supports Israel, Aramco can
anticipate being nationalized 'if not today, then tomorrow.' If the U.S. does not stay out of this
conflict, the U.S. is finished in the Middle East" (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1967).
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The company managed to resist full nationalization over the next few decades, with the country
instead opting to slowly increase its profit share and replace American managers with Saudi per-
sonnel. As Saudi influence over the company grew and the political situation in the Middle East
deteriorated, the American consortium began to feel increasing tension between the interests of the
Saudi and U.S. governments. Following the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, Aramco's Amer-
ican partners advocated for the Saudi political agenda. In May of 1973, the directors of Exxon,
Mobil, Texaco and SoCal called on their contacts at the State Department, the Pentagon and the
White House to urge the government to support the Saudi position in the Arab-Israeli hostilities
(Sampson 1975, 292-293). On June 21, 1973, Mobil published an "advertorial" in the New York
Times calling on the U.S. government to join with the Soviet Union in insisting on a peace agree-
ment in the Middle East. The article argued that continued American prosperity depended on
U.S. support of Saudi interests in the Middle East, and warned that "political considerations may
become the critical element in Saudi Arabia's decisions, because we need the oil more than Saudi
Arabia will need the money" (New York Times, 1973). Oil minister Yamani later wrote to Mobil's
president praising the ad and calling it a "positive step".4 That July, SoCal's chairman sent out his
own letter to the company's employees and shareholders asking them to pressure their representa-
tives to "acknowledge the legitimate interests of all the peoples of the Middle East" and encourage
Washington to improve relations with Arab governments (Sampson 1975, 294). On October 12, six
days after the start of the Yom Kippur War, the chairmen of Exxon, Texaco, Mobil and SoCal sent
a joint memo to President Nixon's chief of staff warning that U.S. aid to Israeli forces would result
in "a critical and adverse effect on our relations with the moderate Arab producing countries"
and the loss of American influence in the region "to the detriment of both our economy and our
security" (Sampson 1975, 300). Indeed, the oil embargo began five days later on October 17th,
and Aramco was compelled to enforce the Saudi boycott of oil sales to the United States and other
Israeli supporters to maintain its concession.
In 1981, American oil companies again inserted themselves in the middle of Saudi-U.S. diplo-
macy concerns preceding the controversial sale of the AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control
4 In an extremely bizarre incident, Mobil Oil took out another full-page ad in the New York Times on May 8,
1980 regarding a documentary called "Death of a Princess" that was set to air on PBS two days later. The film
told the story of a young Saudi princess who had been publicly executed for committing adultery. It was considered
extremely unflattering by the Saudi regime, and Mobil (which was one of the major supporters of PBS) called on the
network to cancel the broadcast. The last line of the article read:
"We hope that the management of the Public Broadcasting Service will review its decision to run this film and
exercise responsible judgment in the light of what is in the best interest of the United States." (New York Times,
1980).
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System) surveillance planes, which was proposed by the Reagan administration. 5 Once again, the
oil industry launched an extensive political campaign in support of Saudi Arabia. Mobil in partic-
ular spent more than half a million dollars on full-page advertorials in the New York Times, again
emphasizing the importance of the economic partnership between Saudi Arabia and the United
States. Mobil's president also personally called Arkansas senator David Pryor to lobby for the
sale (Bard 2010). Congress eventually approved the landmark sale, despite strong opposition from
American voters, the State of Israel, and the Israel lobby.
In the meantime, Aramco's ownership had been slowly transferred to the Saudi government, with
Saudi Arabia completing its purchase of Aramco's assets by the end of 1980. American interests
continued to manage the company, however, and the final paperwork for full nationalization was
not signed until 1990 (Yergin 1991, 652). During this time, a precursor to the discount scheme
resulted in Yamani's termination as oil minister. In 1986, Yamani had been charged by the king
to both increase Saudi production and increase the worldwide oil price. Yamani thought this
was impossible, and instead offered some customers a secret 50 cent-per-barrel discount on their
contract price to try to meet the production quotas. The discount caused overall oil prices to
fall and spurred tensions with other OPEC members, and the King relieved the previously highly
successful oil minister of his post. This action announced the King's intention to control oil policy
more directly rather than working through OPEC (New York Times 1986, PIW 1986, Financial
Times 1986, Adelman 1995, Jaffe & Elass 2007).
After nearly sixty years of Saudi-U.S. partnership, control of Aramco passed fully to the Saudi
government in 1990. Even without its American partners, the newly-independent Saudi Aramco
would continue in its role as a critical conduit for diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and
the United States.
1.2.2 Diplomacy After Nationalization: "Oil for Security"
Just as the American-owned Aramco served as an intermediary for American and Saudi interests
through the 1980s, Saudi Aramco has continued to work to achieve the kingdom's foreign policy
goals since nationalization. While the company's core mission is to maximize oil profits, this goal is
often superseded by the government's foreign policy agenda. The most significant examples of this
are the use of Saudi Arabia's considerable excess production capacity to stabilize U.S. oil supplies
5 James Atkins, former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, predicted that Saudi Aramco would keep the crude price at
32 dollars if the AWACS sale was allowed to proceed (Adelman 1993).
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and the U.S. export quota policy.
Saudi Aramco has used its excess capacity at key moments to serve U.S. economic interests
during oil supply emergencies. The first such incident occurred just after full nationalization in
1990, when Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait at the start of the first Gulf War. As promised, American
forces were immediately deployed to Saudi Arabia, and President Bush sent a letter to King Fahd
requesting that the kingdom immediately increase production in order to replace lost U.S. crude
supplies from Iraq and Kuwait. The King agreed, and within three months the company had raised
production by 2 million barrels per day (bpd) to 7.3 million bpd. The oil price, which had surged
to 40 dollars per barrel on the news of the invasion and UN boycott, fell immediately back to pre-
invasion levels (Jaffe & Elass 2007). Another notable instance of this strategic export expansion
occurred in 2002, when Saudi Aramco pledged to replace U.S. supplies lost during the Venezuelan
oil strike. In return for this type of strategic assistance, the United States provided the Saudis with
domestic intelligence, protection against external threats, and advanced weaponry. The American
commitment to protect the Gulf states was first explicitly stated in 19806 and later reiterated by
President Reagan, who specifically articulated a commitment to intervene to protect Saudi Arabia
in particular. This commitment was borne out most clearly at the beginning of the Gulf War, when
American forces arrived in Saudi Arabia less than two weeks after the invasion of Kuwait.
The United States is also by far the main supplier of military equipment to Saudi Arabia, with
U.S. supplies accounting for 66.4 percent of Saudi arms imports between 1990 and 2010 (SIPRI,
2011). In 1990, President Bush waived a number of congressional bans to proceed with a multi-
billion dollar arms sale to Saudi Arabia that included F-15s, Stinger and Patriot missiles and
launchers, M60A3 and Abrams tanks, Apache and Blackhawk helicopters and other equipment
(SIPRI, 2011). The size of these arms deals continued to increase throughout the 1990s under both
the Bush and Clinton administrations (Figure 1-1).
1.2.3 Saudi Interests in the Middle East Peace Process
In addition to security and weapons, Saudi Arabia's other main diplomatic concern has been
American engagement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Saudi Arabia has long supported
Palestinian claims to sovereignty, and has used its economic and diplomatic relationship with the
6 "Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region
will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be
repelled by any means necessary, including military force."
President Jimmy Carter, State of the Union Address, 1980.
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United States to pursue this agenda. Indeed, the most overt use of Saudi oil as a political weapon
occurred before 1990, with the threatened expropriation of Aramco in 1967 and the oil embargo
of 1973, both of which occurred in response to American support of Israeli military actions. Since
then, Saudi advocacy has focused mostly on U.S. diplomacy toward Israel.
There have been several notable instances where the Saudi regime has put diplomatic pressure
on the United States to intervene in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Following the surge in violence that
followed the failure of the 2000 Camp David summit, Crown Prince Abdullah reportedly refused
an invitation to visit Washington in June 2001 to indicate Saudi displeasure over insufficient U.S.
efforts to prevent Israeli military action against Palestinians (New York Times, 2001a). Later
that year (and less than two months after the September 11th attacks), the Saudi Foreign Minister
declared that the Saudi government was "angrily frustrated" with the Bush administration's failure
to engage with the Palestinian leadership in the peace process (New York Times, 2001b). Crown
Prince Abdullah subsequently proposed a new Saudi-backed peace plan, which was adopted by
the Arab League in 2002. Despite repeated diplomatic pressure from Saudi Arabia, however, the
United States failed to pressure Israel to accept the plan and U.S.-Saudi relations continued to
deteriorate. As described in the next section, this deterioration in diplomatic relations coincided
with the abandonment of the discount policy.
1.3 The Discount Policy
1.3.1 History
The discount policy began in 1990 as a politically-motivated export quota policy. Following
Aramco's full nationalization and transition to Saudi control, King Fahd directed the company to
maintain a position as the top supplier of foreign crude to the United States (Jaffe & Elass 2007).
The stated purpose of this policy was to cement Saudi Arabia's strategic alliance with the United
States by making itself critical to U.S. energy security. Achieving the quota on a month-to-month
basis was initially quite straightforward; Aramco supplied as much as a third of total U.S. imports
in the early 1990s while keeping the U.S. price for Saudi crude roughly the same as the world price.
By the end of the decade, however, increasing competition from Mexico, Venezuela and Canada
forced Aramco to cut its U.S. prices to defend its market share (Figure 1-2). The discount reached
a high of $6.30 per barrel in 2001, 30 percent of the U.S. selling price at the time (Figure 1-3). The
total value of the discount over the policy period from 1991-2003 was 8.5 billion dollars.
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As the discount became larger, the Saudi government faced increasing pressure from Aramco
to abandon the expensive quota policy.7 Faced with a string of political disappointments at the
beginning of the 2000s, the Saudi government also began to question the benefits of a close alliance
with the United States. 8 Saudi Arabia also began to feel the political strain of its relationship with
the United States. Although Saudi Arabia declined to participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom in
2003 (and voiced its disapproval of American intervention in Iraq), it became a target of a string of
Al Qaeda attacks in the aftermath of the war. Tensions again worsened after the report on the 9/11
terrorist attacks described alleged Saudi links with the hijackers and funding sources from within
the Saudi government. At the same time, Saudi pressure for the United States to intervene in
the escalating Arab-Israeli conflict went unheeded, and President Bush declined to intervene with
Israel in support of King Abdullah's proposed peace plan. In light of the lackluster geopolitical
response of the United States to Saudi interests, the commercial costs of the export policy seemed
too great.
The policy was suspended in 2003, with Aramco allowing the average discount to fall to zero and
ceding the top exporter spot to Canada.9 Saudi crude exports, which had averaged 15.9 percent of
total gross imports in the first half of 2003, fell to 13.1 percent in the second half of the year and
then to 11 percent in the beginning of 2004. Industry observers noted the apparent policy changelo,
and Saudi Aramco President Abdullah Jumah publicly acknowledged the shift in February 2005".
1.3.2 Discount Distribution
The prices that refiners pay for Saudi crude deliveries are determined by Aramco's Official Selling
Prices, or OSPs. Aramco's OSP announcement is made about a month in advance of delivery, and
consists of a differential relative to the spot price of a different benchmark crude for each of the
four markets (see Figure 1-4). Over the policy period, these benchmark crudes were West Texas
Intermediate (WTI) for the United States, dated Brent for Europe and the Mediterranean, and
7 For more details see Jaffe & Elass (2007).
8Saudi arms purchases also fell dramatically after 2000, dropping from 1.7 billion dollars a year from 1990-1999
to .5 billion from 2000-2011.
9 At the same time, all American troops were withdrawn from Saudi Arabia in September 2003.
10 "Has Saudi Arabia abandoned its pivotal policy of being the largest crude supplier to the U.S.? The world's
top oil exporter has long had the biggest share of the world's largest oil market and has favored volume over price
to retain the top spot. Intriguingly, since the spring of last year, in the wake of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the
Saudis have ceded their prime position to others." ("Saudis Drop Volume, Lose U.S. Top Spot" Petroleum Intelligence
Weekly, May 12, 2004.)
"Jad Mouawad and Simon Romero, "Saudis in Strategy to Export More Oil to India and China," The New York
Times. February 18, 2005.
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the Oman-Dubai average (ODA) for Asia. These differentials reflect factors such as the quality
differences between the marker crude and the Saudi crudes, transportation costs, 12 and product
prices in different markets. The price that refiners pay is then calculated using the previously
announced differential and the average price of the marker crude over the month. Figure 1-4 shows
a sample OSP release from Platts from December 2001 announcing the pricing differentials on
January deliveries.
For example, the January differentials for Arab Light to the United States and Asia were -4.05
and +0.25, respectively. During January, the average WTI price was 19.48 dollars per barrel, and
the average spot prices of the Oman and Dubai crude markers was 18.34 dollars per barrel. The
price paid by U.S. refiners for January deliveries of Arab Light was 19.48 - 4.05 = 15.43 dollars per
barrel, and the price for Asian refiners was 18.34 + 0.25 = 18.59 dollars per barrel. The value of
the "discount" that month was therefore the difference between the realized Asian and U.S. prices,
i.e. 18.59 - 15.43 = 3.16.
Discount Asian Price - U.S. Price
(ODA + Asia Differential) - (WTI + U.S. Differential)
= (18.34 + 0.25) - (19.48 - 4.05)
= 18.59 - 15.43
= 3.16.
In addition to dictating the prices that refiners pay, Saudi Aramco also directly controls how
much crude each refinery receives each month. Saudi Aramco only sells crude through long-term
contracts with specific refineries, and crude resale is not permitted. Although many petroleum
producers trade their crude on a spot basis and/or allow their crude to be traded by buyers ex
post, Saudi Aramco does neither and keeps tight control over where its crude is processed. Any
resale by refiners results in permanent blacklisting from future contracts, and even companies
that refine Saudi crude in multiple locations must specify the particular refinery where they will
process each shipment. Refineries must therefore be prepared to either process or store whatever
quantity they receive in a particular month. Contract quantities are specific to refinery capacity to
process Saudi crude, and potential buyers submit detailed contract applications to the Crude Oil
12 Although Aramco considers differences in transportation costs in determining the price differentials, all OSPs
reflect fob prices and do not include transportation.
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Sales Department in Dhahran that provide refinery specifications and operating figures as well as
audited balance sheets and detailed corporate profiles. Once approved, these contracts may then
be renewed on an annual basis at the discretion of the refinery and Saudi Aramco.
Despite the rigidity of the contract rules for refiners, the actual delivered quantities vary sig-
nificantly from month to month. While annual contracts specify the quantity that refiners are
willing to buy in terms of barrels per day, deliveries are subject to unilateral cuts by Aramco.
Quantities may be cut, for example, following a decrease in OPEC quotas or a mandate from the
Saudi government.1 3 Indeed, there is significant monthly variation in the quantities that buyers
receive each month, both at the refinery and company level. Although Aramco frequently changes
quantity deliveries, it is very unusual for refiners to cut their orders even when prices are high. 14
Refinery inputs are constrained by physical capital in the short run, and most refineries require the
composition of their input blend to be fairly consistent. Refiners can replace a shortage of Saudi
crude by buying a fairly close substitute crude on the spot market, but these prices are usually
higher than the Saudi term contract prices. Aramco also tries to keep its contract terms fairly
attractive on average so that customers want to renew their contracts over the long term and so
that they can continue to place their desired quantities in the U.S. market.
1.4 Where Did the Discount Go?
The first task of this paper is to track down where discount rents accrued when Saudi Aramco
sold discounted crude to the United States, whether captured by refiners as excess profits or passed
on to consumers in the form of lower product prices. I next provide an overview of the relevant
features of the U.S. refining industry and a basic model to give some intuition on the incidence of
the discount. I then discuss the data required for this part of the analysis, the empirical framework,
and the results from the estimation.
1 3 In practice, Saudi Aramco can at its discretion give some flexibility to buyers to switch between the several
crude grades it produces or to ask for a change in the total quantity. In the month prior to delivery, Saudi Aramco
announces its price differentials. Customers then indicate their preferences, and Saudi Aramco takes their requests
into account when issuing the final allocation.
14 "Despite their grumbling, customers - sensitive to the strategic importance of Saudi contracts - will not dare
threaten to reject their March supplies. 'We can only hope that we're compensated next month with a deep discount
on the April formula,' says an industry source. ... One US contract holder, none too pleased with the March price
adjustment, carefully described the change as 'very inconsistent with the market.' .... Again, however, loyalty to
Aramco seems certain to win out over momentary irritation. 'We are painfully aware of the new prices, but we're
dealing with it,' the customer added." Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, "Buyers Bemoan Saudi Price Hikes, Eyes Now
on Iraq" (Feb. 8, 1999).
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1.4.1 Market Details
At their most basic, refineries blend input crude oil and then distill it into its constituent hydro-
carbons, isolating the molecules and then blending them into end products like propane, gasoline,
jet fuel and diesel. Although all refineries perform this same basic process, they vary a great deal
in their complexity and in what sorts of crude oil they can process and what finished products
they output. Topping refineries, the most basic type, include only distillation units and produce
mainly unfinished oils. Hydroskimming refineries add a hydrotreating and reforming unit to the
basic topping refinery configuration, allowing the refinery to remove sulfur from more sour crudes
so that outputs conform to environmental standards. The most versatile (and most expensive)
refinery type are catalytic cracking or coking refineries, which also feature gas-oil conversion plants,
olefin conversion plants, and coking units to reduce or eliminate the production of residual fuels.
These refineries are able to break larger (and less valuable) molecules and reform them into lighter,
more valuable products like gasoline and jet fuel. The product mix is determined both by the blend
of molecules in the input crude mix as well as the sophistication of the refinery.
Most refineries blend different crude oils before distillation begins. This allows them to maintain
consistent processing conditions and mitigate the corrosive effects of cheaper sour crudes. Refiners
periodically run linear programming models to determine the optimal quantity and quality of their
inputs and outputs and to make (small) adjustments to their refinery operating parameters. Most
secure a certain amount of "baseload" crude under term contracts, which are less flexible but offer
more attractive prices, and then balance their remaining crude slate in the spot markets. If a
refinery gets a cut in its monthly crude order from Saudi Aramco, then, they will buy other similar
crudes on the spot market to fill the shortfall rather than curtailing their run. Mexican Isthmus-34,
for example, is a good substitute for a refinery using Arabian Light in its crude mix and is available
on the spot market at most locations where Saudi crude can be delivered. Spot market prices are
usually higher than Saudi term contract prices, however, so replacing a shortfall of Saudi crude on
the spot market tends to increase input costs.
Once the crude oil has been fully processed, refined products are transported to wholesale racks
by either pipeline, barge, truck or rarely by railroad (Figure 1-5) (Association of Oil Pipelines
2009). Pipelines are the least expensive way to move products, 15 and mainly connect areas of high
refining output with those of high demand. Trucks usually make only local trips, and most trips by
1 5 Transportation costs by pipeline, barge and truck are estimated at 2, 4.5 and 35 cents per gallon per thousand
miles of transportation (Jacobs 2002).
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petroleum tank trucks are no longer than 50 miles (Untiet 1984). Refiners sell products to retailers
out of these local wholesale racks, who then mark up the prices to sell to consumers. These retail
margins make up only a small proportion (about ten percent) of consumer prices. 16
The two primary possible destinations for Saudi discount rents are therefore refiner profits and
consumer prices.
1.4.2 Model
Although changes in crude oil costs certainly influence the consumer price of gasoline, 17 there
is reason to think that discounts targeted at specific refineries will be captured as profits rather
than passed on to consumers, even in a competitive market. 18 Over the policy period, Saudi oil
accounted for about ten percent of crude refined in the United States, and crude receipt varied
substantially across refineries in the same local area. This section therefore models the receipt of
Saudi crude as a heterogeneous cost shock across refineries in a given market.
The gasoline wholesale market is characterized by a relatively small number of refineries with
fixed capacities. At most, cities have 12 refineries that supply refined gasoline to wholesale racks
for retail distribution. Most refineries operate at full capacity for most of the year, and even with
regular shutdowns for maintenance overall capacity utilization is around 90%. Though fixed costs
are large, the majority of marginal costs are the price of crude inputs. These vary across time as the
price of crude fluctuates, and across refineries according to refinery sophistication. While common
shocks to costs do pass through into gasoline prices, cost shocks targeted to specific refineries will
tend to affect profits but not prices. To make this clear, I consider a simple model of the wholesale
refined product market characterized by a finite number of refineries with fixed short-run capacities.
Consider a city (or wholesale market) with n possible refineries with marginal costs ci such that
CI C2 <_ - Cn
16See http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/gasdiesel/ for the components of the price of a gallon of gasoline.
1 7The literature on the nature of the dynamics of crude price pass-through into gasoline prices began with Bacon
(1991), though the link between crude and gasoline prices was already well-established. Further detailed work on
the magnitude and speed of gasoline price responses to crude prices can be found in Borenstein & Shepard (1996),
Borenstein, Cameron & Gilbert (1997), Borenstein & Shepard (2002), and Bachmeier & Griffin (2003). Even though
several of these papers find that the pass-through of crude price changes to gasoline prices is not immediate, full
pass-through of all common shocks occurs within a month or two of the initial shock. Because I examine pass-through
at the annual level, I avoid these dynamic pass-through concerns and assume that all discount effects pass through
to gasoline prices in the year that they occur.
18Borenstein & Kellogg (2012) find that refiners, not consumers, captured the rents generated by a temporary
depression in crude prices in the Midwest. As in this section, their model generates this lack of pass-through into
product prices as a consequence of the fact that most refiners are capacity-constrained, and are therefore operating
at the vertical part of their supply curves.
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and capacities ki,..., kn. Demand is given by D(p), where p is the gasoline (or product) price.
In this market, equilibrium will consist of an m and p* such that
1. No additional firms want to begin producing:
cm+1 > D-- k
2. No producing firms want to exit the market:
M-1
D- 1 ( k) > Cm
3. The marginal refinery (m) is maximizing profits:
p*= argmaxp:D(p)<km (p -cm) D(p) - kj
The equilibrium price p* therefore comes from the marginal firm's profit maximization facing the
residual demand from all lower-cost firms producing at capacity.
Therefore (for non-corner solutions):19
Cm
1+ r-ED
where ED is the elasticity of residual demand:
m-1
Dr(p) = D(p) - Y k
Note that p* is only a function of the marginal firm's marginal costs, i.e. p* = p* (Cm)
The profit of the marginal firm is:
7rm(cm) = (p*(cm) - cm)Dr (p*(cm))
19For solutions where the marginal firm produces at capacity, decreases in costs will not affect prices even for
marginal firms. Increases will sometimes increase prices if they are sufficiently large.
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For inframarginal firms (i < m):
iri(ci, cm) = (p*(cm) - ci)ki
Therefore non-marginal shocks to marginal cost will only affect refiner profits (7j) and will not pass
through into prices. Decreasing the costs of the marginal firm (cm) will lower prices, increase profits
of the marginal firm (7rm) and lower profits for other firms (iri). Figure 1-6 shows a simple example
of how profits and prices are affected under targeted and common (non-targeted) cost cuts. Panel
i shows the market without any discounts. There are m firms in the market, and the marginal
firm m sets a price p* above its own marginal cost (the highest one in the market) to maximize
its own profits facing the residual demand curve. Panel ii shows the effect of a common shock to
costs, such as a decrease in the "world price" of crude, i.e. a drop in price affecting all grades
and types of crude oil. Because this common shock reduces the costs of the marginal refinery, this
refinery increases its production and the price of gasoline decreases. In Panel iii, several of the
inframarginal refineries experience a targeted decrease in costs (such as the discount) that is not
given to the marginal refinery. In this case, profits increase for all of the discount recipients, but
the market product price remains unchanged.
Consequently, this simple model shows that we would expect most receipts of discounted crude
to affect refiner profits and not to pass through into product prices. Since most refiners are infra-
marginal, most of the discounted crude is also inframarginal; only changes in the amount of Saudi
crude sold to the one marginal producer in each market would even partially be passed through
into the price.
1.4.3 Data
In this part of the analysis, I follow the discount through each stage of the refining process from
the delivery of the discounted crude to the refinery to local gasoline prices.
Total Discount Value
The key independent variable for the analysis in this paper is the refinery-level value of the
discount received from Saudi Aramco, i.e. the per-barrel discount multiplied by the quantity of
crude delivered to each refinery. I calculate the per-barrel discount that U.S. refiners receive relative
to Asian refiners using Saudi Aramco's official selling prices. As described above, Saudi Aramco
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takes a variety of measures to prevent the emergence of a secondary market in its crude, so these
prices should accurately reflect the prices that refiners pay to purchase Saudi crude oil. The OSP
releases are published each month by Platts for each of the major crude grades in each market, and
the time series of the realized selling prices (these differentials plus the relevant benchmark) are
available from Bloomberg. The series for Arabian Light, Arabian Medium, and Arabian Heavy are
available for Europe, the United States, and Asia beginning in January 1991, and I use these series
to construct a single average discount for Saudi crude. 20 I use the Asian price as the benchmark
to calculate the discount, as East Asia was the primary alternative destination for Saudi crude
exports. Asian markets received about half of total Saudi crude exports by 2003 and 65 percent
by 2010. At the same time, the share that went to the North American market fell from what had
been a steady 25 percent from 1991 to 2003 down to 18 percent in 2010.21
In order to estimate the effects of the discount on refinery profits and local retail prices, it is
critical to identify which refineries received crude shipments from Saudi Arabia in each month.
All of this information comes from the Energy Information Administration (EIA), which monitors
domestic petroleum refining operation and which collects data on all foreign crude imports through
the EIA-814 Monthly Imports Report. This data is publicly available at the refinery-level from the
EIA starting in 1986. I match this data to a list of all operating refineries in each year constructed
using the EIA Refinery Capacity Report (from EIA-820), which lists all operating U.S. refineries
in each year for 1994, 1995, 1997, and 1999-2010 and reports capacity, owner, and state for each
refinery. There are 178 refineries listed in the report. When matched with the importer data, this
lists all refineries operating in a given year and how much crude each refinery imported from Saudi
Arabia and elsewhere.
Receipts vary a great deal across refineries and within each refinery from month to month,
which leads to considerable variation in discount values among refinery owners and across states.
Of the 178 operating refineries, 58 used crude imported from Saudi Arabia between 1991 and 2003.
Most deliveries of Saudi crude go to refineries along the Gulf Coast, but a surprising amount also
goes to inland refineries and to refineries in California and along the East Coast (Figure 1-7).
20 Since only overall sales volumes for all the crude types are available, I calculate the discount as a weighted
average of the discounts on the three different crude grades. The weights are left fixed over time and are based on
the volumes published in the IEA Oil Market Report over the 1998-2003 period. The average discount is calculated
as
AvgDiscountt = 0.35 -LightDiscountt + 0.46. MediumDiscountt + 0.19 -HeavyDiscountt.
21Export figures are from United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database.
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Coastal refineries are mostly supplied by tanker and offshore terminal, and inland refineries receive
deliveries by pipeline within a couple of weeks of delivery by tanker. There is also a great deal of
variation in the fraction of inputs that come from Saudi Arabia. The Texaco refinery in Delaware,
for example, got more than half of its inputs from Saudi Arabia over the period. Mississippi and
Arkansas also got over half of their crude inputs from Saudi Arabia (Figure 1-8).
Refiner Profits
To estimate the impact of the Saudi crude discount on refiner profits, I use data on annual
profits from refining operations for the 40 publicly-traded companies that owned at least one U.S.
refinery during the sample period. These data come from Standard and Poor's Compustat North
America dataset. Because many U.S. refineries are owned by large corporations with multiple
business lines, I use profits data from the Business Segments Dataset, which includes companies'
self-reported balance sheet data by business type. The relevant segments were identified using the
segment-specific NAICS classification for petroleum refining and the segment name as reported
by the company. The analysis focuses on operating profits, which represents sales of the refining
business segment less its allocated share of operating costs and expenses. For comparison, I also use
overall net income as a measure of total company profits. This is also available from Compustat,
and represents quarterly income (or loss) after subtracting all expenses and losses from all revenues
and gains. The reporting for this item is more consistent across companies, but is a much noisier
indicator of the variable of interest.
In order to link company profits to refinery imports, it is also necessary to determine annual cor-
porate ownership of each refinery. Ownership of individual refineries was established using the EIA
Refinery Capacity Reports and supplemented using corporate profiles from the Moody's/Mergent
Industrial Manuals. Refineries owned through a join enterprise were assigned to either the U.S.-
listed corporation or to the majority stakeholder. 2 2 Refineries that changed ownership mid-year
were assigned to the company that owned the refinery for the majority of the year. Table 1.1
provides some summary statistics on the publicly-traded refinery owner companies that appear in
the profits analysis. Discount receipts for these companies also vary tremendously, and are not
necessarily related to company size. Chevron and Texaco, for example, received over 4 billion
dollars worth of crude discounts, an amount equal to 10% of their overall refining profits. The
22Texaco is an exception to this, and is excluded from the regressions due to its Motiva joint venture with Saudi
Aramco. In general, including Texaco in the regressions either has no effect or slightly decreases point estimates and
increases their statistical significance.
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similarly-sized Shell, however, received only 0.08 billion in discounted crude, 0.2% of total refining
profits. Smaller companies like Marathon and Valero received about a billion dollars in discounts
over the period as well. Although a substantial share of the discounted crude went to the former
Aramco partners (ExxonMobil, Chevron and Texaco), other companies like BP, ConocoPhillips,
Marathon and Valero were also top recipients. There is also great deal of variation in the fraction
of inputs that come from Saudi Arabia. Texaco, for example, received Saudi imports at seven of
its ten refineries and devoted approximately 45 percent of its processing capacity to refining Saudi
crude.
Retail Gasoline Prices
In addition to examining the effect of the discount on refining profits, I also look at the impact
on consumers though changes in the retail price of gasoline in local refinery markets. For this part
of the analysis, refineries were matched to the largest city within an hour travel time by road.
Monthly retail price averages for the 75 cities with local refineries was provided by the Oil Price
Information Service (OPIS). OPIS uses data from credit card receipts to capture daily station-
specific retail gasoline prices for up to 120,000 stations throughout the United States, and their
data include prices for most major retailers regardless of ownership. This daily station data for
regular unleaded gasoline was aggregated up to the city-month level for this paper.
I link this price data for each city to refining capacity and Saudi crude quantities in its wholesale
market. I define a city's market in two different ways. In the first, local markets are defined using
the assumption that refineries serve only cities within an hour travel time by truck. I alternatively
define a refinery's market as any city that is "down-pipe" of the refinery using directional product
pipeline information from 2004 (Figure 1-9).23 Under the first definition, for example, retail prices
in St. Paul and Chicago are assumed to be affected only by the refineries operating in their local
area. The second market definition takes into account that there is a product pipeline going from
Bismarck to St. Paul, and from St. Paul to Chicago. Prices in Bismarck are still only affected by
refineries in the local area, but St. Paul prices are now also affected by refineries in Bismarck as
well as in St. Paul, and prices in Chicago by refineries in Bismarck and St. Paul.
2 3 This is similar in spirit to Muehlegger (2006), who also uses product pipelines (as well as truck and barge access)
to calculate the approximate transportation costs for a refinery to serve markets in each state.
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1.4.4 Empirical Framework and Results
In this section, I investigate what refiner characteristics determine receipt of Saudi crude, and
where discount rents went. To determine whether the discount was captured as profits or passed
through to consumers, I estimate the effect of discount receipts on refinery owner profits and local
retail gasoline prices.
Who received the discount?
To get a sense of which features made companies most likely to receive Saudi crude, I first
construct a dummy variable (D(Recipient)) equal to 1 if the company received Saudi crude at
any point over the policy period. I estimate a simple descriptive linear probability model for this
dummy variable on a set of refiner characteristics. These include total refining capacity over the
period as well as a dummy variable indicating whether the company owned any refineries that had
processed Saudi crude in the 1989/1990 period, indicating that the company had the technical
capacity (without any further investment) to process crude from Saudi Arabia. I also construct a
set of dummy variables that indicate whether the company owned a refinery in a particular state
to get at geographical effects. Anticipating the results in section 5, I also include a set of variables
indicating political contributions by these companies in the 1989/1990 period to check whether
recipients differed from non-recipients in their political leanings. 24
The results from the LPM for discount receipt on refiner characteristics (Table 1.2) reveal that
the most important requirements to have received Saudi crude are technical. Companies that owned
at least one refinery with demonstrated capacity to process Saudi crude were 65 percent more likely
to have received Saudi crude over the policy period. Of course, the availability of substitute crude
inputs means that these firms do not require Saudi crude, and that refineries that did not process
Saudi crude in the pre-period may still have had the capacity to do so. Firms may also have
updated refinery specifications during the period to enable Saudi crude capacity. Nonetheless, this
variable is significant in all seven specifications and its magnitude is quite consistent. There is no
indication that firms with larger overall refining capacity were more likely to receive Saudi crude,
and these coefficients are close to zero and statistically insignificant. Former Aramco partners were
surprisingly no more likely to get Saudi crude than other refiners controlling for technical refining
capacity.
2 4The political contributions data are discussed in detail in section 5.
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The coefficients for the state dummy variables are not reported in the table, and are jointly
significant but mostly individually not statistically significant. These estimates tend to be positive
for states that are easily accessible by barge (e.g. Alabama, Louisiana, California, New Jersey) and
negative for those that are difficult to reach (e.g. Alaska, Arizona, Illinois, Nevada). (Including
these dummy variables in the other LPM regressions has very little effect on the point estimates,
but makes the standard errors on the other coefficients larger.)
The estimates on the aggregates for overall contributions, contributions to politicians and con-
tributions to committees are all small and statistically insignificant. The aggregates by politician
characteristics (party, pro-Israel donation recipients) are also very small and close to zero, indicat-
ing that the overall contribution patterns of recipients and non-recipients were very similar in the
pre-period. Recipients and non-recipients do appear to have varied in how their contributions were
allocated across members of various committees, however; companies with more contributions to
members of the House Armed Services and Senate Foreign Relations committees were more likely
to receive Saudi crude. Companies with more donations to members of the House Energy, House
Foreign Affairs, and Senate Armed Services committees were less likely to get Saudi crude.
Refining Profits
To determine the extent to which the discount was captured as profits, I estimate the relationship
between company-level refining profits and total annual discount value as well as the relationship
between log profits and log quantity:
7rjt = # DiscValuejt + aj + yt + e (1.1)
log(7rjt) = # log(q pudi) - &+ + /t -- Qjt (1.2)
The motivation for these two specifications comes from the expression for the refiner's profits. The
value of the discount to a refiner can be expressed in terms of the percentage discount on the crude
price (dt), the per-barrel price of crude (ct), and the number of barrels the refiner receives from
Saudi Arabia in year t, qjudi. We can then write the refiner's profit function:
-Trj = (pt - ct)qcap + - DiscValuejt + Ejt
= + dt - ct - gjt + Ejt
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where pt is the average product price and q,'aP is refinery capacity. pt is the difference between
the average product price and the cost of crude, i.e. the refining profits per barrel or the "crack
spread".
In this case, 3 can be consistently estimated using firm fixed-effects as long as pt is fixed over
time and does not vary with the crude price, i.e. pt = p. This leaves us with:
7 = cap +3- DiscValuejt + Ejt
This was approximately true from 1983-2003, with the crack spread, which estimates the value
added by the refining operation, remaining fairly constant in real terms at around 12 dollars per
barrel (Figure 1-10).25
A more serious empirical problem is created by integrated refiners. Since these firms also sell
crude, the crude price now enters the calculation for the discount value as well as the profitability
of their exploration and production business lines:
7r3 t = -qcap + d -c . qjts +ct -qjde - jt
DiscValuejt rbjt
Now Cov (DiscValuejt, rqjt) > 0, and / overestimates the effect of the discount on refiner profits.
Intuitively, the discount per barrel can only be large when the price of crude is also large - you
cannot have a six-dollar discount when the crude price is only five dollars. We would also expect
refiners that produce crude to have higher profits when the oil price is higher. Even though I use
refining profits in this analysis to try to mitigate this effect, these self-reported segment profits are
likely to co-move with overall company profits.
One solution to this problem is to use a log-log specification and add time fixed effects to remove
time-varying factors (ct, dt) from the discount. The coefficient # now estimates the percent change
in profits associated with an increase in the quantity of Saudi crude that a refiner receives.
log /3= log(qj ) + &j + ~5t + jt (1.4)
25 The crack spread is calculated as the difference in cost between a barrel of crude and a representative mix of
typical outputs. For example, a simple version (the 2-1-1) is calculated as the difference in cost of 2 barrels of crude
and a barrel of gasoline and a barrel of heating oil/diesel. Here I use the 6-3-2-1 crack spread, which is the difference
in the total cost of 6 barrels of crude and outputs of 3 barrels of gasoline, 2 barrels of heating oil/diesel, and 1 barrel
of residual fuel oil. Trends are the same for each of the four standard spreads.
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Since the discount per barrel is mostly positive over this period, a positive estimate indicates that
an increase in the total discount value to a refiner is associated with an increase in firm profits.
Results from the profit regressions (Table 1.3) indicate that most of the discount appears to
be captured by refiners as profits. On average, the discount value is equal to about two percent
of refining profits, and the average discount is one dollar per barrel over the period. Full capture
would therefore be consistent with a coefficient of 0.02 in column 1. The actual point estimate is
0.016, i.e. a 1.6 percent increase in profits associated with doubling the amount of Saudi crude
delivered. When the sample is restricted only to observations with non-zero amounts of Saudi crude
and positive profits, the point estimate increases to 0.17 relative to the full pass-through benchmark
of 0.09 for this subsample.
The point estimate from the level regression in column 3 is large, implying a three dollar increase
in profits for every dollar of discount, and may be biased upward for the reasons discussed in the
previous section. 26 Nonetheless, the test of this coefficient against the full pass-through benchmark
of 1 cannot be rejected.
To support the interpretation that the receipt of discounted crude increases profits through
reducing costs rather than by increasing output, I also estimate the effect of annual district-level
Saudi crude receipts on total refinery output.2 7 Because events like refinery shutdowns and capacity
expansions are likely to affect both production levels and inputs, I control for total district refining
capacity. I use time fixed effects to capture trends in capacity utilization rates and district fixed
effects to control for district-level heterogeneity in refinery efficiency.
Table 1.4 reports the results from this regression of the log of production on Saudi crude receipts
controlling for refining capacity and year and district fixed effects. These estimates are all very
small; a doubling in the Saudi crude delivery is associated with around a 0.3 percent increase in
production even though about ten percent of crude inputs came from Saudi Arabia. This is in
contrast to the estimates in column (1) of Table 1.3, which indicates a 1.6 percent increase in
profits for the same increase in Saudi crude quantity. The primary channel for the impact of the
receipt of discounted crude on profits is therefore the discount on costs rather than an increase in
2 6 Consistent with the hypothesis that the upward bias of the estimate in the level regression is due to measurement
error due to other business lines, the point estimate in column 3 decreases to 2.48 when I exclude the supermajors
(BP, ExxonMobil, Chevron and Shell), which had the largest incomes from crude production. The estimates in
columns 1 and 2 decrease slightly but remain statistically significant.
2 7 Although refining capacity is available at the refiner level, capacity utilization rates are only released at the
district level. The EIA defines twelve such refining districts: East Coast, Appalachian No. 1, Indiana-Illinois-
Kentucky, Minnesota-Wisconsin-North and South Dakota, Oklahoma-Kansas-Missouri, Texas Inland, Texas Gulf
Coast, Louisiana Gulf Coast, North Louisiana-Arkansas, New Mexico, Rocky Mountain, and the West Coast.
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production.
Retail Gasoline Price
As for profits, I examine the extent to which the discount was passed through to consumers by
estimating the effect of the city-level discount per gallon of refined gasoline and quantity share in
production on local gasoline prices:
RetailPricemt = p. DiscGalmt + Am + Tst + Emt
saudi
log (RetailPricemt) log c It + Am + st + Emt
qmt
The retail gasoline price can be expressed as a per gallon markup on the crude costs per barrel
(pr) plus some state-level tax -rt. The observed price is this counterfactual price (,7st) plus the
effect of the discount, which is expressed here as the discount value per gallon of gasoline refining
capacity multiplied by p, the share of the discount which is passed on to consumers. This yields:
RetailPricemt = p9 + Tt +p - DiscGalmt + Emt (1.5)
Using the constant crack spread p, p9 can be expressed as a markup M over the price of crude ct
divided by the number of gallons of gasoline per barrel:
P + Ct
19.5
where 19.5 is the average number of gallons of gasoline refined from a 42 gallon barrel of crude oil.
The discount per gallon is calculated as the total discount to refineries in market m divided by the
total number of gallons of gasoline refined in that market:
DiscGalmt cap
qm
As discussed earlier, one of the primary challenges here is defining the local market in order to
link refineries to the appropriate retail gasoline prices. I do this two ways: first by assuming that
refineries only serve cities within an hour travel by truck, and second by linking each refinery to all
cities "down-pipe" of the refinery. These two definitions affect how qgIdi and q2P are calculated.
Under the first definition, they refer to Saudi imports and refinery capacity only in refineries within
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an hour's travel from the city. Under the second, they refer to imports and capacity of all refineries
up-pipe.
Again, taking logs and using state by month fixed effects removes any bias caused by the crude
price appearing in both the counterfactual gasoline price and the value of the discount.
log (DiscGalmt) = log(dtct) + log(qjtId) 
- log(q"P)
The primary specification is therefore
log (RetailPricemt) = log cmap + Am + f/St + Mt (1.6)
The pass-through coefficient y is therefore identified off of variation in the changes in Saudi crude
shares across cities within the same state.
The results from these regressions show no evidence that discounts were passed on consumers in
the form of lower refined product prices (Table 1.5). Estimates in column 1 give fairly precise zeros
(with standard errors clustered at the city level), even when compared with a full pass-through
benchmark of -0.0428. The full pass-through benchmark for cities that receive positive amounts of
Saudi crude (column 2) is -0.15, so these estimates are also very close to zero. Large standard errors
on the estimates in column 3 make their interpretation more difficult, but the point estimates are
nonetheless quite small. Panel A of column 3, for example, indicates that a one-cent increase in the
per-gallon discount value decreases gasoline prices by 0.03 cents. These estimates are consistent
with the large pass-through into refining profits in Table 1.3.
Taken together, the profits and retail price results indicate that, as expected, the discount
rents were captured by refining firms as profits rather than passed on to consumers. Since refining
companies appear to have been the primary beneficiaries of the discount, the next section examines
how discount receipts affected political action by these firms.
1.5 Political Action by Discount Recipients
While it is impossible to directly measure the effect that the discount actually had on U.S.
foreign policy toward Saudi Arabia, we can observe how the companies that received the discount
28The average unleaded gasoline price is 1.34 dollars, and Saudi inputs make up about 5.5 percent of total inputs,
so a one percent increase in the Saudi input share would decrease prices by 0.04 percent.
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behaved as a result of the policy. As described earlier in the paper, there are plenty of cases where
American oil companies took (sometimes rather extraordinary) political action to support Saudi
interests. The most easily measurable type of corporate political action is financial contributions
to political campaigns. In this section, I examine the relationship between discount receipts and
political contributions by American refiners during the policy period. In particular, I focus on refiner
contributions to Members of Congress, particularly those who serve on key committees and those
who appear to be most sympathetic to Israeli political interests. It is important to note that direct
contributions to politicians from individual donors represent only a fraction of financial support
from companies to politicians, and a smaller fraction still of total political action by corporations.
Overall, individual donors account for only about half of the money that goes to House candidates
and two thirds of the money that goes to Senate candidates (Center for Responsive Politics 2012).
The rest comes from PACs and candidates' personal resources. The advantage of focusing on
individual donations is that it shows the direct link from refiners to politicians so that patterns of
giving can be examined in addition to overall levels of giving. Patterns that are seen in this small,
transparent part of political action by discount recipients may be suggestive of overall patterns of
behavior as it relates to the receipt of the crude discount.
1.5.1 Saudi Arabia and the U.S. Congress
The empirical results in the literature on political contributions and policy influence are mixed.
In particular, despite the conventional wisdom in political economy, it has proven very difficult to
show direct causal links between contributions and voting behavior, though there is some evidence
that regulatory outcomes are influenced by political contributions (de Figueiredo & Edwards 2007).
In their study of the incidence of the costs and benefits of several transportation-sector environmen-
tal regulations, Holland, Hughes, Knittel, & Parker (2011) find patterns in the political donations
by organizations and politician voting behavior that suggest that districts used campaign contri-
butions to influence the House vote on the Waxman-Markey cap and trade bill. In particular, they
find evidence that organizations that opposed the Waxman-Markey bill were more likely to donate
money to House members from districts that would be negatively impacted by the bill, with a
similar pattern in the contributions of supporters to candidates from districts that would benefit.
Further, they find that political contributions from organizations that opposed the bill were asso-
ciated with a large reduction in the likelihood of voting for the bill. As discussed by Ansolabehere,
de Figueiredo & Snyder (2003), campaign contributions likely affect policies in other ways besides
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through roll call votes, including securing access to legislators at other stages of the policy-making
process. Indeed, politicians likely find it desirable to promote client interests in ways that are
observable to clients but not to voters. Because of these difficulties in observability, I assume that
corporate donors allocate their donations strategically, whether with the intent of affecting policy
or to demonstrate loyalty to Saudi interests.
In particular, contributions to federal legislators are an important channel corporations can use
to advocate for Saudi interests. Many bills pass through Congress that affect Saudi Arabia, includ-
ing bills regarding arms sales, trade, aid29 , and immigration 30 . Most of these are referred to the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs or the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Committees
exercise a great deal of power over the legislation they review, and can both block legislation by
tabling it or by revising the bill before they send it to the floor for a vote. In 1992, for example, none
of the bills opposing the sale of F-15XP fighter planes to Saudi Arabia made it out of committee.
In another example, the House Foreign Affairs Committee tabled the Persian Gulf Security Cost
Sharing Act (2001), which would have required Saudi Arabia to defray the cost of U.S. military
deployments in the region.
Committees can also amend popular bills to turn them from aggressive foreign policy changes
into purely symbolic gestures. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs had added Presidential
waiver authority to several anti-Saudi bills, including the Anti Economic Discrimination Act of 1995,
which would have stopped the sale of military equipment to countries participating in the boycott
of Israel. Another notable example of this was an amendment to the 2005 Foreign Appropriations
bill, which stated that "[n]one of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to
this act shall be obligated or expended to finance any assistance to Saudi Arabia." Changes to this
amendment made in committee allowed the President to waive this rule provided that he certified
to the Congressional Appropriations committees that Saudi Arabia was cooperating in the war
against terrorism. Although the amendement passed, 31 it was immediately waived by Presidential
Determination. A subsequent bill (the Prohibit Aid to Saudi Arabia Act of 2005) that attempted
to impose the ban on U.S. aid to Saudi Arabia without waiver authority was not passed on by the
2 9 Examples of aid-related bills include H.R.3137.IH (2003) which prohibited assistance or reparations to Cuba,
Libya, North Korea, Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia, as well as Amendment 708 to H.R. 4818 (the Foreign Operations
Appropriations bill for FY2005).
3 0 See for example, H.R. 604 and 3934. These bills would have halted the issuance of visas to Saudi citizens until
the President certified that the Saudi government did not discriminate in its visa policies on the basis of religious
affiliation or cultural heritage.
3 1Vote 217-191, see roll call http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2004/roll389.xml
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House Foreign Affairs Committee.3 2
In the rest of the paper, I look at how the level and composition of direct corporate donations
to Members of Congress vary with discount receipts.
1.5.2 Data
In this part of the analysis, I match company-level discount receipts to corporate political dona-
tions. Although it is illegal for corporations to contribute to political campaigns directly, in practice
they do contribute through personal donations by their managers and employees. These individual
donors account for approximately two-thirds of campaign money to Senate candidates and half of
the financing for House candidates. By federal law, all contributions to federal candidates, political
action committees (PACs), or parties of over 200 dollars must be reported to the Federal Elec-
tion Commission (FEC). These reports include the name and address of the donor, as well as the
donor's employer and occupation. These data are published by the FEC and aggregated by the
Center for Responsive Politics (among others). I use these data to construct total annual campaign
contributions by employees of all U.S. refining companies to each member of the House and Senate
for the 1991-2003 period. I merge these with data on congressional committee assignments from
Stewart & Woon (2012) and Nelson (2012) to construct total contributions by committee. Table
1.6 shows some summary statistics on political contributions for the 26 companies that received
crude from Saudi Aramco, both public and private. (Though they are excluded from this table, all
126 refining companies are used in the analysis.) The positive relationship between Saudi imports
and total political contributions over the period can be seen graphically in Figure 1-11, which plots
the log of total company campaign contributions against the log of total Saudi imports over the
discount policy period.
For the politician-level contributions analysis, committee assignments and political contribu-
tions are matched to the set of all Members of Congress collected in Stewart & Woon (2012), which
begins in 1993. The merged politician by refiner-level dataset contains information on politician
characteristics including party affiliation, committee assignments, chamber seniority, and contribu-
tions from other types of interest groups. In particular, the analysis classifies politicians according
to the degree to which they receive contributions from donors affiliated with pro-Israel groups.
One categorization simply assigns a dummy variable equal to one for politicians who received any
3 2 In practice the United States provides almost no aid to Saudi Arabia, and the ban targeted a small 25,000 dollar
International Military Education and Training grant for Saudi military training.
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contributions from pro-Israel donors. Another categorizes politicians according to their approxi-
mate quintile of average pro-Israel donations. The first group is the approximately 27 percent of
politicians who never received any contributions from pro-Israel organizations during their time in
Congress. The second group collects the 27th through 40th percentile of recipients, the third the
40th through 60th percentile, the fourth the 60th through 80th percentile, and the fifth the 80th
percentile and above.
Table 1.7 gives some summary statistics for the total annual contributions at the company by
politician level. Since most politician-refinery-year observations are zeros, the left hand panel shows
statistics conditional on a donation occurring. The median contribution to a single politician is
around one thousand dollars per year, though the maximum contribution is very high; in 1996,
Koch Industries affiliates and employees contributed almost 45,000 dollars to Representative Sam
Brownback's (R-KS) campaign. The median total giving by a company in a single year is 7,404
dollars, but again the maximum is quite high; ExxonMobil donated over 374,000 dollars in direct
contributions in 2000.
1.5.3 Results
Contribution Aggregates
As in the profits analysis, I estimate the relationship between discounts and political contribu-
tions using the regression
Contribjt = 0 . DiscValuejt + aj + 7Yt + Ejt (1.7)
where j is the contributing refining company and t is the year. One possible concern here is the
effect of refiner profits on contributions. If corporations increase overall contributions or change
their contribution patterns when their profits are high, 0 may capture the spurious common effect
of overall crude price on contributions (via profits) and the discount value or the indirect effect of
the discount through its effect on profits. I therefore also run this regression on a the subsample of
public companies (for which I have refining profits) both with and without profit controls.
Results for the aggregate contribution regressions are reported in Tables 1.8a and 1.8b. Table
1.8a shows the results for the whole sample of refiners (both public and private). Column 1 shows
the relationship between discount receipts and total donations, and Columns 2 and 3 break this out
into aggregates for contributions to politicians and to PACs. The estimate in Panel A of Column 1
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indicates a small but positive relationship between the discount and overall political contribution
by refiners - a one-million dollar increase in the discount value is associated with an approximately
385 dollar increase in contributions. This is consistent with the fact that contribution magnitudes
tend to be much smaller than the discount value. Among discount recipients, the average discount
amount is 45 million dollars per year and often varied substantially from year to year; the average
annual fluctuation in the value of the discount was 25 million dollars. The average discount, then, is
associated with a contributions increase of 17,325 dollars, which is quite substantial compared with
the annual company average of 18,578 dollars from Table 1.7. Positive and significant estimates of
the elasticity of contributions with respect to discount receipts in Panel B confirm this relationship.
Table 1.8b reports the same results for the subsample of corporations that report profits data. The
results are consistent with the estimates in Table 1.8a, though the point estimates tend to be larger.
Controlling for profits has almost no effect on the estimates for this subsample, which is reassuring
for the full sample results.
Interestingly, these estimates are close to previous estimates of the relationship between corpo-
rate profits and political contributions. Jayachandran (2006) finds that for every dollar companies
had donated to the Republican party, firms lost 2,313 dollars of their market value following the
shift of control in the U.S. Senate when Senator Jim Jeffords switched his party affiliation from
Republican to Democrat in May 2001. This estimate implies that a one million dollar decrease
in market value would have been associated with a contribution of 432 dollars to the Republican
party. My estimates of the effect of discount receipts on overall political giving indicate an increase
of 385 dollars in response to the receipt of one million dollars in discounted crude. Ansolabehere
et al. (2003) find that top corporate executives increased their personal giving to congressional
campaigns by 510 dollars for every additional million dollars of income per year.
I also address the direct effect of profits on contributions by comparing the effect of the dis-
count with that of non-discount profit shocks. To capture non discount-related variation in refiner
profits, I use hurricane landfall events as an instrument for annual profits. Hurricanes affect oil
and petroleum product production in several ways. As a hurricane approaches the coast, offshore
platforms are evacuated and wellheads are plugged to prevent leakage. These offshore platforms
are sometimes destroyed by hurricanes, which imposes direct costs on producers and disrupts oil
supplies. In addition to shutting down upstream crude, hurricanes also affect downstream infras-
tructure. Underwater pipelines can be damaged, and ports may stop accepting shipments. Onshore
refineries can also be heavily damaged; Hurricane Rita, for example, caused refining capacity losses
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of more than 4.9 million bpd due to direct damage or power interruptions along the Texas coast
(EIA 2006).33
To construct the hurricane instrument, I create a dummy variable equal to 1 if a company had
a refinery in a state that was hit by a hurricane in that year. This is further split into dummy
variables for each hurricane category - i.e. dummy variables indicating the most severe hurricane
level experienced by a refinery owned by company j in year t. I focus on the most damaging
hurricanes, i.e. those that were classified as category 2, 3, or 4 on the Saffir-Simpson scale (Simpson
& Saffir 1974), with sustained surface wind speeds of 82-95 knots, 96-112 knots, and 113-136 knots,
respectively.3 4
I then use these hurricane indicators to instrument for profits in a regression of political contri-
butions on refining profits and discount receipts. 35
(FS) Prof itsjt = 6 - DiscValuejt + (1 1(Category 2 )jt + (2 1(Category 3+)jt + aj + 7t + Ejt
hurr
Prof itsjet = - 1(Category 2 )jt + (2 1(Category 3+
--- 
-
hurr(SS) Contribjt = #1 - DiscValuejt + /32 - Prof itsft + a3 + 7t + vjt (1.8)
I then test #1 > 02 to determine whether discount receipts had a larger effect than other types
of profits. Table 1.9 reports the results for the regression of total contributions on discount value
and profits orthogonal to the discount. Panel A reports results from the first stage regression,
which confirm that discounts increase profits and hurricanes decrease them, and that the hurricane
instruments and the discount have comparable explanatory power for profits. The results in panel
B show that only discount receipts seem to have an effect on total contributions, with a one million
dollar increase in the discount associated with a 317 dollar increase in contributions (column 1).
Column 2 shows the corresponding elasticity estimate, and a ten percent increase in the discount
is associated with a 3 percent increase in political contributions. Profits not associated with the
3 3 Other papers have examined the effect of hurricanes and tropical storms on U.S. refined product markets,
including Fink, Fink & Russell (2010), Kaiser, Dismukes & Yu (2009) and Lewis (2009).3 4 There are five relevant hurricane landfall events in the sample. Two of these were category two hurricanes: Bob
(New York 1991) and Georges (Mississippi 1998). The two category three hurricanes were Andrew (Louisiana 1992)
and Bret (Texas 1999), and there was one category four hurricane, Iniki (Hawaii, 1992). Hurricane landfall and
severity data comes from NOAA (2006).
3 5 Allowing for more flexibility in the effects of hurricane landfall events on profits has little impact on the results.
In particular, indicators for refineries owned in adjacent states were statistically insignificant in the first stage and
had no effect on the two-stage least squares results.
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discount have no statistically significant effect on contributions, and the point estimates are close to
zero as well. In both regressions we can reject the hypothesis that discount receipts and orthogonal
profit shocks have the same effect on contributions.
The second set of results (Table 1.10) shows the relationship between the discount value and
the way that total contributions were allocated among various committees. For the foreign policy
committees, for example, the regression is of the share of congressional contributions that go to
members of the House or Senate foreign policy committees.
ContribFP
Sharefp = C tit ta- 0 - DiscV aluejt + aj + t + Ejt (1.9)
it
Though the standard errors on these estimates are large, the pattern is suggestive. The coeffi-
cient on contributions to the foreign policy committees is not statistically significant, but there is
a substantial increase in contributions to members of the Appropriations committees, which also
review Saudi-relevant legislation. The coefficient in Column 2 indicates that a one billion dollar
increase in the discount is associated with a 39 percentage point increase in the share of contribu-
tions that go to Appropriations committee members. The average discount of 45 million dollars
would therefore correspond to a 1.8 percentage point increase in contributions to members of the
Appropriations committees. This is about seven percent of the average share of 27 percent. I also
include some results for "placebo" committees, that would be less likely to be concerned with Saudi
affairs. Most of these coefficients are negative and significant with the exception of the House Post
Office and Senate Labor committees, which appear to be unaffected. 3 6
1.5.4 Politician-Level Contributions
To further understand the effect of the discount on political giving, I also examine the effect of
the discount on corporate contributions at the politician level. In this part of the analysis, company-
year level discount receipts are interacted with a set of politician characteristics (gi) to estimate
how discount receipts affected contributions to different types of politicians. These politician char-
acteristics include a dummy variable for receiving contributions from Pro-Israel interest groups,
quintiles of the level of pro-Israeli contributions, party affiliation and committee membership. This
yields:
Contribijt = 0 -gi - DiscValuejt + Xit3 + aij + -+ E t (1.10)
36As in Table 1.9, most of these results remain the same when I control for profits, though the further loss of
observations increases the standard errors.
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where the subscript i indicates the politician, and j and t the company and year. Controls Xt are
dummies for the time-varying politician characteristics (chamber seniority and committee member-
ship).
In Table 1.11a, we see that the discount tended to decrease giving to pro-Israel politicians, with a
one billion dollar increase in discount receipts decreasing annual contributions by an additional 180
dollars to politicians who received pro-Israel funding (column 1). Column 2 shows this same result
split up by quintile, and the point estimates (though not statistically significant) indicate larger
penalties for politicians in the highest pro-Israel funding quintiles associated with the discount.
The pattern is similar in the regression with the full set of interactions and the coefficients are
individually significant. Republican politicians benefit more from the discount than Democrats
and independents. Republican candidates get a 166 dollar boost from companies that received an
additional billion dollar discount relative to Democrats and independents (column 3). Again, the
pattern is the same in column 5, with Republicans taking a 141 dollar increase. The evidence on
the committee membership patterns is much more mixed, and contrasts with the patterns in the
aggregate contribution regressions. Point estimates on the committee membership interactions are
very sensitive to controls, and are large and negative for the House Foreign Affairs committee in
both columns 4 and 5. Estimates for members of other committees are noisy, and although point
estimates are quite large none are statistically significant.
In general, these results indicate significant politician-level heterogeneity in the impact of the
discount on funding by refining companies. Top beneficiaries were Republicans and candidates
who did not receive funding from pro-Israeli groups. If Israeli interest groups donated more to
candidates that were perceived as being pro-Israel, this could indicate that the discount caused
refining companies to divert funds away from pro-Israel politicians, a move consistent with the
Saudi political agenda toward the Arab-Israeli conflict.
It is important to note here that all of these estimates are quite small. The 253 dollar penalty to
pro-Israel donation recipients, for example, implies that the average discount of 45 million dollars
would be associated with just an eleven-dollar decrease in contributions to these candidates. From
Table 1.7, the average contribution to these candidates, however, is only 38 dollars, so the eleven-
3 7 When the sample is restricted to years when the discount was large (1998-2003, Table 1.11b), the patterns become
more clear for the pro-Israel and committee assignment results. In particular, the estimate of the discount penalty
to pro-Israel donation recipients increases to 253 dollars, and a statistically significant pattern of larger penalties to
politicians who received more pro-Israel money emerges (column 2). The large positive effect on members of the
Senate Appropriations committee is statistically significant in columns 4 and 5 at around 2,400 dollars. The negative
estimate for members of the House Foreign Affairs committee decreases to 621 dollars (column 4), and the magnitude
of the (still statistically insignificant) point estimate for the Senate Foreign Affairs members decreases as well.
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dollar increase is a reasonable proportion of the total, though difficult to think of as practically
significant. Nonetheless, the pattern of the change in this type of contribution is likely suggestive
of other political responses, both financial and otherwise, by discount recipients.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper examines the effect of the Saudi crude discount program on the political behavior
of U.S. firms. This policy is an empirically appealing example of Saudi strategic political behavior
both because it had a clearly measurable cost and because it was effectively directed at specific
recipients. There are three main sets of results. First, I calculate that the program transferred
substantial rents to the U.S. market, with a total discount value of 8.5 billion dollars over the policy
period. Second, I find that the discounted crude was almost entirely a gift to refinery owners, with
full pass-through of discount receipts into refiner profits. Finally, the results suggest that this
gift induced some amount of pro-Saudi political action on the part of recipients. In particular, I
find that discount receipts were associated with higher levels of overall political giving and with
an increase in the share of funds directed toward members of key congressional committees. On
the politician level, there is also some evidence that recipients tended to divert funds away from
congressmen who received donations from pro-Israel interest groups.
There are two possible explanations for this observed pattern in the data. First, the pro-Saudi
shift in corporate political contributions could reflect a direct and intentional effort by Saudi Arabia
to influence the U.S. political process. However, the pattern is also consistent with rent-seeking by
firms trying to protect their future access to discounted crude. This behavior could reflect either a
desire to be seen as friendly by Saudi Arabia, or simply efforts to protect the interests of a country
with which they had developed close economic ties. In any case, the results indicate that U.S.
refiners responded to the discount, and that the policy successfully influenced their political action.
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Figures
Figure 1-1: Annual Value of U.S. Weapons Sales to Saudi Arabia, mil 1990 USD. Source: SIPRI
1985 1990 1995
year
2000 2005
Figure 1-2: U.S. Crude Imports by Country, mil bbl per month (12mma). Source: EIA-814.
1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
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Figure 1-3: Saudi Crude Quantity, Discount, and Discount Value
(a) Saudi Crude Deliveries to U.S. Refineries, mil bbl per month. Source: EIA-814
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Figure 1-4: Sample OSP Releases for December 2001. Source: Platts
Singapore (Platts) - 4 Dec 2001/9.58 pm EST/2.58 GMT
Benchmark Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan
Extra Light WTI -2.75 -3.35 -3.25 -3.05 -3.05 -2.75
Arab Light WTI -4.30 -4.80 -5.10 -4.75 -4.75 w4.05
Arab Medium WTI -5.35 -6.05 -6.40 -5.95 -5.75 -45
Arab Heavy WTI -7.00 -7.40 -6.80 -6.30 -6.65 -5.65
All prices are FOB Ras Tanura.
--Platts Global Alert--
Singapore (Platts) - 4 Dec 2001/7.20 pm EST/0.20 GMT
Super Light
Extra Light
Arab Light
Arab Medium
Arab Heavy
Benchmark Aug Sep Oct
(Oman+Dubai)/2 +2.85 +1.95 +1.55
(Oman+Dubai)/2 +1.65 +1.15 +1.15
(Oman+Dubai)/2 +0.50 +0.30 +0.30
(Oman+Dubai)/2 -0.30 -0.20 -0.20
(Oman+Dubai)/2 -1.10 -0.80 -0.80
Nov
+1.15
+0.75
+0.20
-0.10
-0.55
Dec
+1.05
+0.55
+0.20
-0.20
-0.65
Jan
+1.05
+0.55
+0 .25
-0.10
-0.50
Sales of Saudi crude into Asia loading FOB Ras Tanura are priced
versus the average of Oman/Dubai, plus or minus a differential.
--Platts Global Alert--
Figure 1-5: Crude Refining Inputs and Refined Product Distribution
Foreign
CrudeCrudeRefinery
Crude Truck
Barge Wiokesale fr"I ktai
Pipeline Rak 
ttin
U.S.
Crude Refinery
B
Foreign Foreign
Crude Ckrude
Discount
Profits
-4Reta-4-30 Price
Retail
Margins
51
Figure 1-6: Common cost shocks affect both price and profits, but inframarginal shocks affect only
profits.
(a) Equilibrium without discounts
P
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(b) Common crude price shock affects both price and profits
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(c) Discount to inframarginal producers affects profits but not prices
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Figure 1-7: Geographic Destinations of Saudi Crude and Discount Value, 1991-2003
(a) Saudi crude quantity by refinery, mil bbl
0.01
o 10
1,000
(b) Total discount value by refinery, mil 2000 USD
o 10
1,000
53
Figure 1-8: State-level Saudi inputs as a share of total refining capacity
I
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Figure 1-9: Product Pipelines, 2004.
Note: The pipelines in this map were used to construct the markets in panel B of table 1.5.
Source: http: //www.theodora. com/pipelines/united-states-pipelines .html#map
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Figure 1-10: Crack Spread and Average Refiner Crude Cost
110
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90 
-- Average Refiner Crude Cost
-6-3-2-1 Crack Spread80
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Note: The crack spread is calculated as the difference in cost between a barrel of crude and a representative
mix of typical outputs. For example, a simple version (the 2-1-1) is calculated as the difference in cost of
2 barrels of crude and a barrel of gasoline and a barrel of heating oil/diesel. Here I use the 6-3-2-1 crack
spread, which is the difference in the total cost of 6 barrels of crude and outputs of 3 barrels of gasoline,
2 barrels of heating oil/diesel, and 1 barrel of residual fuel oil. Trends are the same for each of the four
standard spreads. Source: EIA.
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Figure 1-11: Correlation of Total Saudi Imports and Total Campaign Contributions by Company
* -
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Note: This figure plots the log of total congressional campaign contributions (mil USD) over the 1991-2003
period against the log of total Saudi imports (thousands of barrels).
Fitted line is ln(amount) = 0.562 * ln(Saudi imports) + 0.175; F(1,20) = 13.55.
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Tables
Table 1.1: Refinery owner characteristics and receipts, 1991-2003
Disc Saudi Refining Share No. Refining
Value Imports Capacity Inputs No. Saudi Profits Disc/
Owner (bil USD) (bil bbl) (bil bbl) Saudi Refs Refs (bil USD) Profits
Chevron / Texaco 4.05 3.26 10.16 0.32 18 12 39.84 0.10
Marathon 1.01 0.68 3.50 0.19 7 6 10.81 0.09
ExxonMobil 0.97 0.89 9.03 0.10 10 8 73.94 0.01
Valero 0.84 0.39 1.82 0.21 14 6 4.71 0.18
BP / Amoco 0.57 0.45 9.28 0.05 15 6 34.68 0.02
ConocoPhillips 0.46 0.37 4.97 0.07 17 5 1.17 0.39
Royal Dutch Shell 0.09 0.13 4.13 0.03 15 7 40.13 0.002
Premcor 0.08 0.04 1.70 0.02 6 2 1.10 0.07
Tosco 0.06 0.02 2.53 0.01 10 2 3.22 0.02
Murphy 0.05 0.02 0.61 0.03 2 1 0.33 0.12
Sunoco 0.05 0.11 3.45 0.03 6 2 1.52 0.03
Lyondell 0.03 0.04 1.25 0.04 1 1 0.99 0.03
Alon USA 0.02 0.01 0.34 0.02 2 1 0.04 0.50
Fina 0.01 0.02 0.78 0.03 3 1 0.05 0.20
Total 0.002 0.002 0.62 0.003 3 1 13.72 <0.001
UDS 0.001 0.001 1.27 0.001 4 2 3.31 <0.001
Amerada Hess 0 0 2.46 0 2 0 0.13 0
Citgo 0 0 2.37 0 4 0 1.53 0
Tesoro 0 0 0.94 0 6 0 1.12 0
UnoCal 0 0 0.67 0 3 0 0.57 0
Mapco 0 0 0.56 0 2 0 0.64 0
Farmland Ind 0 0 0.54 0 2 0 0.07 0
Crown Central 0 0 0.47 0 1 0 -0.04 0
PDVSA 0 0 0.39 0 1 0 0.99 0
Frontier 0 0 0.35 0 2 0 0.42 0
Holly 0 0 0.31 0 3 0 0.55 0
United Refining 0 0 0.29 0 1 0 0.09 0
Delek 0 0 0.26 0 1 0 0
Pennzoil / Quaker 0 0 0.28 0 3 0 0.72 0
Giant Industries 0 0 0.18 0 3 0 0.42 0
Big West 0 0 0.11 0 1 0 0
Calumet 0 0 0.10 0 3 0 0.00
Huntway Refining 0 0 0.06 0 2 0 0.06 0
AIPC 0 0 0.03 0 1 0 -0.06 0
Suncor 0 0 0.02 0 1 0 0.34 0
Greka Energy 0 0 0.01 0 1 0 0.00
SABA Petrol 0 0 0.01 0 1 0 0
Notes: This table provides sample statistics on the refinery-owners that are publicly-listed. Columns 1-
6 are calculated using refinery-level observations on monthly Saudi imports and crude prices and annual
refinery capacity reports from the EIA. Columns 5 and 6 indicate the number of uni ue refineries that
were owned by the company during the policy period and the number of these that received any
amount of Saudi crude during the period. Total refining profits is the sum of the annual operating
profits variable for refining operations from the Compustat Business Segments data, and total net
income is the sum of the quarterly net income entries from the Compustat aggregation of the SEC-10K
filings. Column 8 reports the ratio between the value of discount receipts relative to total refining
profits. All dollar values are billions of real 2000 USD.
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Table 1.2: Refiner Characteristics and Saudi Crude Receipts
Saudi Crude Refinery(89/90)
Total Refining Capacity
Former Aramco Partner
Overall Political Contrib
(89/90)
Politicians
Committees
Pro-Israel Recipients
Republican
Democratic
House Appropriations
House Armed Services
House Energy
House Educ & Labor
House Foreign Affairs
House Post Office
Senate Appropriations
Senate Armed Serv.
Senate Energy
Senate For. Rel.
Senate Govt Affairs
Senate Labor
State Dummies
N
0.072
(0.053)
0.116**
(0.056)
-0.058**
(0.026)
-0.024
(0.073)
-0.213**
(0.087)
-0.199
(0.135)
0.011
(0.015)
-0.158*
(0.083)
-0.026
(0.024)
0.095*
(0.054)
0.145
(0.102)
0.088
(0.068)
x
0.373 0.620
115 115
0.379 0.381 0.376 0.380 0.434
115 115 115 115 115
Notes: Results for LPM regression of a dummy for whether a refining company received Saudi crude
during the policy period on a set of refiner characteristics. These include whether the company ever
owned a refinery that had processed Saudi crude in the pre-policy period (1989-1990), total refining
capacity in billions, an indicator for the former Aramco partners, and pre-period political
contributions to Members of Congress by party affiliation and committee membership. All political
contributions are in thousands of 2000 USD. State dummies indicate whether a company owned any
refineries in a particular state.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(1)
O.6j47***
(0.086)
0.025
(0.030)
-0.012
(0.113)
(2)
U.639***
(0.125)
0.062
(0.058)
0.036
(0.247)
(3)
U.637***
(0.090)
0.007
(0.032)
-0.080
(0.130)
0.001
(0.001)
(5)
0.635***
(0.089)
0.008
(0.035)
-0.079
(0.104)
(6)
0.637***
(0.087)
0.002
(0.035)
-0.070
(0.132)
. (7)
O.626),(***
(0.103)
0.062
(0.082)
-0.554
(0.676)
(4)
0.642***
(0.090)
-0.005
(0.039)
-0.090
(0.130)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.002)
0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
Table 1.3: Impact of the Discount on Refining Profits
Quantity: log Quantity: log Value: level
(1) (2) (3)
Discount Value 0.016** 0.169*** 3.38**
(0.007) (0.045) (1.56)
HO: full pass-through (p-value) 0.620 0.101 0.135
Companies 39 16 39
N 317 81 317
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report results from the regressions of log annual company-level refining
profits on log quantity of Saudi crude delivered to refineries owned by the same company in that
year for the 1991-2003 period. In the regression in Column 1, 1 is added to profits and 1 to
quantity to avoid losing observations (both in billions) and column 2 drops observations with
negative profit observations or zero Saudi quantities. Column 3 shows the results from a
regression of the level of refining profits on total discount value. The second row reports the p-
value of an F-test of the coefficient against the full pass-through benchmark of 0.02 for column 1,
0.09 for column 2 and 1 for column 3. All regressions include company and year fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the company level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<O.l
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Table 1.4: Saudi Crude Receipts and Refinery Output
(1) (2) (3)
ln(Saudi Crude Receipts) 0.001 0.004* 0.003*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
ln(Refining Capacity) 1.103*** 1.142*** 0.661***
(0.081) (0.065) (0.174)
District FE x x x
District FE * t x
Year FE x x
N 156 156 156
Notes: This table shows the results from the regression of log annual district-
level production on the log of Saudi crude receipts to all refineries in the district
for the 1991-2003 period. Refinery output is calculated at the district level for
twelve refining districts using refining capacity from the EIA Refining Capacity
Report and capacity utilization rates from the EIA-810 Monthly Refinery
Report. One is added to all three variables to avoid dropping observations.
Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.5: Impact of the Discount on City-Level Retail Gasoline Prices
Quantity: log Quantity: log Value: level
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Local Markets
Discount per Gallon -0.0002 -0.001 -0.031
(0.0007) (0.002) (0.112)
HO: full pass-through (p-value) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Panel B: Pipeline-Connected Markets
Discount per Gallon 0.0001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.0009) (0.002) (0.142)
HO: full pass-through (p-value) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Cities 75 31 75
N 5326 1375 5326
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report results from the regressions of the log of monthly
city -level gasoline prices on log of Saudi crude deliveries as a share of total local
refining capacity for the 1998-2003 period. In the regression in Column 1, 0.01 is
added to share to avoid losing observations and column 2 drops observations
with zero Saudi quantities. Column 3 shows the results from a regression of
gasoline price levels on monthly discount per gallon of local refining capacity.
Panel B reports the same results accounting for all imports and refining capacity
"up-pipe" of the city. The second row in both panels reports the p-value of an
F-test of the coefficient against the full pass-through benchmark of -0.04 for
column 1, -0.15 for column 2 and -1 for column 3. All regressions include city
and state x year x month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the city
level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.6: Political Contributions and Discount Value by Company, 1991-2003
Corporation
Chevron/Texaco
Marathon
ExxonMobil
BP/Amoco/ARCO
Valero
ConocoPhillips
Ergon
Royal Dutch Shell
Sunoco
Lyondell
Premcor
Hunt
Tosco
Fina
Murphy
Coastal
Phibro
Chalmette
Alon USA
Koch
Total
Basis
Orion
Sinclair
UDS
Flint Hills
Total
Contrib
7.720
3.806
7.093
8.592
1.636
3.403
0.263
1.245
1.696
0.0002
0.014
1.036
0.793
0.113
0.688
2.762
0.007
0
0.010
6.214
0.037
0.001
0
0.046
0.186
0.008
Politician
Contrib
2.704
2.053
4.296
2.586
0.745
1.370
0.202
0.810
0.561
0
0.009
0.286
0.306
0.052
0.150
1.136
0.007
0
0.007
2.471
0.031
0.001
0
0.040
0.150
0.008
PAC
Contrib
4.928
1.682
2.669
2.681
0.852
1.938
0.049
0.384
1.112
0.0002
0.003
0.700
0.474
0.058
0.496
1.575
0
0
0.003
3.615
0.006
0
0
0.004
0.010
0
Disc
Value
4,049
1,005
970
567
835
460
172
85
45
34
81
62
64
13
45
27
2
19
22
1
2
0
1
-1
1
1
Share
Inputs
Saudi
0.683
0.441
0.185
0.130
0.211
0.218
0.345
0.030
0.033
0.035
0.024
0.232
0.009
0.030
0.029
0.014
0.018
0.027
0.024
0.001
0.003
0.021
0.005
0.002
0.001
0.001
Share
Saudi
Exports
0.475
0.131
0.129
0.066
0.056
0.053
0.020
0.018
0.016
0.006
0.006
0.005
0.003
0.003
0.003
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.001
0.0003
0.0003
0.0003
0.0002
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
Refining
Profits
39,840
10,810
73.940
34,680
4,710
1,170
40,130
1,520
990
1,100
3,220
50
330
40
13,720
Disc /
Profits
0.10
0.09
0.01
0.02
0.18
0.39
0.002
0.03
0.03
0.07
0.02
0.26
0.14
0.55
<.001
3,310 <.001
Notes: Includes all public and private companies with any Saudi imports over the period. Columns 1-3
are calculated using data from the FEC filings available at
http://data.influenceexplorer.com/docs/contributions. Column 2 includes only direct contributions to
campaigns for House and Senate seats, and Column 3 totals contributions to political committees.
Columns 4-6 are calculated using refinery-level observations on monthly Saudi imports and crude prices
and annual refinery capacity reports from the EIA. Total refining profits is the sum of the annual
operating profits variable for refining operations from the Compustat Business Segments data. Column 8
reports the ratio between the value of discount receipts relative to total refining profits. All dollar values
are millions of real 2000 USD.
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Table 1.7: Summary Statistics for Politician-Level Political Contributions: 1993-2003
Conditional (>0) Unconditional
Mean Median Max SD N Mean N
Overall 1,487 997 44,901 1,883 10,680 34 464,954
Received pro-Israel Contribs 1,595 1,026 44,901 2,042 8,218 38 337,583
ISR27-40 1,187 933 38,732 1,852 1,314 26 59,307
ISR40-60 1,182 937 17,618 1,370 2,204 28 92,447
ISR60-80 1,709 1,053 31,402 2,074 2,534 46 93,418
ISR80+ 2,130 1,157 44,901 2,496 2,166 50 92,411
Republican 1,572 1,006 44,901 2,014 7,701 52 230,456
Democrat 1,269 958 21,155 1,472 2,977 16 232,655
Independent 721 721 963 342 2 1 1,354
House 1,247 951 44,901 1,584 8,515 28 379,093
Senate 2,431 1,406 31,402 2,554 2,165 61 85,861
House Appropriations 1,244 960 38,732 1,746 1,210 1,224 1,223
Senate Appropriations 2,508 1,877 21,155 2,517 708 2,454 721
House Foreign Affairs 1,136 697 44,901 2,085 591 1,097 606
Senate Foreign Relations 2,478 1,199 31,402 3,103 393 2,439 399
Company-Level Total 34,861 7,404 374,089 57,333 453 18,578 850
Notes: This table reports annual average values for contributions by refining companies to
members of congress. The left panel reports statistics on the non-zero entries in the dataset,
e.g. the size of an annual contribution conditional on a contribution being made by that
company to that politician in a given year. The right panel reports statistics on the entire
annual company by politician sample, including zeros for years in which the politician was a
member of congress and the company existed but no contribution was made. The last row of the
table gives annual averages by company. Contribution values are in 2000 USD.
62
Table 1.8: Discount Correlation with Refiner Political Contributions
(a) All RefiningFirms
Total Politicians PACs
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Levels
Discount Value 0.385** 0.107 0.271***
(0.170) (0.092) (0.086)
Panel B: Elasticities
ln(Discount Value) 0.440*** 0.432*** 0.418**
(0.149) (0.114) (0.186)
Companies 115 115 115
N 1033 1033 1033
Notes: Panel A shows the results from regressions of total annual political contributions
on total discount value (in thousands) in the same year over the 1991-2003 period, and
Panel B reports the elasticity of giving with respect to changes in the value of the
discount. Column 1 shows the correlation with total overall political contributions, and
columns 2 and 3 break this overall effect into the effects on contributions to individual
politicians and to PACs. All regressions include company and year fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the company level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(b) Public Refining Firms Only
Total Politicians PACs
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Levels
Discount Value 0.385** 0.107 0.271***
(0.170) (0.092) (0.086)
Panel B: Elasticities
ln(Discount Value) 0.440*** 0.432*** 0.418**
(0.149) (0.114) (0.186)
Companies 115 115 115
N 1033 1033 1033
Notes: Panel A shows the results from regressions of total annual political contributions
on total discount value (in thousands) in the same year over the 1991-2003 period, and
Panel B reports the elasticity of giving with respect to changes in the value of the
discount. Column 1 shows the correlation with total overall political contributions, and
columns 2 and 3 break this overall effect into the effects on contributions to individual
politicians and to PACs. All regressions include company and year fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the company level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.9: Profit Shocks and Total Political Contributions
Levels
(1)
Panel A: First Stage (Profits on
Discount Value
I(Category 2)
I(Category 3')
Partial R 2 (Discount Value)
Partial R 2 (Hurricane Indicators)
Discount Value
Discount and Hurricane Indicators)
3.89**
(1.67)
-2.57***
(0.24)
-0.21**
(0.09)
0.004
0.010
Panel B: Second Stage (Contributions on Profits)
0.317***
(0.089)
Profits from Hurricane Shocks
F-test p-value
Companies
N
-0.005
(0.013)
0.001
38
316
1.90***
(0.57)
-0.93***
(0.05)
-0.11*
(0.06)
0.006
0.010
0.302**
(0.092)
-0.002
(0.030)
0.007
38
316
Notes: Results from a two-stage least squares procedure showing the effects of
discount receipts and profits shocks associated with hurricanes on total refiner political
contributions over the 1991-2003 period. Profits are in thousands of 2000 USD and
contributions in 2000 USD. Regressions include company and year fixed effects. One is
added to contributions, discount, and profits (all in billions of 2000 USD) to avoid
losing observations in the regressions in column 2.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.10: Discount Value and Share of Political Contributions by Committee
Post Indian
FP A pro Energy Educ Office Labor Affairs
(Both) (Both) (Both) (House) (House) (Senate) (Senate)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Discount Value 0.113 0.385** -0.508** -0.677** -0.035 0.021 -0.358**
(0.084) (0.156) (0.254) (0.280) (0.067) (0.068) (0.148)
Sample Avg 0.104 0.271 0.223 0.040 0.010 0.030 0.065
Companies 77 77 77 77 77 77 77
N 532 532 532 532 532 532 532
Notes: This table reports the relationship between the total Saudi discount value and share
of total refiner political contributions by committee membership over the 1991-2003 period.
Discount value in billions of 2000 USD. All regressions include company and year fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the company level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Easticit
(2)
Table 1.11: Discount Receipts and Politician-Level Political Contributions
(a) Full Sample: 1993-2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(ISR=1)*DiscValue -118.21*
(66.70)
(ISR27-40)*DiscValue -65.65 -20.51
(92.88) (90.36)
(ISR40-60)*DiscValue -72.93 -47.54
(74.46) (75.18)
(ISR60-80)*DiscValue 
-140.73 -152.78
(89.07) (94.70)
(ISR80+)*DiscValue -176.70 -162.53
(138.87) (135.90)
Republican*DiscValue 166.23** 140.54*
(73.18) (77.91)
(House Approp)*DiscValue 92.99 57.16
(402.97) (403.16)
(Senate Approp)*DiscValue 1685.37 1705.26
(1079.05) (1080.74)
(House For. Aff.)*DiscValue -1177.70*** -1212.62***
(398.24) (402.23)
(Senate For. Rel.)*DiscValue 
-1570.44 -1543.64
(1278.91) (1262.46)
N 464,954 464,954 464,954 464,954 464,954
Notes: This table shows the results from the regression of annual politician by company level
political contributions on the interaction of company discount values with po itician
characteristics. All regressions include politician by company and year fixed effects and controls
for committee membership and discount value. Discount value in billions of 2000 USD,
contributions in 2000 USD. Standard errors are clustered at the politician by company level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<O.l
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Table 1.11: Discount Receipts and Politician-Level Political Contributions
(b) High Discount Period: 1998-2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(ISR=1)*DiscValue -253.11***
(85.52)
(ISR20-40)*DiscValue -196.84* -178.00
(110.49) (109.40)
(ISR40-60)*DiscValue -214.56** -208.00***
(89.16) (89.75)
(ISR60-80)*DiscValue -406.76*** -438.21
(127.28) (129.67)
(ISR80+)*DiscValue -175.11 -243.06
(172.81) (179.81)
Republican*DiscValue 30.45 0.19
(93.02) (102.97)
(House Approp.)*DiscValue -605.49 -578.65
(383.80) (377.23)
(Senate Approp.)*DiscValue 2375.64** 2432.25**
(1192.79) (1185.21)
(House For. Aff.)*DiscValue -621.36* -616.60
(377.95) (378.35)
(Senate For. Rel.)*DiscValue -582.36 -567.95
(1043.25) (1038.65)
N 223,213 223,213 223,213 223,213 223,213
Notes: This table shows the results from the regression of annual politician by company level
political contributions on the interaction of company discount values with politician
characteristics. All regressions include politician by company and year fixed effects and controls
for committee membership and discount value. Discount value in billions of 2000 USD,
contributions in 2000 USD. Standard errors are clustered at the politician by company level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<O.l
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Chapter 2
Can Hiring Quotas Work? The Effect
of the Nitaqat Program on the Saudi
Private Sector
2.1 Introduction
It is often observed that abundant natural resources tend to be associated with slow economic growth
in resource-rich countries. This counter-intuitive combination of resource abundance and economic under-
performance is called the "resource curse", a term that refers to a variety of common development problems
in resource-rich countries. In particular, non-renewables like fuel and minerals tend to be associated with
underdevelopment of the non-resource sector, high unemployment, weak institutions and corruption, and
political instability. These challenges were particularly salient for Middle Eastern oil producers during the
Arab Spring uprisings of 2011 and 2012, and protests occurred in almost all of the oil-exporting countries in
the Middle East.' While there were certainly a variety of reasons for the demonstrations, protestors often
cited unemployment as a central concern, especially in places like the usually peaceful Oman. Indeed, high
unemployment rates, particularly among young people, tend to be a crucial issue for governments worried
about political instability. Because the governments in the Middle East also control between a half and one
third of world oil reserves, their political stability is often of great international interest as well.
Among resource rich countries, there is a subset of oil exporters that share several peculiar labor market
issues. The countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) - Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait,
This project was undertaken as part of the Labor Market Decision Support System at the Center for Complex
Engineering Systems at MIT and the King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology. I am extremely grateful to
Michael Greenstone and David Autor for their extensive feedback and to Ahmed Fadol for his considerable assistance
with this project. I also thank the rest of the LMDSS team for their support and advice. Miikka Rokkanen, Heidi
Williams, and seminar participants at MIT contributed many helpful comments and suggestions.
'Uprisings or protests were documented in Libya, Yemen, Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Algeria, Syria, Iraq, Kuwait,
Morocco, Oman and Saudi Arabia.
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Qatar and the UAE - have economies that are characterized by several common core features. In particular,
all six have a very heavy reliance on oil and gas, with fuel exports ranging from 30 to 85 percent of total GDP;
in comparison, Venezuela derives only 18 percent of GDP from oil and gas. The GCC countries also tend
to have dramatically segmented labor markets, with large populations of low-skilled migrant workers. These
guest workers form between 20 and 80 percent of the total workforce in these countries, and non-citizens
make up nearly a third of the total GCC population. Correspondingly, there is also a low participation of
nationals in the private sector, with most citizens working in the public sector or in the oil and gas industry.2
At the same time, these economies tend to suffer from high and rising unemployment, especially among young
people. Saudi Arabia is a clear example of this pattern, with a large number of guest workers, high native
unemployment, and sluggish growth in the non-oil private sector. Saudi nationals form about half of the
labor force, with four million Saudis employed in 2011. Of these, sixty percent worked in the public sector,
and only about 600,000 worked in the non-oil private sector. Expatriate guest workers make up ninety
percent of the non-oil private sector workforce. Unemployment is also very high among new labor market
entrants, and official figures from the Central Department of Statistics and Information (CDSI) report 40
percent unemployment in the 20-25 age group.
The reliance on migrant labor in the face of rising national unemployment has become a critical issue for
the governments of the GCC. While high-skill workers are also brought in from the West for their technical
expertise, the majority of expatriate workers are hired for low-skill work. In comparison to nationals, who
often have access to generous government benefits and other forms of rent redistribution, expatriates tend
to be accept lower wages and to work longer hours in poorer conditions. The de facto minimum wage for a
Saudi worker, for example, is around 3000 SR per month, around 800 USD. In contrast, expatriate workers
can be paid about 1500 SR per month, or 400 USD. Although expatriates must be recruited from overseas,
their employment terms are also much more flexible than those of Saudi employees, who are more difficult
to fire under Saudi labor laws. Foreign workers usually come to the GCC without their families, and are not
offered a path to citizenship; their ties to their host countries remain very loose, and many send their wages
back to their home countries as remittances.
Throughout the GCC, governments have become increasingly concerned about both rising citizen unem-
ployment and continued dependence on foreign labor. In addition to political concerns about the potential for
radicalization among unemployed youth, large expatriate populations themselves are seen by elites as poten-
tially politically destabilizing, making nationalization efforts highly politically desirable (Randeree 2012, Al-
Dosary 2004, Al-Lamki 1998). Over the past thirty years, all six countries have instituted some form of
2Until recently, the GCC states used public sector employment as a way to combat unemployment and redistribute
oil wealth. This strategy has lately become unsustainable, however, as population growth has rapidly outpaced growth
in oil revenues (Forstenlechner & Rutledge 2010, Forstenlechner, Madi, Selim & Rutledge 2012, El-Katiri, Fattouh &
Segal 2011).
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private-sector workforce nationalization program to address these two issues.3 These programs are known as
Saudization in Saudi Arabia, Bahrainization in Bahrain, Kuwaitization in Kuwait, Omanization in Oman,
Qatarization in Qatar, and Emiratization in the UAE. These initiatives are the core government strategies
to both increase national employment and to reduce dependence on a foreign workforce. Until recently,
however, these programs have been relatively narrow in scope and largely unenforced (Randeree 2009).
From 1995 to 2010, Saudi Arabia's nationalization efforts were similar to others in the region, with
extremely ambitious Saudization targets that were not enforced on a broad scale, but which had achieved
some success in the oil and gas industry and in financial services.4 In 2011, the Saudi Ministry of Labor
began enforcing an updated version of the old nationalization program that had previously been on the
books but non-binding. This new program, called Nitaqat, or "bands", was designed to give firms more
attainable targets and to introduce incentives to achieve nationalization mandates. The program developed
nationalization targets based on firm size and industry and imposed visa restrictions based on how firms
performed relative to these targets. These incentives have been strictly enforced, and non-compliers have
faced restrictions on their work visas for foreign workers, while firms that perform well are given expedited
access to Ministry services such as recruiting assistance and visa approvals. This employment quota program
is unprecedented in the broadness of its scope as well as its rigorous enforcement and close monitoring.
Because of this, the Nitaqat program is a key test case to measure the potential of these programs to combat
unemployment.
At the same time, one of the main concerns about these programs is that they will impose an undue
burden on an already-fragile private sector (Looney 2004). These strict regulations are expected to raise
costs for private sector firms, which could significantly handicap growth even as these countries become more
reliant on this sector to diversify their economies away from oil and gas. The Nitaqat program is also an
important case study for how the costs imposed by such a quota program can restrict the growth of the
targeted firms.
This paper focuses on two main questions: was Nitaqat successful in increasing the number of Saudis
in the private sector, and what were the costs to firms? To answer these questions, the analysis employs
a comprehensive dataset on the full universe of Saudi private-sector firms used by the Saudi Ministry of
Labor to administer the program. The data is particularly notable for its wide coverage and high quality, as
employment submissions from firms were automatically checked against government social security and visa
records. The establishment-level data contains weekly totals of Saudi and non-Saudi employees as well as
basic firm characteristics such as industry and size category as well as the level of quota compliance. This
3These programs are summarized in Randeree (2012).4 Under the old Saudization law, companies in nine sectors were required to achieve 30 percent nationalization
targets, and construction companies were assigned a 10 percent Saudization target. This law was not enforced,
however, and companies in most sectors fell well short of these quotas.
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is the first time that such establishment-level data has been made available to researchers, and this access
provides a unique opportunity to study the firm-level effects of this program. The main empirical strategy
exploits a kink in the incentive to increase Saudization generated by industry-level Nitaqat quotas. This kink
in the policy rule yields an identification strategy based on discontinuities in the derivatives of the outcome
variables. I use this regression kink design (RKD) to estimate the effect of the Nitaqat program on firms
near the quota cutoffs in terms of program "benefits" (Saudization, Saudi hiring, and expatriate downsizing)
as well as program "costs" in terms of firm size and exit. I also use a differences-in-differences approach to
estimate the average effect of the program on all firms, which allows for an estimate of the overall effects of
the program.
The analysis finds that the program succeeded in increasing Saudi employment, but at significant costs to
firm growth and survival. Program compliance rates were significant, with firms increasing their Saudization
rate by 0.2 percentage points on average for every percentage point increase required to reach the quota.
Quota compliance was primarily accomplished by hiring Saudis, and the paper estimates that Nitaqat was
responsible for the addition of 52,000 Saudi workers to the private sector workforce over the 16 month period,
a sizable share of the approximately 460,000 new Saudi workers employed at eligible firms over the period.
At the same time, the program caused almost 11,000 firms to shut down, raising exit rates from 19 percent
to 28 percent. Surviving firms also tended to shrink in terms of the total number of employees, and the
program decreased total employment at these firms by 198,000 workers. There is also some evidence that a
small number of firms were able to game the system by hiring Saudi workers on a temporary basis in order
to avoid sanctions. General downsizing does not appear to have been strategic, however, and firms do not
appear to have downsized below the size cutoffs for Nitaqat inclusion as a way to escape regulation.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides some context for the work on labor market
quota programs. Section 3 gives some background on the structure of the Nitaqat program, and Section
4 describes the data used in this analysis. Section 5 describes the regression kink empirical strategy, its
applicability to the analysis of the Nitaqat program, and reports the relevant RKD identification checks.
Section 6 describes the main RKD results and some extensions, and section 7 concludes.
2.2 Background: Previous Literature
The analysis of the Nitaqat program relates to a large literature in labor economics on the effects of
employment quota programs. The most well-studied of these are affirmative action policies in the United
States.5 Although most of this literature has focused on the effects of affirmative action on employees, there
are several studies that have attempted to estimate the effects on firms. Griffin (1992), for example, estimates
5For a detailed survey of this literature, see the comprehensive literature review in Holzer & Neumark (2000).
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establishment-level translog cost functions for firms that were government contractors (and therefore subject
to affirmative action regulations) and for firms that were not in the contracting sector. He finds that the
labor costs of contracting firms were 6.5 percent higher than those of non-contracting firms. In the absence
of exogenous variation in which firms were exposed to the regulation, however, it is difficult to know how
much of these differences are attributable to affirmative action alone. There are also several recent papers
on employment quota programs outside of the United States. Recent studies by Howard & Prakash (2012),
Chin & Prakash (2011), and Prakash (2009), for example, have examined the effect of Indian minority hiring
quotas on employment outcomes and occupational choice of favored groups. These studies find that these
programs increased the probability of finding a salaried job for some types of favored groups, and that
this improved employment outcome was associated with higher household consumption expenditures and
higher-skilled occupational choice.
This study adds to this literature in several ways. First, the strict enforcement and clean color-band
assignment cutoffs provide quasi-experimental variation in incentives that allow this study to estimate the
causal effect of the quota on firms. This type of evidence is rare in this literature, which often suffers from
endogeneity problems in the identification of program effects. This study is the first to examine a quota
program of this magnitude, both in terms of the number of industries included in the program as well as its
geographical extent. The overall effects of programs that target a particular industry or focus on a single
area are likely to be small both because the small number of affected workers as well as the fact that workers
may easily be shifted from non-targeted industries or areas. Because of this, the modest effects seen in these
types of programs may not be relevant when scaled up to an economy-wide program like Nitaqat. This study
will therefore be able to offer a more accurate picture of the effects of a national-level quota policy. This
study is also the first to examine the effect of a nationalization policy rather than one targeting a historically
disadvantaged minority. The differences in the characteristics of the targeted labor force will also have an
effect on the interpretation of these results.
This study is also of particular interest given the popularity of nationalization as an employment stimulus
program in other resource-rich countries, particularly those in the GCC. All six GCC countries (Saudi Arabia,
Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE) already have some form of nationalization program in place
(Randeree 2012). Among these, Nitaqat is unique in its broad scope and its enforcement, and therefore
provides an important test case for countries looking to expand their efforts in this area. The UAE, for
example, recently announced a renewed focus on its Emiratization initiative to bring more Emiratis into
the private sector. 6 This study adds important evidence to the debate about the efficacy of these programs
by providing estimates of both the benefits in terms of the employment of nationals as well as the costs to
6Raissa Kasolowsky, "UAE mulls new labor law to attract Emiratis to private sector," Reuters. February 16,
2013.
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private sector firms.
2.3 Background: The Nitaqat Program
2.3.1 Firm Categories
Under Nitaqat, the Saudization quotas that firms face vary by industry and size. All private sector firms
are allocated into these industry by size categories based on their economic activity type and number of
employees. There are currently 51 different industry categories based on the 3,127 economic activities regis-
tered with the Ministry of Commerce. These include categories such as "financial institutions", "pharmacies
and drug stores", and "bakeries". Although the program initially started with only 41 categories, several
of these have been split into smaller categories to account for large degrees of heterogeneity within sectors.
Since June 2011, the program has added 10 new industry classifications, increasing the number of industries
from 41 to 51. These new sectors were split off from the existing categories in response to complaints that
dissimilar business groups were being held to the same targets. Road cargo transport, for example, was split
into long-haul and intra-city trucking. Firms were allowed to change their classification up to one time by
appealing to the Ministry of Commerce.
Within each category, entities are classified into size groups according to the total number of employees
in a single industry category across all branches of the firm. These size groups were set somewhat arbitrarily
based on natural economy-wide clustering of firm sizes.7 The five size categories are: very small (< 10
employees), small (10-49 employees), medium (50-499 employees), large (500-2999 employees) and giant
(3000+ employees). These entity sizes are calculated by the Ministry using data on the number of foreign
workers visas held from the Ministry and National Information Center (NIC) records and the number of Saudi
employees from the General Organization for Social Insurance (GOSI). The number of Saudi employees is
entered as a moving average over thirteen weeks to prevent sharp changes in size category or Saudization
percentage.
Firms are therefore assigned to industry and size categories according to the economic activity of their
branches (as registered with the Ministry of Commerce) and their numbers of employees as calculated by the
Ministry of Labor from NIC and GOSI data. For example, a firm with three bakeries with 30 employees at
each branch would be counted as a single entity with 90 employees, putting it in the Medium size category.
A firm with a jewelry store with 12 employees and a clothing store with 60 employees would be classified
a two entities, one Small entity in the Jewelry sector and another Medium entity in the Retail sector. If
the firm decided to list as one entity, it would be considered Medium sized with 72 employees, and it would
7 Administrators at the Ministry believe that larger firms are seen as more desirable places to work, and therefore
have an easier time recruiting Saudi employees. As such, the targets are almost all weakly increasing in firm size.
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have to achieve Saudization targets for the most stringent sector in which it had any economic activity, in
this case the jewelry sector with 20 percent nationalization rather than the retail sector target of 17 percent
nationalization. Firms may also be listed as a conglomerate, in which case their business lines are classified
as a single entity and coded in the "multiple economic activities" category.
Overall, there are 1.8 million branches and 1.2 million private-sector entities monitored by the Ministry
under Nitaqat.
2.3.2 Nitaqat Color Bands
Within each cell of the industry by size classification, firms are assigned to a color group based on their
Saudization percentage relative to the Ministry's color group cutoffs for that cell. Figure 2-1 shows a sample
color band grid for building and construction from the Nitaqat website. For a medium-sized construction
entity, for example, the color band ranges were:
Red: 0-2%
Yellow: 2-6%
Green: 6-28%
Platinum: 28+%
A construction firm with 5 Saudi employees and 95 foreign workers would therefore be classified as Yellow
with a Saudization rate of 5 percent. Firms with fewer than 10 employees or who had been granted an
exception from Nitaqat are classified as "white" and are not included in the program. 8
Industry and size group cutoffs were designed based on pre-Nitaqat Saudization rates so that approxi-
mately half of firms would be coded as Green or Platinum and the other half as Red or Yellow. This means
that the lower bound for the Green band was approximately set at that group's median Saudization level.
Cutoffs for the red and platinum bands were determined by ministry staff.
A firm's Saudization rate is calculated using as a thirteen-week moving average of the number of Saudi
workers registered with GOSI. This smooths shocks and encourages firms to improve their color band status
through long-term employment of Saudis rather than through temporary positions. There are several types
of non-Saudis that can be counted toward the firm's Saudi total, as well as bonuses for hiring disadvantaged
groups. The formula is presented in more detail in the data section.
8There are some exceptions where larger companies are categorized as white. For example, international schools
have no Saudi employment quotas. There are some other individual exceptions for other firms like this where
Saudization is not feasible.
73
2.3.3 Enforcement: Sanctions and Benefits
The main services that the Ministry of Labor provides to firms are foreign recruitment and the issuance
and renewal of work visas for foreign workers. The introduction of the Nitaqat program coincided with a
streamlining of Ministry visa applications in which firms could renew and change their visas online. Firms in
the Green and Platinum bands were offered these new expedited visa services, while firms in the Yellow and
Red bands faced increasing restrictions over time in their ability to renew existing visas and to recruit foreign
workers. In addition to becoming eligible for expedited and more flexible visas for their foreign workers as
well as enhanced recruitment services from the ministry, firms in the Green and Platinum bands were also
given the ability to offer jobs to foreign workers from the Red or Yellow color band categories. Firms in
the Yellow band faced some restrictions on their visa renewals, and were not eligible for the electronic visas
or recruitment services. Entities in the Red band could not renew any of their existing visas and were not
issued any new visas. Their existing visas were very inflexible, and they were not allowed to open any new
facilities or branches. According to the Ministry, the sanctions were designed so that firms that remained
in the Red band would find it prohibitively difficult to remain in business. The sanctions and benefits are
summarized in Table 2.1 along with the timing of their implementation. All sanctions and benefits were
being enforced by the end of the first year of the program.
2.3.4 Program Results
Between July 2011 and October 2012, the number of Saudis employed in the private sector increased
by 462,000, and the Ministry has claimed that the program was responsible for the creation of 250,000 jobs
for Saudi nationals. Figure 2-2 shows the time series of Saudi and expatriate workers in the private sector.
While the number of expatriates in the sector increased by almost the same amount, 467,000, the Saudi
workforce grew by 72 percent while the expatriate workforce increased by only 7 percent. There was also a
large improvement in firm color-band assignments, with most Red and Yellow firms moving into the Green
or Platinum bands by October 2012. Table 2.5 shows the matrix of firm color band movements, depicted
graphically in Figure 2-3. Approximately 68 percent of Red firms improved their status, with over half
ending the period in the Green or Platinum bands. Almost 80 percent of Yellow firms improved their status,
and very few Green and Platinum firms moved into lower color bands.
As expected, the reaction from Green and Platinum firms has been quite positive: an HR representative
from a telecommunications company categorized as Green under Nitaqat reports that visa applications are
now much quicker and that work visas are easier to obtain. Representatives from companies categorized
as yellow and red complained about the prohibitive cost of recruiting and hiring Saudis and the negative
effects of visa restrictions driving their business to other GCC countries. A recent article also reports that
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investors in the Saudi trucking industry complain that Nitaqat has hurt their business, claiming that the
restrictions cause them to lose SR 250 million a year for failing to hire enough Saudi truck drivers to meet
their 10 percent benchmark.9
2.4 Data
2.4.1 Nitaqat Program Data
The primary data for this analysis is the administrative Nitaqat program data collected by the Ministry of
Labor. This dataset contains weekly entity-level observations of the employment measures and corresponding
color band assignments used by the Ministry to determine program compliance and trigger enforcement
measures. The dataset contains firm identifiers including geographic location, industry, size category, and a
unique firm identifier. Collected employment measures include a counts of Saudi and expatriate employees as
well as counts of employees in important groups, such as disabled Saudis, ex-convicts, citizens of other GCC
countries, women, non-Saudi spouses of Saudi citizens, non-Saudis with Saudi mothers ("special foreigners),
part-time workers, students, and members of displaced tribes from the Rub' al Khali with a Saudi passport
but no national identity card. For Nitaqat purposes, the Ministry counts non-Saudis with Saudi spouses
or Saudi mothers, and members of displaced tribes toward the total Saudi employee count. Former Saudi
prisoners are equivalent to two Saudi employees, disabled Saudis equivalent to four Saudi employees, and
students working part time as half of a full-time Saudi worker. The total number of Saudi workers for Nitaqat
Saudization calculations is therefore:
Nitaqat Saudis = Saudis + Spouses + Special Foreigners + Gulf Citizens + Displaced Tribes
+ 2 -Ex-Convicts +4 -Disabled Saudis + .5. Students + .5 -Part-Time
The Nitaqat Saudization rate is calculated as the ratio between this total and the total number of employees.
Color band assignments are based on a 13-week moving average of this rate to avoid sudden reclassifications
due to temporary staffing shocks. All of these employment measures are updated by the Ministry on a weekly
basis using Ministry data on visa issuance for foreign workers and GOSI data on Saudi employment rolls.
Data collection began on June 11, 2011, and entities were fully represented and reporting all employees by
July 9, 2011. Therefore, although data exists for June, all comparisons in this paper are based on a starting
date of July 9th. The dataset contains observation up through October 13, 2012.
The data includes observations for over one million firms, 116,873 were large enough to be included
9http://www.arabnews.com/saudis-find-salary-truckers-low
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in the Nitaqat program at its start in July 2011. Of these, 83,568 also appear in the data for October
2012, reflecting exit by 33,305 from the sample.10 48,157 new firms entered over the intervening 16 months.
These 83,568 firms form the sample for the empirical analysis of the effects of the program on employment,
size, and firm value. Analysis of firm exit is done using the full set of 116,873 baseline firms. These firms
are distributed across 37 industries and four size categories at baseline (Table 2.2). These firms appear
in 109 of the corresponding Nitaqat industry by size categories. Just over one third of these entities were
in the construction industry, with most of these in the smallest size category. Construction firms were
also responsible for nearly half of private-sector employment and almost a quarter of Saudi private sector
employment (Table 2.3). In addition to being the largest private sector industry, construction also had one
of the lowest Saudization rates, with an industry average of 5.8 percent Saudi workers. After construction,
the next largest industries were retail and manufacturing, with 20 and 11 percent of the Saudi private sector
workforce, respectively. The industry category for conglomerates ("multiple economic activities") contains
a large number of entities, all which have less than 50 employees and which employ less than one percent of
the Saudi private sector workforce.
Although a large number of firms are exempt from Nitaqat due to the ten-employee inclusion cutoff, the
firms included in the program employed over 95 percent of the Saudis and 68 percent of the expatriates in
the private sector workforce at baseline.1 1
Also of note is the large variation in Saudization rates across industries and within different size groups.
In July 2011, Saudis made up less than five percent of the workforce in farming, maintenance, and private
labor recruitment services. Financial institutions had the highest starting Saudization rate at 80 percent;
petroleum and gas followed at 76 percent, and petrochemicals at 45 percent. Though the total workforce
share of firms was roughly declining in firm size, Saudi employment was greater for larger firms (Table 2.4).
Tiny firms accounted for only three percent of Saudi employment, small firms for 12 percent, medium firms
for 29 percent, and large firms for 37 percent. The 58 giant firms with over 3000 employees employed only
eleven percent of the total workforce and 19 percent of the Saudi workforce. Correspondingly, Saudization
rates are higher for larger firms: small firms were only four percent Saudi, with an average of less than one
Saudi employee per firm in this category, and large firms had the highest average Saudization rate of 17
percent.
10It should be noted that exit from the Nitaqat sample does not necessarily reflect exit from the market, and
these exit rates may overestimate overall rates of firm shutdown. Entities may exit the sample by falling below the
10-employee inclusion threshhold or by creating a new registration with the Ministry of Labor following a merger,
split, or other change in firm structure.
"Recent updates to Nitaqat have extended the program to include more of these firms, but the current analysis
does not include this time period.
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2.4.2 Firm Balance Sheet Data
The analysis also uses stock price and balance sheet data for all entities included in the Nitaqat data
belonging to joint stock companies that are listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange. These companies are
required to submit their balance sheets and auditors' reports to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry on
a quarterly basis. This data, along with the number of shares and stock price, are available through the
Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) on their website12 as well as through Bloomberg. Of the 158 firms listed
during the period, 147 were matched to Nitaqat entities, and 255 entities were matched to listed firms. Of
these, 156 had stock price information available for the period. When multiple entities were matched to a
single firm, most were subsidiaries of a larger firm that were engaged in different economic activities or that
were located in different geographic areas. Balance sheet items that were reliably reported included capital,
total equity, liabilities, expenses, and inventories. Compared to the rest of the sample, these firms tend to be
large and to have higher Saudization rates. Only 22 percent of these firms were in the Small size category;
39 percent fell in the Medium, 36 percent in the Large, and 3 percent in the Giant category. They also tend
to be concentrated in different industries, with the largest groups of Tadawul firms in manufacturing (19
percent), insurance (17 percent), and retail (15 percent). Construction is notably not well-represented, with
only 8 percent of these firms in that sector compared with 35 percent of all Nitaqat firms. Although they
are certainly not a representative sample, there is still some variation in their color bands at baseline, with
18 percent beginning in the Red band, 10 percent in the Yellow band, 32 percent in the Green band and 40
percent in the Platinum band.
2.5 Empirical Strategy
The purpose of the empirical analysis is to identify the causal effects of imposing a Saudization percentage
quota on firms. In particular, the analysis seeks to estimate how the required increases in Saudization affected
(1) actual changes in Saudization (did the program have any effect?), (2) hiring of Saudis and downsizing of
expatriates (how did firms achieve their Saudization targets?), (3) firm size, exit, and value (what costs did
these requirements impose on firms?). The policy variable of interest is therefore the compliance requirements
that the Nitaqat program imposed on firms, i.e. the amount by which firms were required to increase their
Saudization rates to meet their Nitaqat quotas. If these required changes were randomly assigned, the
analysis could directly estimate the effect of these requirements on these outcome variables. In this case,
however, the policy variable was mechanically determined by the firm's baseline Saudization percentage and
the Saudization quota for the corresponding industry by size cell. These baseline Saudization rates are
12 http://www.tadawul.com.sa
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potentially endogenous to all of the outcomes of interest; unobserved determinants of baseline Saudization
are almost certainly correlated with future changes in the employment of Saudis and expatriates as well as
other measures of firm performance.
Because of this, the analysis relies on the variation in the policy rule generated by the placement of
the quotas to identify the causal effects of the program on firms. In particular, the estimation relies on the
variation in the incentive to increase Saudization rates created by the quota cutoffs. The Yellow/Green color
band cutoffs in particular generated an incentive for firms below the quota (in the Yellow or Red bands)
to increase their Saudization rates while imposing no new constraints on Green and Platinum firms with
Saudization rates above the cutoff. As discussed below, the quotas generate a kinked assignment function
from baseline Saudization percentages to the increase required for program compliance. Because of this, the
main analysis uses the regression kink design (RKD) to estimate the effects of the program on staffing, firm
value, size, and exit. Overall program effects are also estimated using a differences in differences approach
comparing the relative changes of Yellow, Red and Green firms within industry and size cells.
2.5.1 Regression Kink Design
The regression kink design is a research method that estimates treatment effects using kinks in a continu-
ous policy variable that is based on a potentially endogenous assignment variable. This method is analogous
to regression discontinuity design, but can be used in cases where the policy variable is continuous but
contains discontinuities in its derivative (i.e. kinks). This is critical to the analysis of the Nitaqat program
because the hiring incentives approach zero as firms near the cutoff; a Yellow firm with 7.9 percent Saudiza-
tion facing an 8 percent quota will have almost no need to adjust its staffing. Yellow firms below the quota,
however, will need to increase Saudization by an amount that is directly increasing with their distance below
the quota, while Green firms' incentives to change Saudization rates will be uniformly zero regardless of
their distance above the cutoff. The RKD method will allow us to exploit this kink in the quota compliance
requirements to estimate the effect of the program near the quota cutoffs. The program's treatment effect
will be identified by changes in the slopes of the outcome variables around this kink point in the assignment
function.
The RKD is formalized by Card, Lee, Pei & Weber (2012), which establishes the conditions under
which the RKD identifies the local average response, or treatment on the treated, parameter that would
be identified if the treatment had been randomly assigned. Like RDD, the treatment effect is identified by
the discontinuities in the derivatives (i.e. changes in the slopes) of the outcome variables around the kink
point in the policy variable. The necessary identification tests and robustness checks are similar to those for
RDD outlined in detail in Lee & Lemieux (2010). This method has previously been used for the evaluation
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of programs with kinked benefit structures such as the EITC (Jones 2011), UI benefits (Card et al. 2012),
college financial aid (Nielsen, Sorensen & Taber 2010), intergovernmental grants (Dahlberg, M6rk, Ratts0&
Agren 2008), education finance (Guryan 2001), and prescription drug reimbursement (Simonsen, Skipper &
Skipper 2010).
Compliance Requirement
The RKD analysis in this paper relies on the kinked compliance requirement that was generated by the
imposition of Saudization quotas on firms in each industry by size group. As discussed above, the most
important quota is the one at the Green/Yellow cutoff. The incentive for firms to increase their Saudization
percentage was increasing in their baseline distance below this cutoff. For example, the cutoff for medium-
sized construction firms was six percent; a firm in the Yellow band with four percent Saudi workers needed
to increase its Saudization rate by two percent to comply with the program; a firm in the Green band with
eight percent Saudization was already in compliance, so no change was needed. This generates a kinked
function mapping initial Saudi percentage to the increase mandated by the program. Figure 2-4a shows this
compliance requirement for medium construction firms. This rule generates a similar compliance requirement
with a kink at the quota level for each of the 109 industry by size cells; these kinked compliance requirements
are plotted for each cell in Figure 2-4b.
We can combine these by normalizing the cutoff to zero and measuring the compliance requirement as
the distance below the cutoff, i.e.
b(Vi,) = max(q. - V, 0)
where Vj, is the initial Saudization percentage for firm i and qj, is the quota for the corresponding industry
j and size group s. This normalization collapses the compliance rules in Figure 2-4b into a rule with a single
kink at zero shown in Figure 2-5.
When examining the effect of the program on variables measured in terms of employees, i.e. number of
Saudi employees and number of expatriate employees, it will also be useful to define the distance from the
cutoff in terms of the number of Saudis that would have to be hired or expatriates that would have to be
downsized to meet the quota. For Saudis, we can express this as:
Distances, = Saudis*'. - Saudisij,
where
Saudis*Saudis*4, : Quotag= . ijsi QSaudis*g + Expatsi3 8
For example, a firm with 18 expatriate employees and 0 Saudi employees facing a quota of 10 percent would
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need to employ 2 Saudi workers to meet the quota, so
Distance S = Saudis*. - Saudisij, = 2 - 0 2
Similarly, for expatriates:
Distancej, = Expats*5 - Expats 3 5
where
Saudis-
Expats*. : Quota.ij 38 Saudisij, + Expats*3
For example, a firm with 12 expatriate employees and 1 Saudi employee facing a quota of 10 percent would
need to downsize 3 expatriate workers to meet the quota, i.e.
Distancej, = Expats*5 - Expatsij, = 9 - 12 = -3
These normalizations will be useful in the interpretation of the effects of the program in terms of the number
of different types of workers employed. The normalized compliance requirements are plotted in Figures 2-6a
and 2-6b.
RKD Identification and Estimation
The identification assumptions and estimation procedure for RKD are very similar to those required for
RDD, but applied to the discontinuity in the derivative rather than the level of the treatment function. In
particular, for outcome Y, starting Saudization quota distance V and Nitaqat compliance requirement B,
we can express the effect of the Saudization requirement on the outcome of interest using the generalized
nonseparable model
Y y(B, V, U)
i.e. define the outcome of interest as a general function of the compliance requirement B, baseline Saudization
(and potentially other observable covariates) V, and an unobserved error term U. The key relationship of
interest is the effect of B on y.1
If B exerts a causal effect on Y and there is a kink in the deterministic relation between B and V at
v = 0, then we would expect to see an induced kink in the relationship between Y and V at v = 0. In
our case the kink is sharp: the compliance requirement is a deterministic function of baseline Saudization
percentage.
13 In this formulation, the error term U may enter the model non-additively, which allows for unrestricted hetero-
geneity in the response of Y to V. This setup also allows heterogeneity in the response of Y to B.
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For a Sharp RKD, Card et al. lay out four conditions that must be satisfied for the RKD to identify
the causal effects of B on Y. Follow their notation, denote the conditional density functions of V on U by
Fvly=,(v) and fvyy=s(v). Let B = b(V) and denote the partial derivatives of y(-,-,-) by y1(b, v, u) = 9ybou)
and y2 (b, v, u) ay(bu). The identifying assumptions for the sharp RKD are then:
av
A1: (Regularity) y(-, -, -) is continuous, and y1 (b, v, u) is continuous in b for all b, v, and u.
In other words, the marginal effect of B on Y must be a continuous function of both observables and
of the unobserved error term.
A2: (Smooth Effect of V) y2(b, v, u) is continuous in v for all b, v, and u. This is like the IV exclusion
restriction: V can affect Y, but the effect has to be continuously differentiable, i.e. any observed kinks
in Y cannot be direct the result of small changes in Y. In our case, this would rule out a kinked
underlying relationship between baseline Saudization and increases in Saudi percentage, for example,
in the absence of the Nitaqat program.
A3: (First Stage) b(-) is a known function that is everywhere continuous and continuously differentiable
on (-oo, 0) and (0, oo), but
lim b'(v) 7# lim b'(v)V- O+ V-O
The compliance function must therefore be known to the researcher and have a kink at v = 0. There
also must be a positive density around the kink point.
In our case, the compliance requirement is
b(V) = max(V - Q, 0)
->lim b'(v) = 1 4 0 = lim b'(v)Vo O+ v4-+O
Because the quotas were placed near the median Saudization rates for each industry by size cell, there
is also a large density of firms around this kink point.
A4: (Smooth Density) Fvly=s(v) is twice continuously differentiable in V for all u and v. This condition
rules out the manipulation of the assignment variable, and is the key identifying assumption for the
RKD.
In summary, if everything else is continuous near the kink, any changes in the slope of the outcome
can be attributed to the kink in the compliance requirement B. In this case, the RKD will identify the
"treatment on the treated" parameter at this point, i.e. the average effect of a marginal increase in the
compliance requirement near the cutoff holding the distribution of unobservables constant. The degree to
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which V and U are correlated will determine the degree to which this treatment effect applies to firms that
are further away from the quota.
There are two testable implications of the identification assumptions above. First, in a valid Sharp RKD,
fv(v) must be continuously differentiable in v. This rules out precise manipulation of baseline Saudization
percentage by firms near the Saudization quota cutoffs. As in the RDD case, we can test for this by examining
the baseline distribution of V. In particular, I test for a break in the density of V around the kink in the
compliance function using a modified McCrary test (McCrary 2008). Figure 2-7 plots the density of baseline
Saudization percentages relative to the cutoff. A McCrary test shows no evidence of bunching to the right of
the quota at the start of the program, and the figure confirms that quotas were set near the median starting
Saudization percentages.
The second testable implication is that there should be no kink in baseline covariates around the quota,
i.e. d Vv) is continuous in v at v = 0 for all x.14 Baseline values of several sample covariates (firm
size, Saudi employees, and expatriate employees) are plotted in Figure 2-8; none of these correspond to
a statistically significant kink or discontinuity in averages around the cutoff. The fact that quotas were
assigned near cell medians also means that there should be roughly the same number of firms above and
below the cutoff within industry by size groups.
If we think of the relationship using a simple, additive model with constant effects:
Y =TB+g(V) +U
Then, under the above assumptions:
lim'Os+ 49E[YIV=v] - OiMv__, E[Y|V=v]
limV'O± b(v) - imv o b(v)
av - av
This "RKD estimand" is the change in the slope of the conditional expectation function E[Y V = v] at the
kink point v = 0 divided by the change in the slope of the assignment function b(-) at that same point.
In our case, the assignment function is
b(V) = max(V, 0)
where V is the percentage point distance below the relevant Saudization quota. For Yellow and Red firms,
this will be positive: a firm with a baseline Saudization rate of 5 percent facing a quota of 8 percent would
have b(3) = max(3, 0) = 3. A Green firm with 9 percent Saudization facing the same quota would have
b(-1) = max(-1, 0) = 1.
1 4 This is like a test for true random assignment in an RCT.
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Therefore the change in the slope of the assignment function is 1 at the cutoff, so we have
limV+o+ aE[Y|V=v] -- iMv40- aE[Y|V=v]
T-*O- 9v
limV O± ab(v) - imv o ab(v)
+ v -m - av
rn &E[Y|V = v] _ l. aE[Y|V = v]V-*0+ OV v-+O- OV
which can be estimated from the model:
P
E[Y|V = v] = ao + E [ap(v - k)P + p(v - k)P - D]
p=1
where Iv - kj < h and p is the polynomial order of the fit. The analysis estimates these local polynomial
regressions using a symmetric uniform kernel and several values of the bandwidth and the polynomial order.
In estimating the derivative at the kink point, Card et al. (2012) point out that a local quadratic (p = 2)
leads to asymptotically smaller bias than a local linear regression (p = 1), but find that this comes at the
cost of significantly larger asymptotic variance.15 While the analysis reports the estimates from both p = 1
and p = 2, the local linear specification is therefore preferred. The results will also be reported for several
choices of bandwidth. 16
2.5.2 Differences in Differences
While the RKD analysis focuses on changes in incentives to hire around the kink in the policy rule,
it is also useful to estimate the overall effects of the Nitaqat program on Saudi employment, expatriate
employment, firm size and exit. This can be done by estimating the average effect of assignment to the Red
or Yellow color bands as compared to firms in the Green band within the same industry by size cell:
AYijs = 1 - D(Red)ij, + 72 -D(Yellow)j,8 + a s + Cos
Because Green firms that were well-above the cutoff may have also been affected by the program, the
analysis also reports estimates where only Green firms within five Saudi employees of the cutoff are used as
15They calculate that the bias in the linear specification would have to be v/15 times larger than the standard
error for a local quadratic to reduce the mean squared error over the local linear regression.
16 Work is currently in progress to implement the optimal RKD bandwidth calculation as described in Rokkanen
(2013). The methodology is similar to that of the RDD optimal bandwidth from Imbens & Kalyanaraman (2012).
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a comparison group:
AYijs =1' -D(Red)ij, + 7 - D(Yellow)i j + -y'D(Green > 5) + a , + E'
where D(Green > 5) is a dummy variable for the group of Green firms which began above the quota by
more than five Saudi employees.
To complement the RKD analysis, I also examine how this effect changes with starting distance from
the cutoff. When this distance is measured in Saudi employees, for example, we can define a set of dummy
variables for each value of distance from the cutoff:
d {dkfs} _D = 1{Distances. = k}
These dummy variables are constructed similarly for distance in terms of expatriates, and using percentage-
point bins for regressions where the distance is measured in terms of Saudization percentage.
I then estimate:
AY = yd + e
In this specification, all effects are compared Green firms just at the cutoff, i.e. the omitted category k = 0.
Results from these specifications are reported graphically, with the estimated coefficients plotted against
distance from the cutoff.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Quota Compliance
The RKD plots of the change in Saudization percentage against the starting quota distance are presented
in Figure 2-9a. The program appears to have had at least some of the intended effect on firms below the quota:
Yellow and Red firms tended to increase their Saudization percentages to comply with quota requirements.
This compliance is particularly sharp very close to the quota, where firms needed to make smaller changes to
their employee mix to improve their color band rating. This effect is partially offset by Green firms, however,
who tended to reduce their Saudization percentage with increasing distance above their quotas. Although
compliance rates are high among Yellow and Red firms, this reduces the estimated effect of the program.
The estimates for the size of the kink are reported in Table 2.6, with most local linear estimates around
0.20. This indicates that the effect of the program was to increase Saudization in Yellow and Red firms by
0.2 percentage points for every percentage point they started below their Nitaqat quota.
84
Firms could achieve these increases in Saudization percentage both by downsizing expatriates and by
hiring Saudis. Figures 2-9b and 2-9c show the RKD results for the Saudi and expatriate employment
outcomes. There is a clear kink in the number of Saudi hires as a function of the firm's initial distance
from the quota in terms of Saudi employees. Yellow and Red firms close to the cutoff hired almost exactly
as many Saudis as they needed to reach their Saudization quotas without changing their expatriate worker
totals. In contrast, Green firms just to the right of the cutoff experienced no change in their number of
Saudi employees. The econometric results in Table 2.6 confirm this, with estimates ranging from 0.35 to
0.59 Saudi workers hired for each one needed to meet the quota. Expatriate workers, on the other hand,
show little responsiveness to quota cutoffs, though expatriate hiring increases in distance above the quota.
This suggests that firms were not changing their expatriate staffing in order to achieve the quotas. The
visa restrictions placed on Yellow and Red firms (and the streamlined renewals offered to Green firms) likely
reduced expatriate hiring at Yellow and Red firms while encouraging an increase in hiring at Green firms.
Yellow and Red firms far below the cutoff were the least likely to improve their color band assignment and
become eligible for the enhanced recruitment services. Similarly, Green firms well-above the cutoff were both
unconstrained by quotas and likely to maintain access to visa services over the period. The estimates in
Table 2.6 confirm that there is little evidence of a kink, with all of the point estimates close to zero and most
not statistically significant.
These findings are supported by Figure 2-10, which plots the coefficients from the differences-in-differences
specification described above. Panel (a) shows the results for Saudi employees. As in Figure 2-9b, there
is again evidence of a kink in Saudi hiring at the Nitaqat quota. There is also some evidence that Green
firms farther above the cutoff tended to reduce their numbers of Saudi employees. This may be because the
program made experienced Saudi employees more valuable to Yellow and Red firms, so firms well-above the
cutoff allowed their employees to be "poached" by other firms. This effect will mitigate the overall impact of
the program on Saudi employment by simply shuffling already-employed Saudis between firms. It is therefore
important to allow this group of Green firms well-above the cutoff to be "treated" by the program in the
analysis below estimating the overall program effects.
2.6.2 Program Costs
The effects of the program on firm size, exit, and market value are shown in Figure 2-11. Panel (a) shows
the RKD figures for the percentage point change in firm size relative to the initial percentage point distance
from the Nitaqat cutoff. Firms that remained in the sample over the whole period grew on average, and the
kink height indicates a growth of about 25 percent among firms just at the cutoff. On average, firms above
the cutoff appear to have grown at about this rate. For Yellow and Red firms below the cutoff, however,
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the effect on firms size is dramatic, with the growth of these firms dropping off sharply in cutoff distance.
The estimates for firm size in Table 2.6 mostly indicate a 0.5 percentage point decrease in firm growth for
every percentage point below the cutoff. This indicates that the increase in Saudi employees was not the
only effect of the program, and that Nitaqat imposed serious constraints on firm growth over the 16-month
period.
Also on the cost side, the Nitaqat program also appears to have increased firm exit. Panel (b) shows
the graphical results, plotting average exit rate against percentage point distance from the cutoff. Firms
above the cutoff experienced little effect on exit rate, with the average exit rate for Green firms at around
15 percent regardless of cutoff distance." For Yellow and Red firms, exit rates are increasing in distance
below the cutoff; although estimates for exit rate are sensitive to the choice of bandwidth, and all linear
kink estimates fall in the 0.72-2.17 range. This indicates that exit rates increased by between 0.72 and 2.17
percentage points for every percentage point distance below the cutoff.
The RKD figure for the market value of the 147 publicly-listed firms is shown in panel (c). Unfortunately
the small sample size makes it impossible either to detect a kink in market value or to find a sufficiently
precise zero. As suggested by the figure, parametric estimates of the kink are very noisy and usually not
statistically significant. This is also the case for other balance sheet measures available in the Tadawul data
for these firms.
2.6.3 Overall Effects
Estimates for the overall effects of the program are displayed in Table 2.7. These estimates are based on
cell-level difference-in-difference estimates calculating the average effects by initial color band assignment.
As discussed above, odd-numbered columns show comparisons against all firms in the Green band; even-
numbered columns allow for "poaching", or changes in Green firms that were more than five employees above
the cutoff, by using only Green firms near the cutoff as the comparison group. Because this effect appears to
be important, our conclusions focus on these results. The last two rows of the table show the total estimated
effect of the program based on these estimates as well as the relevant full-compliance benchmark. In odd
columns this benchmark is the change in the outcome variable associated with all firms moving up to the
relevant Nitaqat quota, with no change in Green and Platinum firms. In even columns, the benchmark
includes the effect of all firms above the quota adjusting down to the quota as well.
The table shows that Yellow and Red firms increased their Saudization percentages by 3.5 percentage
points on average, with Green firms reducing their Saudization rates by 5.45 percentage points. Overall, the
program is estimated to have increased Saudization by 2.73 percentage points, compared to a benchmark of
1 7About 10-12 percent of businesses in the U.S. and the U.K. close each year.
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3.22. On the Saudi employment side, Red and Yellow firms increased their Saudi employment by around
one employee on average, while Green firms reduced their employment of Saudis by almost nine employees.
Because there are many more Red and Yellow firms, however, the overall effect is to increase Saudi employ-
ment by 52,000; close to the benchmark of 57,000 but well short of the no-poaching benchmark of 211,000.
This implies that Nitaqat was responsible for 13 percent of the total increase in Saudi employment over the
period. There is also evidence that Nitaqat reduced the overall size of the expatriate workforce, with Red
firms hiring 5.29 fewer expatriates than firms in the comparison group. Expatriate hiring in Green firms
increased for firms farther above the cutoff, however, and these increased expatriate employment by 39.36
on average. Overall, the estimated effect was a reduction in expatriate employment of 250,000, a decrease of
nearly 40 percent relative to the implied counterfactual increase in expatriate employment in the Kingdom.
These effects on Saudi and expatriate employment are reflected in the estimates for the changes in total
firm size. Red firms were smaller by 4.29 employees, while Green firms hired 30.55 more employees than
the comparison group. The overall effect was to reduce total employment in the private sector by 198,000
workers. The effects on exit rates were also largest for Red firms, with these firms 11.67 percent more likely
to exit than the comparison group. Yellow firms had an average exit rate 4.31 percent higher as a result of
the program. Unlike with the other outcomes, Green firms with more than five "excess" Saudi employees
did not experience a differential effect on their exit rates relative to Green firms closer to the cutoff. Overall,
the effect of the program was to increase exit by 10,665 firms. This is a significant proportion of the 33,305
firms that exited during the period, implying that the program increased exit rates from 19 percent to 28
percent.
2.6.4 Sector Breakdown
The impact of the program also seems to have varied by industry, and Figure 2-12 presents the main
RKD results by sector. The strongest effects, both in terms of compliance (hiring Saudis) and costs (exit
and downsizing), were experienced by the secondary sector, which includes construction (the largest private-
sector industry) and manufacturing. Effects were more muted in the services sector, with lower compliance
rates as well as more muted kinks in the size and exit relationships. The primary sector (agriculture and
extraction) shows little effect of the program - there is no evidence of an increase in the number of Saudis
employed at Yellow and Red firms, and no corresponding decrease in firm size or increase in exit. This pattern
is likely the result of several factors, including the degree to which different industries rely on foreign labor
as well as the degree of competitiveness in the included industries. The services sector is the least exposed to
competition from imports, and while these firms did increase Saudi hiring as a result of the program the exit
and downsizing effects were lower than in the secondary sector. In construction in particular, Saudization
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rates are among the lowest, and the industry has historically relied heavily on low-cost foreign labor. It
was critical that these firms improve their color band status in order to keep the bulk of their workforce,
so compliance rates were very high. The costs were also very acutely felt, however, with a strong response
to the program in terms of firm size and exit rates. In the retail sector, which is less reliant on expatriate
labor, compliance rates were slightly lower and costs were more muted.
2.6.5 Temporary Saudi Hiring
In addition to the costs that were an expected consequence of the program, (increased turnover and
downsizing), there are also unintended consequences from incentives created by the particular structure
of the program. The extent to which firms are able to game the system may account for the less than
full-compliance rates as well as suggest some ways in which the program effects are mis-measured.
Because most of the increase in compliance is achieved through increasing Saudi employment, one poten-
tial concern is that this hiring does not reflect a real, long-term increase in Saudization. One way that firms
can avoid hiring restrictions on expatriate workers is to temporarily improve their color band assignment by
hiring a large number of Saudi workers when they need to hire more expatriate workers or renew existing
work visas. The program rules try to prevent this by assigning color bands based on the 12-week moving
average of Saudi employees. Nonetheless, there are occasionally reports of firms hiring large numbers of
low-wage Saudi workers for short periods. To get a sense of the magnitude of this effect, I identify firms
whose Saudi employment patterns follow a strong cyclical pattern, with temporary hiring booms followed by
an increase in expatriate hiring and a sharp decrease in Saudi employment. I do this by flagging firms that
were non-compliant (i.e. in the Yellow or Red bands) for most of the period, but that had at one five-week
or longer stretch of being included in the Platinum band. This would give the firm access to the expedited
recruiting and visa renewal for sufficient time to make use of these services. I restricted attention to firms
that had at least one week-to-week increase and decrease in Saudi employment of more than 30 percent.
Flagged firms also increased their expatriate workforce on average over the period and did not significantly
increase their Saudi workforce, (i.e. all firms had an average increase in Saudi employment of less than 0.5
workers). Of the 113 firms that met these criteria, 18 showed evidence of these strategic temporary hiring
booms (Figure 2-13), and 11 of these firms were in the construction industry. Altogether these firms created
approximately 250 temporary jobs. This type of blatant manipulation does not appear to be common, al-
though it is certainly possible that more subtle gaming of the system is more widespread. It is likely more
common for firms to hire a small number of temporary Saudi workers to switch into the Green band for a
longer period of time, for example. Because these changes are relatively small, they likely have little effect
on the estimates based on the July 2011 to October 2012 comparisons.
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2.6.6 Downsizing to Avoid Quotas
Another way that firms may avoid penalties is by reducing their size below the ten-employee cutoff for
inclusion in the Nitaqat program. Because the Ministry re-codes firms when they leave the program, this
will be indistinguishable from exit in the data. If firms in the Yellow and Red bands are more likely to
downsize in this way, the above analysis will over-estimate the effect of the program on exit (and under-
estimate the effect on firm size). To get a sense of the magnitude of this potential bias, Figure 2-14 panel
(a) compares the distribution of firm sizes of all Nitaqat firms in July 2011 and in October 2012. There
appears to be little change in the distribution of firm sizes, and there is no apparent decrease in the number
of firms near the ten-employee cutoff for inclusion in the program. Panel (b) compares the changes in these
distributions by starting color, restricting the sample to firms that appeared in the sample at baseline. For
both initially compliant (Green or Platinum) and initially non-compliant (Red or Yellow) firms there is a
large decrease in the number of firms with between ten and twenty employees. Because this figure categorizes
firms based on their July 2011 color band assignment, new entrants are not included; these dips, therefore,
may simply reflect a higher failure rate for smaller firms.18 Indeed, the pattern is similar for both compliant
and non-compliant firms, suggesting that the exit of small, non-compliant firms from the data is not driven
by downsizing below the size cutoff. This interpretation is supported by panel (c); exit rates follow the same
pattern for firms above and below the Yellow/Green cutoff. Interestingly, the increase in exit rates appears
to be relatively homogeneous across firm sizes.
2.7 Conclusion
As growing unemployment has led to political pressure, national employment quota policies have become
an increasingly attractive potential solution. While these programs promise a quick and visible remedy to
citizen unemployment, however, these new labor market regulations are potentially quite costly for firms.
The short-term benefits of increasing employment may come at significant cost to long-term economic growth.
Recently, political events in many countries in the Middle East have tipped the political economy toward
prioritizing short-term stability, and it is likely that these types of quota policies will become more widely
enforced in the region. However, there is almost no empirical evidence to suggest what the magnitudes of
the costs and benefits of such a program might be, even in the short term. There is a large literature on
the effects of affirmative action policies in the United States, but these results have limited applicability to
a broad nationalization policy. In particular, affirmative action policies have been applied on a relatively
small scale, and have targeted traditionally disadvantaged groups. Nationalization policies differ from these
18This is consistent with previous observations of larger turnover among small firms, e.g. Dunne, Roberts &
Samuelson (1989).
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policies on both counts, and both features are likely to have significant implications for the program effects.
Further, very little of the work on affirmative action has studied its effects on firms, and identification has
been particulary challenging in this subset of the literature. For a large-scale nationalization policy, the
effect on firms is critical, with serious consequences for the growth of the often fragile private sector.
This paper examines the short-term effects of a nationalization quota policy in Saudi Arabia using quasi-
experimental variation generated by the program structure. On the one hand this context is quite specific:
Saudi Arabia is unique in many ways, and the Nitaqat program is the first to be implemented on such a
wide scale. However, there are many countries with similar labor market features to Saudi Arabia, and there
are several features of this policy which make it a good case study. First, the Saudi government devoted
significant resources to the program, and it was implemented quickly and uniformly applied to all private
sector firms. Enforcement was strict, and the quality of the administrative data is very high. In contrast
to all previously-studied quota policies, both in the United States and elsewhere, it was an economy-wide
program, so the results are more relevant to other national-scale programs. The program was also designed
with sharp quota cutoffs, which yields identifying variation in nationalization incentives across firms.
This paper finds that while the Nitaqat program program did increase native employment, it had a
significant negative effect on firms. In particular, the policy is estimated to have increased the growth in
Saudi employment by approximately 13 percent over a 16 month period, adding 52,000 positions for Saudis
to the private sector labor force. The program also prevented some of the growth in the expatriate workforce,
which grew by 250,000 less than it would have in the absence of the quotas. At the same time, the analysis
suggests that the costs of constraining the labor market in this way were substantial; the program decreased
total employment in the private sector by 198,000 workers and caused nearly 11,000 firms to exit. These
costs were not borne equally across sectors, however, and there is some evidence that the increased costs
were most damaging to industries in the secondary sector, including construction and manufacturing. This
is particularly interesting given that sluggish growth in this sector is one of the typical symptoms of the
resource curse.
Taken together, the results indicate that the program's quick results in reducing Saudi unemployment
have been created at significant costs to firms. However, the program is likely to have important long-term
effects as well, which will mitigate some of the short-run costs. In the medium term, firms can adjust
their capital investments to decrease the costs associated with employing more high-skilled Saudi labor.
More experience and on the job training will also make Saudi workers more valuable to private-sector firms,
decreasing the costs associated with employing Saudis instead of expatriates. Over the long-term, the
presence of opportunities to work in the private sector will also likely affect the human capital investments of
Saudi nationals. Until recently, the primary purpose of post-secondary education was to qualify Saudis for
90
work in the public sector. Increased national participation in the private sector is likely to align education
and other human capital investments with the demands of the private sector. The dynamic effects of the
program will therefore be at least as important as the short-run impact, and this will be a critical area for
future study.
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Figures
Figure 2-1: Sample Color Bands for Medium-Sized Construction Entities
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Figure 2-2: Weekly Totals of Saudi and Expatriate Private-Sector Employees
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Notes: This figure shows the weekly totals of Saudis and expatriate workers in the Nitaqat data. Vertical
lines indicate important dates in program enforcement.
92
0
7.6
7.4 uC
0
7.2 E
t)
7 0
Sa)6.8
6.6
U.
4-
0
6.4 "W
E
6.2 z
6
. ..........
"
-
Figure 2-3: Movements Between Color Bands (July 2011 to October 2012)
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Notes: This figure shows the proportion of firms in each starting category (x-axis) that transitioned into
different color bands. For example, most firms in the yellow starting color band moved to the green category,
and less than ten percent moved into the red category by October of the following year.
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Figure 2-4: Saudization Compliance Requirement - Required Change vs. Initial Saudi Percentage
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Figure 2-5: Normalized Saudization Compliance Requirement: Required Change vs. Initial Dis-
tance from Cutoff
0LO
a)
0.C
E
0
C
a_
Cr
aO
I
2-6: Normalized Compliance Requirement: Required Change vs. Initial Distance from
E
8
-T -
-50 -50 0 50
Distance from Cutoff
95
-50
Distance from Cutoff
50 0 -100
Figure
Cutoff
(a) Saudis (b) Expatriates
E
8
Co
OZ
50 0
Distance from Cutoff
Figure 2-7: Density of Baseline Saudization Percentages Relative to Cutoff
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Notes: Firms with zero Saudization percentage at baseline are excluded from this figure. Bin size on is
0.5 percentage point. This figure corresponds to a McCrary test for a break in the baseline Saudization
percentage for Green and Yellow firms at the compliance cutoff. The corresponding McCrary test statistic
is 0.94.
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Figure 2-8: Baseline Employment Relative to Initial Distance from the Cutoff
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Notes: Parametric tests for a kink in these baseline employment figures fail to reject the null of no change
in the slope at all conventional significant levels. There is no evidence of a kink in either the linear fit or in
the local quadratic polynomial fit.
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Figure 2-9: RKD Figures: Saudization, Saudi Employees, and Expatriate Employees
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Figure 2-10: DD Regression Coefficients
(a) Change in Saudi Employees vs. Distance from Green Cutoff
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(b) Change in Expatriate Employees vs. Distance from Green Cutoff
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employees on distance (in terms of number of Saudi employees needed) from the green color band cutoff.
Panel (b) plots the coefficients of the regression of the change in the number of expatriate employees on
distance (in terms of number of surplus expatriate employees) from the green color band cutoff. Bounds for
the 95% confidence intervals are marked in grey and are based on standard errors clustered at the industry
by size group level. Regressions include a full set of cell fixed effects, and differences are the changes between
July 2011 and October 2012. Omitted category is zero.
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Figure 2-11: RKD Figures: Firm Size, Exit, and Value
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Figure 2-12: RKD Results on Industry Subsamples
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Figure 2-12: RKD Results on Industry Subsamples
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Figure 2-13: Strategic Firm-Level Hiring Patterns: Employment of Saudis and Expatriates over the Nitaqat Period
-I
- - - I
I _ -- I'--~,
A
1
I 1I _____
-
-~ I
I 
/ 
j
- - -- -- -
Notes: Solid lines show employment of Saudis and dashed lines show expatriate employment over the 71-week period beginning in July 2011. Scale
of the y-axes suppressed for privacy reasons.
I J~' ~
- - - -
Il
I'
I r
_P
--f-
Figure 2-14: Strategic Firm Exit
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Tables
Table 2.1: Nitaqat Sanctions and Benefits by Color Band and Date
Red Firms
September 11, 2011 Existing visas cannot be renewed for longer than three months
Job descriptions for foreign workers cannot be changed
No hiring of expatriate workers from other firms
No new visas issued
Firms cannot open any new facilities or branches
November 27, 2011 Existing work visas can no longer be renewed
Expatriate employees may freely transfer their employment to Green or
Platinum band companies without the consent of their current employer
Yellow Firms
September 11, 2011 Existing visas cannot be renewed for longer than three months
Job descriptions for foreign workers cannot be changed
No hiring of expatriate workers from other firms
No applications for new temporary or seasonal visas accepted
Firms are entitled to one new visa for every two workers departing the country
on a final exit visa
February 24, 2012 Existing work visas can no longer be renewed
Workers who have been in the Kingdom for more than six years cannot renew
their visas
Expatriate employees may freely transfer their employment to Green or
Platinum band companies without the consent of their current employer
Green Firms
September 11, 2012 Visa applications can be submitted as usual
Job descriptions for foreign workers can be updated as necessary
Firms are entitled to one new visa for every two workers departing the country
on a final exit visa
Firms receive a six-month extension for the submission of the Certificate of
Zakat and Income Tax
November 27, 2011 Expatriate workers may be hired from Red firms
February 24, 2012 Expatriate workers may be hired from Yellow firms
Platinum Firms
September 11, 2012 Unrestricted approval of new visas
Job descriptions for foreign workers can be updated as necessary
Firms are entitled to one new visa for every two workers departing the country
on a final exit visa
Firms receive a six-month extension for the submission of the Certificate of
Zakat and Income Tax
November 27, 2011 Expatriate workers may be hired from Red firms
Firms receive a one-year extension for the submission of all MOL documents
February 24, 2012 Expatriate workers may be hired from Yellow firms
Existing visas may be renewed for any employee with less than three months
remaining on their visa
Notes: List compiled from http://www.emol.gov.sa/nitaqat/pages/ServiceExtrs.aspx and the Ministry of
Labor Nitaqat Manual
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Table 2.2: Number of Firms by Industry and Size Classification (July 2011)
G
(30
Total 102,693 12,935 1,187 58 116,873
Notes: This table provides sample statistics on the number of firms in each of 37 industries and 4 size
categories at baseline (July 9, 2011). Of the firms in the baseline sample, 1,027,017 were too small to be
included in the Nitaqat program (fewer than ten employees). The fifteen industry classifications that
were added in later versions of Nitaqat were road transport of goods within cities; road transport of goods
between cities; laboratories; governmental and private schools (boys; mixed gender); security escorts;
private employment offices; kindergarten; bakeries; ready-mixed concrete; information technology;
governmental construction contractors; governmental hygiene contractors; petrol stations; and stone,
granite and brick.
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Industry
Building and construction
Wholesale and retail trade
Multiple economic activities
Manufacturing
Workshops and maintenance services
Farmers, fishermen and shepherds
Restaurants and catering services
Personal services
Social and communal services
Passenger transportation (inter-city)
Maintenance and cleaning services
Health services
Lodging and tourism
Insurance and business services
Consulting services
Passenger transportation (intra-city)
Agriculture and livestock
Governmental and private schools
Foreign schools
Printing, publishing and media
Pharmacies
Collection offices and real estate
Institutes and colleges
Agriculture, fishing, grazing, horses
Electricity, gas and water
Gold and jewelry trade
Air transportation
Mining and quarrying
Petrochemicals, coal and rubber
Cement
Financial institutions (banks)
Private labor recruitment agencies
Petroleum and gas extraction
Shipping
General office services
Storage
Communications
Small
(10-49)
34,179
17,677
16,050
5,512
6,481
6,206
4,537
2,364
2,011
1,207
971
863
1,085
493
400
351
343
224
171
238
219
173
144
194
76
76
69
54
50
44
54
41
36
45
29
19
7
Medium
(50-499)
5,351
2,717
1,348
194
220
301
170
278
230
300
396
185
135
145
140
61
180
109
33
47
55
73
20
30
16
20
25
29
28
15
36
26
14
2
2
4
Large
(500-2999)
578
197
120
4
9
8
10
31
9
56
33
19
9
6
10
12
2
1
2
2
5
5
3
7
3
6
6
11
11
10
1
1
iant
00+) Total
39 40,147
6 20,597
. 16,050
1 6,981
. 6,679
. 6,435
1 4,847
1 2,545
1 2,321
1 1,447
4 1,331
. 1,292
. 1,289
. 637
. 551
. 501
2 418
. 406
. 281
. 273
. 268
. 233
. 222
. 217
1 114
. 92
. 92
. 85
. 85
. 83
. 80
. 77
1 73
. 59
. 31
. 22
. 12
Table 2.3: Number of Employees by Industry and Type (July 2011)
Industry
Number Total % Total Saudi % Saudi Share
Industry of Firms Workers Workforce Workers Workforce Saudi
Building and construction 40,147 2,627,940 46.66 152,046 24.35 5.79
Wholesale and retail trade 20,597 927,861 16.47 127,711 20.45 13.76
Manufacturing 6,981 418,025 7.42 69,096 11.06 16.53
Multiple economic activities 16,050 199,166 3.54 4,795 0.77 2.41
Maintenance and cleaning services 1,331 167,817 2.98 12,791 2.05 7.62
Farmers, fishermen and shepherds 6,435 128,447 2.28 1,532 0.25 1.19
Restaurants and catering services 4,847 128,118 2.27 7,961 1.27 6.21
Health services 1,292 124,640 2.21 20,358 3.26 16.33
Social and communal services 2,321 123,849 2.20 39,229 6.28 31.67
Workshops and maintenance services 6,679 122,235 2.17 3,196 0.51 2.61
Personal services 2,545 82,198 1.46 11,923 1.91 14.51
Petroleum and gas extraction 73 70,720 1.26 53,699 8.60 75.93
Passenger transportation (inter-city) 1,447 65,567 1.16 4,929 0.79 7.52
Lodging and tourism 1,289 62,190 1.10 8,185 1.31 13.16
Agriculture and livestock 418 42,124 0.75 4,878 0.78 11.58
Consulting services 551 38,015 0.67 5,691 0.91 14.97
Passenger transportation (intra-city) 501 35,215 0.63 3,654 0.59 10.38
Insurance and business services 637 33,701 0.60 8,251 1.32 24.48
Governmental and private schools 406 30,045 0.53 11,390 1.82 37.91
Financial institutions (banks) 80 28,777 0.51 23,040 3.69 80.06
Electricity, gas and water 114 23,330 0.41 8,329 1.33 35.70
Cement 83 20,292 0.36 4,584 0.73 22.59
Institutes and colleges 222 20,292 0.36 8,607 1.38 42.42
Foreign schools 281 17,794 0.32 6,776 1.09 38.08
Collection offices and real estate 233 14,599 0.26 2,172 0.35 14.88
Mining and quarrying 85 12,111 0.22 4,808 0.77 39.70
Petrochemicals, coal and rubber 85 11,735 0.21 5,298 0.85 45.15
Pharmacies 268 11,316 0.20 1,907 0.31 16.85
Printing, publishing and media 273 10,922 0.19 2,127 0.34 19.47
Agriculture, fishing, grazing, horses 217 9,731 0.17 835 0.13 8.58
Gold and jewelry trade 92 8,847 0.16 2,750 0.44 31.08
Private labor recruitment agencies 77 5,391 0.10 234 0.04 4.34
Air transportation 92 2,897 0.05 352 0.06 12.15
Shipping 59 2,376 0.04 518 0.08 21.80
Communications 12 1,661 0.03 198 0.03 11.92
Storage 22 1,602 0.03 428 0.07 26.72
General office services 31 644 0.01 188 0.03 29.19
Total 116,873 5,632,190 624,466 11.09
1,027,01
Non-Nitaqat Firms 7 1,780,937 31.62 21,250 3.40 1.19
Notes: This table provides sample statistics on the composition of the workforce by industry at baseline
(July 9, 2011). Column 1 counts the number of firms in each industry category, and column 2 the
number of employees at firms in those industries. Column 3 sorts industries by their share of the total
private-sector workforce. Columns 4 and 5 report the number of Saudi workers in each industry and the
share of workers in that industry in the total Saudi private sector workforce. Column 6 calculates the
share of workers in each industry that are Saudi nationals, i.e. the overall industry Saudization rate. The
last line reports the same statistics for the firms that were too small to be included in the Nitaqat
program (less than ten employees).
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Table 2.4: Number of Employees by Size and Type (July 2011)
Number of Number of % Total Saudi % Saudi Share
Size Group Firms Workers Workforce Workers Workforce Saudi
Tiny (<10) 1,027,017 1,780,937 24.02 21,250 3.29 1.19
Small (10-49) 102,693 1,823,386 24.60 74,759 11.58 4.10
Medium (50-499) 12,935 1,582,555 21.35 190,263 29.47 12.02
Large (500-2999) 1,187 1,428,220 19.27 237,851 36.84 16.65
Giant (3000+) 58 798,029 10.77 121,593 18.83 15.24
Total 1,143,890 7,413,127 645,716 8.71
Notes: This table provides sample statistics on the composition of the workforce by size group at baseline(July 9, 2011). Column 1 counts the number of firms in each size category, and column 2 the number of
employees at firms in those categories. Column 3 lists the category share of the total private-sector
workforce. Columns 4 and 5 report the number of Saudi workers in each size group and the share of
workers in that group in the total Saudi private sector workforce. Column 6 calculates the share of
workers in each size category that are Saudi nationals, i.e. the overall category Saudization rate.
Table 2.5: Movements Between Color Bands (July 2011 to October 2012)
Oct 2012 White Red Yellow Green Platinum Total
July 2011
Panel A: Number of Firms
White 981,267 0 0 0 0 981,267
Red 20 19,154 7,334 32,521 1,421 60,450
Yellow 0 570 1,013 5,595 166 7,344
Green 1 996 1,411 11,260 718 14,386
Platinum 0 33 43 483 829 1,388
Total 981,288 20,753 9,801 49,859 3,134 1,064,835
Panel B: Percentage of Starting Firms
White 100 0 0 0 0
Red 0.03 31.69 12.13 53.80 2.35
Yellow 0 7.76 13.79 76.18 2.26
Green 0.01 6.92 9.81 78.27 4.99
Platinum 0 2.38 3.10 34.80 59.73
Notes: Panel A displays the number of firms that moved between color bands between July
2011 and October 2012. Rows indicate the starting color band of the firm, and columns the
ending color band. Panel B gives the share of firms in each starting color band that moved
to each of the ending color bands. This sample includes only firms that were in both the
baseline (July 2011) and follow-up sample (October 2012). Firm count is smaller than in
the baseline summary statistics due to firm entry and exit.
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Table 2.6: RKD Estimates
Estimated
Outcome Bandwidth Polynomial Kink t-statistic N
Percentage 5 1 0.20*** 5.61 48,241
2 0.48*** 3.47 48,241
10 1 0.23*** 8.99 76,425
2 0.19*** 2.92 76,425
20 1 0.20*** 7.60 81,958
2 0.31*** 4.35 81,958
50 1 0.19*** 7.10 83,215
2 0.32*** 5.06 83,215
Saudi Employees 5 1 0.34*** 6.10 75,073
2 -0.03 -0.38 75,073
10 1 0.51*** 7.78 78,461
2 0.15 1.32 78,461
20 1 0.49*** 7.69 81,126
2 0.20 1.46 81,126
50 1 0.59*** 10.59 82,633
2 0.47*** 5.00 82,633
Expatriate Employees 5 1 -0.04 0.13 7,099
2 -0.01 0.04 7,099
10 1 -0.05 0.97 17,637
2 -0.01 0.22 17,637
20 1 0.07*** 3.93 52,612
2 -0.01 0.36 52,612
50 1 0.02 0.85 73,470
2 0.06** 2.35 73,470
Firm Size 5 1 3.07*** 3.93 48,241
2 -12.52*** 3.94 48,241
10 1 -0.61** 1.98 76,425
2 2.35* 1.90 76,425
20 1 -0.52** 2.11 81,958
2 -1.31* 1.75 81,958
50 1 -0.52*** 3.02 83,215
2 -1.21*** 3.44 83,215
Exit Rate 5 1 1.15*** 3.90 65,038
2 2.82*** 2.65 65,038
10 1 2.17*** 17.68 107,602
2 -1.59*** 3.43 107,602
20 1 0.72*** 9.28 114,527
2 4.48*** 18.14 114,527
50 1 0.98*** 18.67 116,362
2 0.97*** 8.39 116,362
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<O.1
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Table 2.7: Average Effects by Color Band (DD Estimates)
Saudization Saudi Employees Expatriate Total Employees % Exit NumberPercentage ployees of Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
D(Red) 4.03*** 3.44*** 1.97** 1.01* -9.60*** -5.29*** -7.63*** -4.29*** 11.85*** 11.67*** 60,450
(0.61) (0.48) (0.85) (0.39) (2.95) (0.94) (2.46) (0.83) (1.18) (1.16)
D(Yellow) 4.20*** 3.45*** 2.03*** 0.81* -4.88** 0.56 -2.85 1.37 4.54** 4.31** 7,344
(0.81) (0.78) (0.69) (0.46) (2.07) (1.80) (2.86) (1.90) (1.88) (1.81)
D(Green > 5) -5.45*** -8.81** 39.36*** 30.55*** -1.84 1,692
(0.89) (3.86) (8.51) (9.04) (2.20)
N 82,180 82,180 82,180 82,180 82,180 82,180 82,180 82,180 115,159 115,159
Total Est. Effect 3.34 2.73 133,995 52,097 -616,159 -249,071 -482,164 -197,579 10,880 10,665
Full Compliance 5.76 3.22 211,433 57,373 -1,865,842 -769,653 .
Benchmark
Notes: This table reports the average change in Saudi percentage, number of Saudi employees, number of expatriate employees, total number of
employees, and exit rates between July 2011 and October 2012 based on initial color band assignment. Comparisons are based on firms in the
same industry and size category that were assigned to the Green band. For odd-numbered columns, the omitted comparison group is all firms that
were initially in the Green color band. In even-numbered columns the comparison group is Green firms that were just above the quota cutoff, with
no more than five Saudi employees more than were needed to meet the quota. Average changes for firms that were in the Green band but which
were well-above the quota are reported as coefficients on D(Green>5). All regressions include industry by size fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the industry by size level. The last column lists the number of matched firms in each category for the sample used in the first eight
columns. The last two rows compare the implied total estimated effect on the relevant outcome variable with the full-compliance benchmark. In
columns 1 and 2 this is the average change in private-sector Saudization; in columns 3 and 4 the increase in Saudi employees; in columns 5 and 6
the decrease in expatriate employees; in columns 7 and 8 the total change in the number of private sector workers, and in 9 and 10 the number of
firms that exited as a result of the program.
*** p<0 .0 1 , ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Chapter 3
The Direct Costs of Conflict-Related
Supply Disruptions on the U.S.
Downstream Oil Industry
3.1 Introduction
"And here we have a serious problem. America is addicted to oil, which is often imported from
unstable parts of the world."
George W. Bush, 2006 State of the Union Address
The security of petroleum supplies is a major issue in U.S. domestic and foreign policy. Concerns about
energy security and exposure to political volatility through the oil market have long been at the center of
policy discussions in the United States. Many strategies to address this issue have focused on increasing
North American oil supply, and there has been ongoing debate over whether restrictions on domestic oil
extraction should be eased, permitting drilling both offshore and in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
(ANWR).1 At the same time, opponents of drilling have cited serious environmental costs and questioned
the benefits of increasing domestic production. Because of this, it is essential to understand how the U.S.
downstream industry is affected by conflict in oil supplier countries.
There are two major types of costs associated with conflict in oil-exporting countries: the indirect costs
of disruptions in exports, usually captured by changes in the world oil price, and the direct costs of supply
disruptions to refiners and markets that were reliant on that particular crude stream. The indirect costs are
the most visible and draw the most attention, as export disruptions cause sudden changes to the world oil
price. These price changes quickly pass through into gasoline prices, and oil price surges make newspaper
headlines. The costs of these conflict-related supply shocks and subsequent surges in the world oil price are
I am grateful to the George and Obie Shultz fund for providing financial support to acquire the data for this
project.
Former President George W. Bush notably supported opening ANWR for drilling, claiming that the supplies
would make the United States less dependent on foreign sources of energy (Bush 2008). He also removed an executive
prohibition on offshore exploration.
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of first-order importance to refiners and consumers. At the same time, however, it is unlikely that increasing
U.S. domestic oil production will protect the downstream industry from these price shocks. Many in the
industry have pointed out that the potential additional production will not be sufficient either to change
world oil prices or to displace all U.S. oil imports. 2
In addition to these highly visible effects on the global downstream industry, however, conflict-related
supply disruptions may also affect refiners and consumers by interrupting refinery-level supplies of particular
imported crude streams. Oil refineries in the U.S. tend to be very specialized and process set shares of
specific types of crude oil. While refineries can be converted to accept a different input mix, the process is
costly and requires significant adjustment of the physical capital. Because of this, oil from different countries
is far from perfectly substitutable, and supply interruptions of particular crude types may have a significant
effect on the refineries that depend on them. If refiners are not able to find substitutes for the lost crude,
these import disruptions may further decrease refining profits for these firms and increase retail product
prices in the markets that they serve.
This paper uses a comprehensive dataset linking refinery-level crude imports to international conflict to
quantify these direct effects of conflict-related supply disruptions on domestic refined product markets. This
exercise provides some evidence on how effectively firms are able to adjust to unexpected supply shortfalls
in the short run. In particular, the analysis first asks how conflict in oil-producing countries affects U.S.
petroleum imports, and what these direct supply disruptions cost refiners and consumers in terms of reduced
profits and increased product prices. I first use data on conflict intensity to identify exogenous disruptions
to oil imports from particular countries. I then identify the refineries that were likely to be affected by these
supply disruptions using historical refinery-level imports to determine which refineries were set up to process
crude from each country. I use this panel variation in the exposure to conflict-related supply disruptions to
examine the effect of the lost supplies on refining profits and on gasoline prices in the markets served by the
affected refineries. This research design allows the analysis to separate the direct effects of conflict-related
supply disruptions from the general effects of shocks to global oil markets.
There are several key results. First, I find that conflicts in oil-exporting countries are associated with
supply disruptions to U.S. refineries. The magnitude of these disruptions is increasing with conflict severity.
On average, conflicts are associated with a 265,000 barrel disruption per conflict-year to importing refineries,
a total loss of approximately 2 billion barrels from 1991-2011, 3.5 percent of total oil imports to operating
refineries during the period. Second, the effect of these disruptions on profits and prices is very small.
2The EIA, for example, estimates that the total production of ANWR would be far too small to have any
significant effect on world oil prices (EIA 2008), and most economists agree that drilling in the Arctic would have no
effect on the price of oil (e.g. Borenstein (2005)). A recent poll of energy experts found that most do not consider
energy independence to be a sensible goal, asserting that the United States would always be linked to global oil
markets even with increased domestic production (Yergin 2012).
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Estimates for the effect on profits are mostly precisely-estimated zeros; the only statistically significant
estimate indicates that a 10 percent decrease in imports due to conflict would decrease profits by 0.3 percent.
The estimates for the effect on prices are also quite small; on average conflicts raise prices by up to 0.006
percent, and a 10 percent decrease in imports due to conflict is associated with a 0.6 percent increase in the
retail gasoline price. On average, then, refineries appear to adjust quickly to unexpected changes in their
supplies, and the impact on refiner costs seems to be small.
There are several important points to be made about these results. First, as mentioned above the most
significant costs of conflict will not be captured by this analysis. The costs estimated here are the differential
effect on refiners and markets that are directly affected by supply interruptions relative to those that are
not. Even though these differential effects are small, the indirect effects on the whole industry are likely
quite large. These effects will be felt by refiners and consumers whether or not they actually import oil
from fragile states. 3 Second, all of the analysis in this paper uses non-importers as a comparison group for
importers when estimating the effect of conflicts in particular countries. These estimates will therefore only
be valid to the extent that these companies and local markets provide a relevant counterfactual both in
terms of their response to global oil shocks as well as whether they experience spillovers from import shocks
to their competitors. Most of these issues will tend to bias the analysis toward larger estimates of the costs,
which is less of a concern given that the results suggest only very small effects.
This paper is the first to examine the direct impact of global conflict on refinery-level supply disruptions.
There has been very little academic work done on the costs to importers of conflict in oil-exporting countries,
and much of the debate has occurred in the popular press rather than in the academic literature. For the
most part, academics have focused on the fact that domestic production will have little effect on global oil
prices, and that increasing imports from North American sources will not shield the U.S. from global price
shocks (Borenstein 2008, Borenstein 2012). On the other hand, there has been a great deal of work on how
oil price shocks, often due to conflict-related oil production interruptions in OPEC countries, have affected
U.S. macroeconomic indicators such as GDP growth, inflation, wages, and employment (see for example
Hamilton (1983), Hamilton (1996), Keane & Prasad (1996), Bernanke, Gertler & Watson (1997), Davis &
Haltiwanger (2001), Lee & Ni (2002), Barsky & Kilian (2004), and Kilian (2008). A relatively recent paper
by Blomberg, Hess & Jackson (2009), for example, looks at how the stock prices of oil companies respond
to acts of terrorism. They find that terrorist activity was associated with an increase in stock returns in the
1968-1973 period, with the relationship disappearing post-1974. They attribute this to the decline of market
power of these companies in the more recent period. This paper complements this literature by examining the
3Even if no U.S. refiner had ever used crude from Libya, for example, the huge export disruption during the Arab
Spring uprising and subsequent surge in world oil prices would have increased input prices for refineries across the
U.S. and raised gasoline prices for consumers.
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direct effect of supply disruptions on the U.S. downstream industry rather than the indirect effects through
oil prices. This paper also adds to the literature on whether conflict in oil-producing countries disrupts oil
production. 4 Recent work by Toft (2011), for example, finds that less than half of conflicts in oil-producing
countries result in production declines. Luciani (2011) examines several case studies and similarly concludes
that oil and gas installations tend to be quite resilient to armed conflict. This paper provides estimates on
how conflicts disrupt U.S. imports rather than overall supply. Although other work by Lee & Ni (2002) finds
some evidence that U.S. petroleum refineries reduce their outputs in response to oil price shocks, this paper
examines the direct link through decreases in refinery-level imports rather than overall changes in input
quantities.
Finally, this paper takes a first step toward understanding what types of conflicts are likely to be the
most costly for the downstream industry. While the analysis finds conflict-related supply disruptions do not
have significant effects on average, there is some evidence that large conflicts are more likely to cause serious
supply disruptions, decrease profits, and raise retail gasoline prices. It is likely that there also are other
characteristics that make certain supply disruptions more serious than others. Shocks may be particularly
difficult for refiners to smooth when the lost crude is heavily used by a particular refiner or in a particular
market, requiring the refinery to secure a large amount of replacement crude on short notice. Supply
interruptions could also be particularly serious when the crude type itself is difficult to replace, whether
because it has unusual characteristics or because there are no other countries providing close substitutes.
Future work is needed to understand how these factors affect the impact of conflict-related supply disruptions.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides some background on how supply disruptions
might be expected to affect U.S. refiners and discusses some important features of the U.S. refining market.
Section 3 describes the data used in the analysis, and section 4 describes the empirical strategy in more
detail. Section 5 presents the results, and section 6 concludes.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Conflict-Related Supply Disruptions
On December 18, 2010, a protest in Tunisia kicked off a wave of revolutionary demonstrations, riots, and
civil wars that would sweep the Arab world. In Libya, the Arab Spring movement became a bloody civil war
between forces loyal to President Muammar Gaddafi and rebels from across the country. The main fighting
began in February 2011 and lasted for about nine months, causing thousands of casualties and bringing oil
4There has also been a great deal of work trying to establish whether oil resources increase the likelihood of
conflict. For more on this, see for example the comprehensive survey by Ross (2004) and the recent paper by Cotet
& Tsui (2013).
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exports to a halt.
Before the civil war, Libya had been one of the world's top oil producers, exporting just over 1.7 million
barrels of oil per day in 2008. Some of this was sold to the United States, which received an average of 22
million barrels per year from 2005 to 2010. The violence of the civil war brought Libya's oil industry to
a standstill, destroying export ports, drilling stations and refineries. Es Sider and Marsa el Brega, two of
Libya's largest marine terminals, were heavily damaged in the fighting (Bahgat 2012). Overall petroleum
production fell by 70 percent between 2010 and 2011, and monthly U.S. imports dropped from an average of
over 2 million barrels per month in 2010 to as little as 145,000 barrels in October 2011 (Figures 3-1 and 3-2).
Reports of supply disruptions to refiners in Europe started as early as March 2011 (PIW 2011c). Libya's
oil is a high-quality, low-sulfur, or "light sweet" crude, one of the easiest and cheapest crudes to process
(EIA 2011c). Because of this, the loss of light sweet crudes is the most difficult to adjust to, since refineries
that process these crudes tend to be the simplest and least flexible in their inputs. Refiners responded to
the disruption in Libyan supplies by drawing down inventories, cutting runs, and turning to alternative
suppliers, and price differentials quickly rose for close substitutes like Azeri Light and Nigerian Qua Iboe
(PIW 2011b). Nonetheless, even in Europe, which was hit hardest by the loss of Libyan supplies, refiners
reported that the main problem they faced was the increase in overall oil prices rather than the loss of Libyan
crude in particular (PIW 2011a). Substitute crudes were also available in the U.S. market, which remained
well-supplied with light sweet crude out of Cushing, Oklahoma. Libyan crude production began to come
back online by the end of 2011, and by March of 2012 was back up to 1.4 million barrels per day, 85 percent
of its pre-war level.
Crude supply disruptions like this affect petroleum markets in several ways. First, these events tend to
raise world oil prices, which can cut into refining profit margins. Prices for Brent, a widely-traded European
marker crude, rose by 20 USD per barrel between February and April of 2011 at the outbreak of the Libyan
civil war. This affects refiners regardless of where they actually buy their crude, and any country that
imports oil will pay higher import prices when the world crude price increases. For refiners that actually
import crude from these countries, however, conflict can also have direct effects through unexpected supply
interruptions. The degree to which this affects refiner profits and retail prices will depend on how these cuts
affect input costs and refinery output. Refiners can respond to delivery shortfalls by turning to spot markets
for substitute crudes, drawing down inventories, or by temporarily cutting their runs. If refiners are able
to fully smooth shocks using inventories or find comparably-priced substitutes, then supply disruptions may
have no differential effect on profits or prices. If supply disruptions drive up the price of substitute crudes,
then cost increases will either appear in reduced profits to refiners or as increased retail product prices. In the
most extreme case when substitutes are not available, refiners may be forced to cut their output, decreasing
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profits and raising retail prices. This paper looks for these changes in refining profits and product prices to
estimate the cost of these conflict-related supply interruptions.
3.2.2 Market Details
The empirical strategy relies on comparing refiners and markets that are directly affected by supply
disruptions with those that are not. There are two main features of the U.S. downstream industry that make
this possible.
First, refineries tend to be calibrated to process set shares of specific types of crude, and purchase a
fairly consistent mix of crudes over time. Because of this, refineries that purchased crude from Iran in the
past, for example, are likely to continue to be customers for Iranian crude. When a conflict disrupts these
supplies, these refineries are the ones that are the most likely to experience the shortfall. This persistence
in oil purchases is due to the fact that a refinery's crude inputs are constrained by its physical capital in the
short run. Most refineries require a fairly specific blend of input crudes to operate, and large adjustments
to the input mix require significant capital investments. Fundamentally, petroleum refining consists of
blending input crudes and then distilling the mix into its constituent hydrocarbons, isolating the molecules
and then blending them into end products such as gasoline, diesel, propane and asphalt. Although all
refineries perform this same process, they differ in their complexity and in what sorts of crude oil they can
process and what outputs they produce. Refineries require special units to handle particularly corrosive
crude inputs, for example, or to create high-value outputs out of heavy, low-priced inputs. Figure 3-3 shows
sample configurations of two different refinery types. The most basic type of refinery is a topping refinery,
which includes only distillation units and produces mainly unfinished oils. Hydroskimming refineries add a
hydrotreating and reforming unit to the basic topping refinery configuration, allowing the refinery to remove
sulfur from more sour crudes so that outputs conform to environmental standards and to prevent corrosion
to the rest of the refining units. The most versatile (and most expensive) refinery type are catalytic cracking
or coking refineries, which also feature gas-oil conversion plants, olefin conversion plants, and coking units
to reduce or eliminate the production of residual fuels. These refineries are able to break larger (and less
valuable) molecules and reform them into lighter, more valuable products like gasoline and jet fuel. The
product mix is determined both by the blend of molecules in the input crude mix as well as the sophistication
of the refinery.
Most refineries blend different crude oils before distillation begins. This allows them to maintain consis-
tent processing conditions and mitigate the corrosive effects of cheaper sour crudes. Although crudes differ
in a variety of ways, the most important characteristics are a crude's sulfur content and its specific gravity,
or API. Figure 3-4 plots most major crudes according to these two characteristics. The combination of tight
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product specifications in the U.S. and increasing refinery sophistication has left refiners with less flexibility
to change the characteristics of their crude mix on short notice. Because of this, refiners tend to secure
most of their inputs under term contracts and turn to spot markets to balance out the rest of their crude
slate. Although crudes from the same region tend to have similar characteristics, there is a great deal of
overlap between regions, and refiners can often find suitable substitute crudes if a particular stream becomes
unavailable. The degree to which supply disruptions will affect refiner profits or be passed along into refined
product prices will depend on the degree to which refiners are able to quickly obtain substitute inputs.
The second key feature of the downstream industry is that refined product markets tend to be very
geographically segmented due to transport costs. Once the crude oil has been processed by a refinery, refined
products are transported to wholesale storage facilities by either pipeline, barge, truck or occasionally by
railroad (Association of Oil Pipelines 2009). Pipelines are the least expensive way to move products,5 and
mainly connect areas of high refining output with those of high demand. There is a major pipeline that
delivers products from refineries along the Gulf coast to population centers on the east coast. Trucks usually
make only local trips, and most trips by petroleum tank trucks are no longer than 50 miles (Untiet 1984).
Refiners sell products to retailers out of these local wholesale racks, who then distribute these products
to local consumers. Because refineries are so closely linked to their product markets, disruptions in crude
supplies at the refinery level should be visible in price shocks in the markets they serve. The markets that are
not served by affected refineries should not experience retail price increases due to direct supply disruptions.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Conflict Data
The analysis uses annual data on conflicts that indicate both the location of the conflict and the severity
of the encounter as'measured in battle-related deaths. This data is provided by the Uppsala Conflict Data
Program (UCDP) and the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute,
Oslo (PRIO) (Th6mner 2012; Gleditsch et al., 2002). The UCDP / PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v4-2012
and the PRIO Battle deaths Dataset v5 2012 give conflict-year level data on state-based armed conflicts
beginning in 1989. One of the main benefits of this data is the relatively low inclusion threshold of 25 soldier
and civilian fatalities per year. This allows the analysis to examine the effects of low-intensity conflicts and
to estimate how disruptions change with increasing intensity. The analysis uses these conflict-level battle-
deaths to create three different conflict indicators for the analysis. First, total annual battle-related deaths
are calculated for each country-year pair by adding up the fatalities that occurred in all conflicts that listed
5Transportation costs by pipeline, barge and truck are estimated at 2, 4.5 and 35 cents per gallon per thousand
miles of transportation (Jacobs 2002).
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that country as a location of fighting. For country c in year t:
BRDet = BRDu,
cEC(w)
where C(w) lists the countries where any fighting took place in conflict w. This yields a continuous indicator
of conflict severity in each oil-exporting country in every year. These counts are also used to create an
indicator variable of whether any conflict. Because major disruptions in oil exports are most likely to occur
when conflict severity crosses some threshold, conflict severity is also captured by a set of dummy variables
indicating the intensity of conflict in that year. Country-year pairs are coded as low-intensity if they fall
in the lowest quartile of conflict fatalities, with between 25 and 62 battle-related deaths. Medium-intensity
conflicts correspond to the second quartile, with 63-268 fatalities, and high-intensity corresponds with 269-
989 fatalities. Very high conflict years are those with over 990 fatalities. This corresponds with the PRIO
definition of a war as a conflict with at least 1000 battle-related fatalities in a single year. It should be noted
that these estimates are much lower than most estimates of the human cost of conflict, since these figures
do not include indirect deaths as a result of war and conflict.
The set of conflicts that occur in supplier countries is listed in Table 3.1. Most conflicts are either civil
wars or violent conflicts between governments and a non-governmental group, indicated in the table as an
insurgency. About 17% of U.S. supplies came from countries that had at least one incident in the dataset.
3.3.2 Refinery-Level Imports
In order to estimate the effects of conflict-related disruptions on refinery profits and local retail prices,
it is critical to identify which refineries received crude shipments from each country. This information comes
from the Energy Information Administration (EIA), which monitors domestic petroleum refining and which
collects data on all foreign crude imports through the EIA-814 Monthly Imports Report. This data is publicly
available at the refinery level from the EIA starting in 1986. I match this data to a list of all operating
refineries in each year constructed using the EIA Refinery Capacity Report (from EIA-820), which lists all
operating U.S. refineries in each year for 1994, 1995, 1997, and 1999-2011 and reports capacity, owner, and
state for each refinery. There are 181 refineries listed in the report. When matched with the importer
data, this lists all refineries operating in a given year and how much crude each refinery imported from each
country.
Of the 181 operating refineries, 116 imported at least some crude from countries that experienced some
conflict during the 1991 to 2011 period. Figure 3-5 shows the locations of all of the refineries in the sample,
with the size of the empty circles indicating each refinery's total refining capacity over the period, and the
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purple circles showing the amount of crude imported from countries listed in Table 3.1. There is a great deal
of variation in how exposed refineries were to conflict; the Ergon refinery in Vicksburg, Mississippi got more
than three quarters of its crude from these countries, and several Citgo refineries imported nearly all of their
crude from Venezuela. At the same time, there were many refineries that got very little or no crude from
countries that experienced conflict. This yields considerable variation in conflict exposure among refinery
owners and across states.
While the sources of crude vary a great deal across refineries, they are fairly persistent within refineries
over time. Figure 3-6 plots annual country by refinery imports against imports in the previous period.
The correlation between the two is 0.95, and most observations fall very close to the 45-degree line in the
figure. As discussed above, this is likely due to the specific mix of input crudes required by different types
of refineries.
Refiner Profits
To estimate the impact of conflict-related supply disruptions on refiner profits, I use data on annual profits
from refining operations for the 40 publicly-traded companies that owned at least one U.S. refinery during
the sample period. These data come from Standard and Poor's Compustat North America dataset. Because
U.S. refineries are often owned by large corporations with multiple business lines, I use refining profits data
from the Business Segments Dataset. This dataset includes companies' self-reported balance sheet data by
business type, and usually lists petroleum refining and marketing operations separately. This is particularly
important since some of these companies are also involved in exploration and production activities in the
countries that were disrupted by conflict. Using overall (rather than just refining) profits could therefore
generate a spurious relationship between profits and conflict. While it is still possible that reported refining
profits may be contaminated by profits from other business lines, focusing on refining profits will minimize
this problem. The relevant segments were identified using the segment-specific NAICS classification for
petroleum refining and the segment name as reported by the company. The analysis focuses on operating
profits, which represents sales of the refining business segment less its allocated share of operating costs and
expenses.
In order to link company profits to refinery imports, it is also necessary to determine annual corporate
ownership of each refinery. Ownership of individual refineries was established using the EIA Refinery Ca-
pacity Reports and supplemented using corporate profiles from the Moody's/Mergent Industrial Manuals.
Refineries owned through a join enterprise were assigned to either the U.S.-listed corporation or to the ma-
jority stakeholder. Refineries that changed ownership mid-year were assigned to the company that owned
the refinery for the majority of the year. Table 3.2 provides some summary statistics on the publicly-traded
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refinery owner companies that appear in the profits analysis. There is large amount of variation in how
exposed companies were to conflict-related supply disruptions. The fairly small Lyondell received almost
80 percent of its total inputs from countries listed in Table 3.1, while many others received very little. Al-
though some received most of this from a single source (PDV, for example, imported most of its crude from
Venezuela), others were exposed to conflict through several supply streams. Premcor, for example, imported
a significant amount of its crude from Venezuela, Mexico, Colombia, Iraq and Angola.
3.3.3 Retail Gasoline Prices
In addition to examining the effect of conflicts on refining profits, I also look at the impact on consumers
though changes in the retail price of gasoline in local product markets. In this part of the analysis, refineries
were first matched to the largest city within an hour travel time by road. Monthly retail price averages for
the 75 cities with nearby refineries were provided by the Oil Price Information Service (OPIS). OPIS uses
data from credit card receipts to capture daily station-specific retail gasoline prices for up to 120,000 stations
throughout the United States, and their data include prices for most major retailers regardless of ownership.
This daily station data for regular unleaded gasoline is aggregated up to the city-year level for this analysis
and covers the period from 1998-2011.
I link this price data for each city to refining capacity and petroleum imports in its wholesale market. I
define a city's corresponding market in two ways. In the first, local markets are defined using the assumption
that refineries serve only cities within an hour travel time by truck. Under this definition, refineries are
assigned to markets that correspond with the city they were closest to. I alternatively define a refinery's
market as any city that is "down-pipe" of the refinery using directional product pipeline information from
2004 (Figure 3-7).6 Under the first definition, for example, retail prices in St. Paul and Chicago are only
affected by import disruptions to refineries operating in their local area. The second market definition takes
into account that there is a product pipeline going from Bismarck to St. Paul, and from St. Paul to Chicago.
Prices in Bismarck are still only affected by refineries in the local area, but St. Paul prices may now also be
affected by refineries in Bismarck as well as in St. Paul, and prices in Chicago by refineries in Bismarck and
St. Paul. Crude supply disruptions that affect a refinery in Bismarck would therefore be allowed to affect
prices under the second market definition but not the first.
6Muehlegger (2006) uses product pipelines in a similar way to calculate transportation costs for a refinery to
serve markets in each state.
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3.4 Empirical Strategy
The objective of this analysis is to estimate the direct costs to U.S. refiners and consumers of supply
interruptions caused by conflict in oil exporting countries. More specifically, how do conflicts in exporter
countries disrupt U.S. imports from these countries, and how do these disruptions affect refiner profits and
retail gasoline prices? To answer these questions, I estimate the effect of conflict on imports, profits, and
gasoline prices. The basic empirical strategy is to compare refineries that had been importing crude from
a country where a conflict occurred to refineries that were not importing from that country. To this end,
the analysis uses a panel of annual country by refinery imports matched to panels of country-level conflict
measures, company profits, and city-level gasoline prices. For the profits analysis, the comparison will be
between companies that owned refineries that were potentially affected by the conflict, (i.e. refineries that
had previously imported crude from that country) and all other companies. For the price analysis, the
comparison is between markets that were served by refineries whose supplies were potentially affected by the
conflict and markets that weren't connected to any of these refineries.
The main empirical issue is to what extent the non-importers provide a good comparison group for the
importers. First, refineries that import from countries listed in Table 3.1 may be different from refineries
that did not import from these places. It is clear from Table 3.2 that most importers obtained at least some
of their supplies from countries that experienced conflict. Those that did not receive any imports at all
from these sources tend to be smaller, own fewer refineries, and have lower total imports. This pattern is
less pronounced but also broadly true for imports from specific countries; companies that imported oil from
Iran, for example, tended to have higher capacity, imports and profits than those that did not. To a large
extent these average differences between refiners will be captured in the regressions by company fixed effects
and conflict controls. However, it may also be the case that there are additional features of these companies
that cause them to respond differently to changes in world market conditions. If a conflict in Libya raises
the world oil price, this may have a larger effect on a large, importing refiner than it would on a refinery
that processes only U.S. crude. In this case, the comparison group will be less affected by conflict than
the treatment group would have even if it had not actually been importing from that source country. This
will generate an over-estimate of the costs of conflict. Similarly, markets that are not served by importer
refineries are likely different from those that are. As shown in Figure 3-5, for example, many of the refineries
that import crude from these countries are coastal and tend to import more of their source crude. Again,
this may bias the estimates of the effect on retail prices upward.
Another important challenge to the identification are spillover effects of the direct effects of conflict to
the comparison group. First, conflicts in an exporter country may affect the profits of refiners that do not
import from that country. Note, however, that this is not always a problem. In particular, if the effect
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comes through an increase in the world oil price, then this is fine; even if no U.S. refiners experienced supply
disruptions, changes in the world price caused by conflicts will always affect the U.S. downstream industry.
The problem arises when non-importers are affected by a conflict because the conflict affects importing
refineries. For example, a conflict that disrupted a light, sweet crude stream would put additional pressure
on the market for a local substitute crude. This would differentially raise the price of the substitute crude
in the U.S. market, potentially driving down profits or raising prices even for non-importing refiners and
markets. To the extent that this is the case, estimating the costs by comparing importers and non-importers
will underestimate the true costs of conflict to importers. Future work will examine this possibility by
estimating the effect of supply disruptions on the prices of close substitutes in the U.S. market. Another
way that conflicts may impact non-importers is by affecting competition between refiners. In particular,
raising input costs for importers may increase the market power of non-importers. In this case, the estimates
generated by the comparison will over-estimate the costs of conflict for the U.S. market as a whole.
In the price analysis, bias in the results could similarly be caused by spillovers to non-importer cities.
This might be the case if consumers drive to non-affected cities when there is a supply shock to an importing
city or if refineries change their distribution to wholesale racks in response to conflict-generated supply
shocks. Because most crude travels by pipeline and only moves short distances by trucks, however, the
analysis addresses this directly using the definitions of the markets, with refineries connected to the cities
that they can easily serve by truck as well as all cities down-pipe. This issue may still be present, but the
magnitude of the bias is likely to be relatively small.
3.4.1 Conflict and Imports
I use two main specifications to estimate the effect of conflict on imports. The first uses a panel of
total annual U.S. imports by country of origin regressed on a measure of conflict in country c in year t.
Country fixed effects are used to control for average differences in imports across countries, and year fixed
effects control for trends in the overall amount of imports. If conflicts decrease the total amount of imports,
however, these year fixed effects will remove some of the effect of imports on conflict. Because of this,
estimates are reported for regressions both with and without year fixed effect. Because disruptions that
affect overall supply are likely to be more costly, the regression without year fixed effects is the preferred
specification.
Importset = 3 - Conflictct + ac + yt + cct
As described in the data section, the conflict measures used are a continuous measure of battle-related deaths
over 25 in a year, an indicator for whether any conflict occurred, and a set of indicators for conflict severity.
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These include an indicator for a country-year pair of low conflict (25-62 fatalities), medium conflict (63-268
fatalities), high conflict (269-989) and very high conflict (990+ fatalities). These cutoffs correspond with the
quartiles of violence in country-year pairs.
This regression is also run at the refinery by country level. This allows us to examine the effect of conflict
on refinery-level imports and yields increased precision. To identify the refineries (r) that are potentially
affected by supply disruptions I define an indicator variable for whether that refinery ever imported crude
from that country. This identifies all refineries that may be directly affected by a supply disruption due to
conflict in a supplier country. I interact this indicator with the same conflict variables used in the aggregate
imports regressions to identify the effect of conflict on potential importers while controlling for the general
effects of conflict on non-importers.
Importsrct = - Conflictet . I- {EverImportedrc} + &rc + t + Et
This specification includes a country by refinery fixed effect, and again results are reported both with and
without the year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the refinery by country level.
3.4.2 Conflict and Profits
To examine the effect of conflict on refiner profits I estimate both the direct effect of conflict as well as
the effect through supply disruptions using a two-stage least squares procedure. Both specifications use the
panel of company-level annual refining profits matched to company by country imports and country-level
conflict measures. As in the imports regressions, I use an indicator variable for whether that company (i)
owned a refinery that had ever imported crude from that country. I interact this indicator with the conflict
variables to identify the effect of conflict on potential importers while controlling for the general effects of
conflict on non-importing companies. The coefficient of interest is therefore 3 in the regression
log (Prof itsit) = # -Conf lictet -1{ EverImportedict } + 6 - Conf lictet + aic + 7t + Ejct.
Here a country by company fixed effect controls for company-level heterogeneity in profits, and a time fixed
effect controls for changes in profitability over time that are not related to conflicts. This includes changes in
overall oil prices due to demand shocks and other types of supply shocks as well as overall trends in refiner
profitability. In these regressions the year fixed effect is not as problematic as it may be in the imports
regressions, and the inclusion of these fixed effects should not have a significant impact on the estimates of
,.
To make the magnitude of /3 easier to interpret, this relationship is also estimated using the conflict
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interaction term as an instrument for log imports in a two-stage least squares estimation procedure. This
yields an estimate of the effect of supply lost due to conflict on refining profits. Again, all regressions will
include company by country fixed effects and will be reported both with and without year fixed effects.
3.4.3 Conflict and Prices
Supply disruptions may also affect U.S. consumers by increasing retail prices in markets served by the
affected refineries. This may be the case if refiners are forced to cut runs because of supply shortfalls or if
the supply shocks increase their marginal costs. The analysis of the effect of conflict on prices is similar to
the analysis of the effect on profits. These specifications use a panel of market-level average annual gasoline
prices matched to market by country imports and measures of country-level conflict intensity. As in the
profits analysis, an indicator variable identifies all markets served by a refinery that has ever imported crude
from county c. This indicator is interacted with the conflict variables to identify markets that may have
been directly affected by conflict-related supply disruptions. The main specification is therefore
log (RetailPrice.t) = 3 - Conf lictet . I{ Everlmportedmct } + 3 - Conf lictet + aimc + yst + Emt.
Here market by country fixed effects control for market level heterogeneity in retail gasoline prices. I also
include controls for state by year fixed effects to capture time-varying factors like overall crude prices and
state-level taxes. As discussed above, the set of refiners serving market m is defined in two ways. In the
first, refineries are linked only to "local" markets, i.e. cities within an hour travel by truck. In the second,
they are also linked to cities that are "down-pipe" on a product pipeline. The second definition therefore
allows more cities to be directly affected by supply disruptions by including more refineries when calculating
1{EverImportedmt }.
This relationship is also estimated using the conflict interaction term as an instrument for import quan-
tities in the regression of prices on imports. Here the market definition will also affect the calculation of
country-level imports associated with a market.
3.5 Results
The results from the regression of aggregate imports on conflict measures are presented in Table 3.3.
Column (1) shows the relationship between aggregate imports (in thousands) and battle-related deaths in
supplier countries. The coefficient indicates that each death above 25 is associated with a 2,630 barrel
decrease in total annual imports from that country. For context, the median number of deaths per year
when conflict occurred was 337; this would be associated with a 886,000 barrel decrease in imports, a two
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percent decrease relative to the average import quantity. As discussed above, the coefficient in column (2)
shows the relationship between conflict and imports taking out year fixed effects. Because this removes the
effect of an overall decrease in imports caused by conflict, this point estimate is slightly lower, indicating a
loss of 2,160 barrels for each fatality, or 728,000 barrels at the median conflict level. The point estimates
for the coefficients on the coarser conflict measures are consistent with the estimates in columns (2) and (3),
but are estimated with large standard errors and not statistically significant in the aggregate regressions.
The refinery-level import effects are presented in Table 3.4. The results here are consistent with the
aggregate results above, but the richer panel yields increased precision. Again, the point estimate on the
linear measure of conflict severity indicates that refineries lose 47 barrels for each battle-related death, or
16,000 barrels for the median conflict. Controlling for the overall level of imports (column (2)) has no effect
on the point estimate. On average, conflicts are associated with a 264,000 barrel reduction in imports. When
this is broken up by severity category (column (5)) the results suggest that large conflicts are more likely to
cause a significant supply disruption, with high-fatality conflicts (269 to 989 fatalities) associated with an
average of 356,000 barrels lost. Again, the inclusion of year fixed effects has very little effect on the point
estimates.
Table 3.5 reports the estimates of the relationship between refining profits and conflict in supplier coun-
tries.7 Most of the point estimates on the interaction term are not statistically significant, and all are very
small. The point estimate on battle-related deaths in column (1), for example, indicates that every thousand
battle-related deaths are associated with a 0.0003 percent reduction in refining profits for companies that
owned refineries that were supplied by the affected country. For the largest conflict in the sample, with 23,000
deaths in a single year, the associated decrease in profits is 0.007 percent. The only statistically significant
estimates in panel A actually indicate a small positive relationship between conflict and profits, with low to
medium intensity conflicts associated with a 0.04 to 0.06 percent increase in profits in that year. Panel B
reports the estimates from the two-stage regressions using the conflict interaction terms as instruments for
log imports. Again the point estimates are quite small and most are not statistically significant. The largest
point estimates come from the estimates using the conflict dummy instrument. These estimates indicate
that a 1 percent decrease in imports due to conflict-related supply disruptions are associated with a 0.03
percent decrease in profits.
The results for the regressions of retail gasoline prices on conflict indicators are presented in Tables 3.6
and 3.7, with Table 3.6 showing the results restricting the impacts to local markets, and 3.7 allowing supply
disruptions to have effects in pipeline-connected markets as well. Again, the point estimates are very small
and quite precisely estimated. In column (1), panel A of Table 3.6, the estimate suggests a 0.003 percent
7 To make this table easier to read, deaths here are in thousands.
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increase in retail gasoline price for every thousand battle-related fatalities in supplier countries. In panel B,
the corresponding two-stage estimate suggests that a supply disruption of 10 percent of total imports would
be associated with a 0.6 percent increase in the gasoline price. The statistical significance of this relationship
does not survive the inclusion of year fixed effects, which decreases both the point estimate and the standard
errors. The reduced-form relationship is similar when the conflict indicator is used, though the sign flips for
the two-stage estimate in panel B. Again, including year fixed effects in this specification both decreases the
point estimate and increases the precision of the estimate. The results for the specification using intensity
dummies (columns (5) and (6)) are similar to those for the specification in columns (1) and (2) with a small
positive effect of very high-intensity conflicts on prices that disappears when year fixed effects are added.
Altogether, the results indicate that, although conflicts do disrupt supplies, these direct supply disrup-
tions have very little effect on refiner profits or on the prices that consumers pay for gasoline. On average,
refiners seem to be very effective at replacing supply shortfalls with substitute inputs.
3.6 Conclusion
Political disruptions in oil-exporting countries affect the global downstream oil industry in many ways.
When conflicts damage oil production and export facilities, supply interruptions can cause the world oil
price to jump, raising product prices and putting pressure on refining margins. Even worries about potential
export disruptions can lead to volatility in global spot and futures prices. As long as it continues to import
oil, the U.S. downstream industry will feel the effects of this volatility in global oil markets.
Because U.S. refineries are so specialized, however, it is also possible that refiners who import oil from
unstable areas are more exposed to the effects of conflict-related supply disruptions. These supply disruptions
may increase input costs or even slow production for refineries that depend on these crude streams. To
examine these potential costs, this paper examines the direct impacts of conflict-related supply disruptions
on refiner profits and retail gasoline prices. There are three main results that emerge. First, conflict in
countries that supply oil to U.S. refiners has a significant effect on aggregate and refinery-level imports.
These supply disruptions, however, do not translate into large differential effects on profits or gasoline prices
for the companies and markets associated with these refineries. There is little evidence that these disruptions
affect refining profits at all, and the estimates of price increases are also quite small. This suggests that
refiners are able to quickly replace unexpected supply interruptions large increases in input costs.
This paper provides evidence that, on average, conflict-related supply interruptions do not impose signifi-
cant differential costs to refiners and markets that are directly affected by these import disruptions. However,
further work is needed to identify what types of supply shocks are likely to be the most costly. There is some
evidence in this paper that certain types of conflict may have larger impacts, and high-fatality conflicts seem
126
to have the largest effects on supplies as well as profits and prices. It is also possible that there are certain
characteristics of markets that will make them more vulnerable to supply disruptions. In particular, it may
be difficult to replace supplies when the lost crude is particularly important either because it is heavily used
or difficult to replace. As discussed in the paper, there are several refineries that got a substantial portion of
their crude from countries that experienced conflicts. There are also types of crude that may be particularly
hard to replace on short notice. These are likely to be high-quality crudes (e.g. light sweet Libyan crude), or
crudes that have an unusual mix of characteristics. In Figure 3-4, for example, there are many crude types
that are very similar to one another in terms of their API and sulfur content, reflected by their location in
a dense part of the plot. Others are outliers without close substitutes: there are several condensates (e.g.
Algerian condensate, Indian condensate) that are extremely light but have a moderate amount of sulfur.
These may be difficult to replace on short notice. Future work will use the observable characteristics of these
crude streams to identify refineries and markets that are particularly vulnerable to supply disruptions.
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Figures
Figure 3-1: Libya Crude Oil Production, million bbl per day: 1980-2013 (Source: EIA)
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Figure 3-2: U.S. Crude Oil Imports from Libya, thousand bbl per month, 3mma (Source: EIA)
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Figure 3-3: Sample Refinery Schematics (Source: Speight (2010)
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Figure 3-4: Crude API and Sulfur Content by Region of Origin
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Figure 3-5: Refinery Capacity and Imports from Countries that Experienced Conflict, 1991-2011
Millions of Barrels, 1991-2011
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Figure 3-6: Import Persistence
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Notes: Figure shows the plot of refinery by country level imports on imports from the previous year, both
in billions of barrels. The red dashed line marks the 45-degree line. The correlation between imports and
lagged imports is 0.95.
Figure 3-7: Product Pipelines, 2004
Notes: The pipelines in this map were used to construct the markets in panel B of Table 3.5.
Source: http://www.theodora. com/pipelines/united-states-pipelines.html#map
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Table 3.1: List of Conflicts in Supplier Countries, 1991-2011
Supplier orts Major Conflicts Years Deaths Intensity
Venezuela 9,371 Coup d'6tat 1992 145 Moderate
Mexico 9,368 Zapatista Insurgency, EPR Insurgency 1994, 1996 182 Low/Moderate
Nigeria 5,702 Niger Delta Conflict, Boko Haram Insurgency 1996, 2004, 2009, 2011 914 Low/Moderate/High
Iraq 2,656 Gulf War, PUK Conflict, Iraq War, Civil 1990-1996, 2003-2011 49,359 Moderate/High/VHighWar
Angola 2,597 Civil War; Cabinda Conflict 1975-1995, 1998-2002, 2004, 25,184 Low/Moderate/High/VHigh2007, 2009
Colombia 1,690 FARC Insurgency 1964-2011 15,741 Moderate/High/VHigh
Kuwait 1,582 Gulf War 1990-1991 21,790 VHigh
UK 1,551 Northern Ireland Conflict, Iraq War 1991, 1998, 2003 8,258 Low/VHigh
Ecuador 1,049 Cenepa War 1995 212 Moderate
Algeria 834 Civil War; AQIM Insurgency 1991-2011 18,098 Low/Moderate/High/VHigh
Russia / Soviet Union 561 Nagorno-Karabakh War, Chechen Wars 1991, 1993-1996, 1999-2011 19,956 Moderate/High/VHigh
Indonesia 316 East Timor Conflict, Aceh Insurgency 1990-1992, 1997-2005 2,304 Low/Moderate/High
Congo (Brazzaville) 312 Civil War 1993, 1997-1999, 2002 14,176 Low/Moderate/High/VHigh
Chad 189 Civil War 1991-1994, 1997-2002, 2005- 6,013 Low/Moderate/High/VHigh2010
Australia 162 Iraq War 2003 8,202 High
Libya 154 Civil War 2011 1,928 VHigh
Azerbaijan 145 Civil War, Nagorno-Karabakh War 1988-1994, 1995, 2005 4,767 Low/VHigh
Egypt 126 Al-Gama'a al-Islamiya Insurgency 1993-1998 616 Low/Moderate
Guatemala 96 Civil War 1988-1995 247 Low/Moderate
Peru 86 MRTA, Sendero Luminoso Insurgency 1989-1999, 2007-2010 3,916 Low/Moderate/High/VHigh
Yemen 70 Civil War, AQAP Insurgency 1994, 2009-2011 2,869 Moderate/VHigh
Cameroon 69 Bakassi Border Dispute 1996 56 Low
Papua New Guinea 25 Bougainville Independence Conflict 1992-1996 198 Low/Moderate
Ivory Coast 22 Civil War 2002-2004, 2011 844 Low/Moderate/High
Syria 17 Civil War 2011 842 High
Thailand 16 Pattani Insurgency 2003-2011 1,312 Low/Moderate
Iran 12 KDPI, MEK, Jundallah Insurgencies, Iran- 1991-1993, 1996-1997, 1999-PJAK Conflict 2001, 2005-2011 1,212 Low/Moderate
Guinea 4 RFDG Insurgency 2000-2001 649 Moderate/High
Mauritania 3 AQIM Insurgency 2010-2011 63 Low
Georgia 1 Insurgency, Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict, 1991-1993, 2004, 2008 3,272 Low/High/VHighGeorgian-Ossetian Conflict
Spain 0.7 Basque Conflict 1991-1992 68 Low
Philippines 0.3 MNLF, MILF, CPP, ASG Insurgency 1991-2011 11,091 Moderate/High/VHigh
Note: This table lists all U.S. oil supplier countries that experienced at least 25 battle-related deaths in a conflict located within their territory during the 1991-
2011 period. The last column indicates all intensity categories associated with the listed country-years.
Table 3.2: Refinery owner characteristics and receipts, 1991-2011
Share of
Refining Total inputs from Refining
Capacity No. Imports listed Profits
Owner (bil bbl) Refs (bil bbl) countries (bil USD)
Lvondell 2.05 1 1.68 79.28 1.31
Citgo / PDV America 4.99 5 4.03 63.75 3.36
Petrobras 0.25 1 0.18 62.25 -0.20
Premcor 1.96 6 1.35 54.85 1.93
Fina 0.78 3 0.42 49.60 0.05
Sunoco 5.91 6 4.05 48.91 3.73
Crown Central Petrol 0.51 1 0.29 42.85 -0.04
Murphy 1.07 2 0.66 41.63 1.11
Valero 7.46 19 4.40 40.64 30.75
UnoCal 0.67 3 0.30 39.60 0.57
Royal Dutch Shell 6.90 15 3.05 37.39 73.51
ExxonMobil 14.46 10 8.76 36.12 73.85
Total 1.29 4 0.51 33.01 35.61
Amerada Hess 3.92 2 1.67 32.37 0.99
ConocoPhillips 11.52 17 5.69 31.66 1.16
Alon USA 0.84 5 0.27 28.52 0.71
Chevron / Texaco 15.17 18 9.01 24.28 48.76
UDS 1.27 4 0.33 22.91 3.30
Marathon 7.38 7 3.53 20.39 18.69
Tosco 2.53 10 1.10 18.17 3.21
BP / Amoco 13.43 15 5.00 17.39 68.58
Tesoro 2.73 7 0.83 12.53 6.83
Farmland Industries 0.78 2 0.12 11.08 0.07
Pennzoil - Quaker State 0.28 4 0.00 1.69 0.83
Frontier 0.82 2 0.16 1.67 2.06
Giant Industries 0.31 3 0.10 0.60 0.73
Western Refining 0.50 4 0.06 0.26 1.96
United Refining 0.48 1 0.47 0.07 0.39
Holly 0.75 4 0.04 0 3.53
Mapco 0.56 2 0 0 0.64
Calumet 0.30 3 0 0 0.55
Suncor 0.28 2 0.06 0 9.01
Huntway Refining 0.06 2 0 0 0.06
Greka Energy 0.04 1 0 0 0.02
AIPC 0.03 1 0 0 -0.06
Notes: This table provides sample statistics on the refinery-owners that are publicly-listed. Columns 1, 3,
and 4 are calculated using refinery-level observations on monthly imports and refinery capacity reports
from the EIA. Column 4 reports the imports from countries that experienced conflict during the period as
a share of total refining capacity. Column 2 indicates the number of unique refineries that were owned by
the company during the period. Total refining profits is the sum of the annual operating profits variable
for all refining operations from the Compustat Business Segments data. All dollar values are billions of
real 2000 USD.
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Table 3.3: Conflict and Overall Import Quantity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Battle-Related Deaths -2.63*** -2.16***
(0.65) (0.61)
D(Conflict) 
-8,094 -4,347
(4,970) (4,337)
D(LowFatality) 
-4,305 609
(2,881) (2,879)
D(MedFatality) -6,327 -2,930
(6,584) (5,858)
D(HighFatality) 
-12,196 -10,203
(10,274) (9,519)
D(VHighFatality) -6,689 -4,244
(6,486) (5,735)
Year FE x x x
Countries 66 66 66 66 66 66
N 1386 1386 1386 1386 1386 1386
Notes: This table shows the results from the regression of annual country-level imports on conflict measures for
the 1991-2011 period. Imports are aggregated from refinery-level receipts reported in the EIA-814 Month
Imports Report, and battle deaths come from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. Import quantities are
in thousands of barrels per year, and battle deaths are the number of fatalities per year above 25. Fatality
dummies cutoffs are set at the quartiles of battle-related deaths in country-year pairs. All regressions include
country fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the country level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<O.1
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Table 3.4: Conflict and Refinery-Level Imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BRD - D(Importer) -0.047*** -0.047***
(0.010) (0.010)
D(Conflict) - D(Importer) -263.90*** -266.24***
(85.13) (85.25)
D(LowIntensity)- D(Importer) -272.02*** -275.75***
(85.67) (85.20)
D(MedIntensity)- D(Importer) -239.18** -233.80**
(110.85) (110.13)
D(HighIntensity)- D(Importer) -355.96*** -354.33***
(119.57) (119.24)
D(VHighIntensity)- D(Importer) -222.07* -228.23*
(124.72) (124.95)
Year FE x x x
Countries 66 66 66 66 66 66
N 215,028 215,028 215,028 215,028 215,028 215,028
Notes: This table shows the results from the regression of annual country by refinery-level imports on conflict
measures for the 1991-2011 period. Imports are reported in the EIA-814 Month ]Inports Report, and battle deaths
come from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. Import quantities are in thousands of barrels per year, and
battle deaths are the number of fatalities per year above 25. Fatality dummies cutoffs are set at the quartiles of
battle-related deaths in country-year pairs. All regressions include country by refinery fixed effects, and standard
errors are clustered at the country by refinery level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0. 05 , * p<O.1
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Table 3.5: Impact of Conflict on Log Refining Profits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Reduced Form (Log Profits on Conflict)
BRD - D(Importer) -0.0003 0.001
(0.004) (0.004)
D(Conflict) - D(Importer) 0.021 0.020
(0.021) (0.019)
D(LowIntensity)- D(Importer) 0.042 0.045*
(0.027) (0.025)
D(MedIntensity)- D(Importer) 0.058* 0.051*
(0.032) (0.030)
D(HighIntensity)- D(Importer) 
-0.022 -0.020
(0.030) (0.029)
D(VHighIntensity)- D(Importer) 0.002 0.008
(0.028) (0.027)
Panel B: 2SLS Estimates (Log Profits on Log Imports)
BRD -0.004 0.016
(0.046) (0.045)
Conflict Dummy 0.032 0.030*
(0.020) (0.017)
Intensity Dummies 
-0.004 -0.005
(0.015) (0.013)
Year FE x x x
Companies 43 43 43 43 43 43
N 30,492 30,492 30,492 30,492 30,492 30,492
Notes: This table shows the results from the regression of annual retining operating profits on contlict measures
for the 1991-2011 period. Imports are reported in the EIA-814 Month Imports Report, and battle deaths come
from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. Import quantities are in thousands of barrels per year, and
battle deaths are in thousands of fatalities per year above 25. Fatality dummies cutoffs are set at the quartiles
of battle-related deaths in country-year pairs. All regressions include country by refinery fixed effects, and
standard errors are clustered at the country by refinery level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<O.l
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Table 3.6: Impact of Conflict on Log Retail Gasoline Price (Local Markets)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Reduced Form (Log Price on Conflict)
BRD - D(Importer) 0.003*** 0.0001
(0.001) (0.0002)
D(Conflict) - D(Importer) 0.006** -0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
D(LowIntensity)- D(Importer) -0.001 -0.001
(0.005) (0.001)
D(MedIntensity)- D(Importer) 0.005 -0.001
(0.004) (0.001)
D(HighIntensity)- D(Importer) 0.002 -0.001
(0.003) (0.001)
D(VHighlntensity)- D(Importer) 0.012*** 0.000
(0.003) (0.001)
Panel B: 2SLS Estimates (Log Price on Log Imports)
BRD 0.061** 0.002
(0.024) (0.004)
Conflict Dummy -0.060* 0.009
(0.035) (0.008)
Intensity Dummies 0.006 0.002
(0.007) (0.002)
Marker Price Controls x x x
State by Year FE x x x
Cities 75 75 75 75 75 75
N 68,376 68,376 68,376 68,376 68,376 68,376
Notes: This table shows the results from the regression of annual average retail gasoline price on conflict measures
for the 1998-2011 period. Imports are reported in the EIA-814 Month Imports Report, and battle deaths come from
the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. Import quantities are in thousands of barrels per year, and battle deaths
are in thousands of fatalities per year above 25. Fatality dummies cutoffs are set at the quartiles of battle-related
deaths in country-year pairs. All regressions include country by refinery fixed effects, and standard errors are
clustered at the country by market level. Odd numbered columns contain controls for WTI and Brent prices. Even
numbered columns contain state by year fixed effects. Refineries are linked to cities within an hour travel by truck.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.7: Impact of Conflict on Log Retail Gasoline Price (Pipeline-Connected Markets)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Reduced Form (Log Price on Conflict)
BRD - D(Importer) 0.003*** -0.000
(0.001) (0.0002)
D(Conflict) - D(Importer) 0.005** -0.000
(0.002) (0.001)
D(LowIntensity)- D(Importer) -0.005 0.000
(0.004) (0.001)
D(MedIntensity)- D(Importer) 0.006* -0.001
(0.004) (0.001)
D(HighIntensity). D(Importer) 0.002 -0.001
(0.003) (0.001)
D(VHighIntensity)- D(Importer) 0.010*** -0.001
(0.003) (0.001)
Panel B: 2SLS Estimates (Log Price on Log Imports)
BRD 0.034*** -0.000
(0.011) (0.002)
Conflict Dummy -0.065 0.006
(0.046) (0.008)
Intensity Dummies 0.009 0.001
(0.005) (0.001)
Marker Price Controls x x x
State by Year FE x x x
Cities 75 75 75 75 75 75
N 68,376 68,376 68,376 68,376 68,376 68,376
iNotes: Ihis table shows the results from the regression ot annual average retail gasoline price on conflict measures
for the 1998-2011 period. Imports are reported in the EIA-814 Month Imports Report, and battle deaths come
from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. Import quantities are in thousands of barrels per year, and
battle deaths are in thousands of fatalities per year above 25. Fatality dummies cutoffs are set at the quartiles of
battle-related deaths in country-year pairs. All regressions include country by refinery fixed effects and standard
errors are clustered at the country by market level. Odd numbered columns contain controls for WTI and Brent
prices. Even numbered columns contain state by year fixed effects. Refineries are linked to cities within an hour
travel by truck and cities down-pipe.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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